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Despite ever-increasing political support to U.S. Army Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF) in the 21st century, enduring obstacles continue to limit the execution of support 
to resistance movements as a viable strategic policy option for the United States. When 
both diplomatic and conventional military options prove too costly and/or reach an 
impasse, the National Command Authority is left with two options: do nothing or force a 
change by supporting elements of the indigenous opposition.  
Recent history provides several examples of presidential decisions to leverage U.S. 
military support to resistance movements (STR) to, as outlined in Joint Publication 3-05, 
Special Operations (2014), “coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying 
power” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and most recently, Syria. Yet the efficacy of this core 
activity remains constrained by legal, political, and organizational challenges. This thesis 
explores both the causes and depths of these obstacles to the employment of ARSOF 
elements in support to indigenous resistance activities and identifies feasible means to 
overcome these hurdles. Ultimately, recognition and alleviation of these obstacles will 
optimize ARSOF’s activities and arm national policymakers with the ways and means to 
achieve long-lasting policy ends. 
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Despite ever-increasing political support to U.S. Special Operations in the 21st 
century, enduring legal, political, and organizational obstacles continue to limit the 
execution of support to resistance movements (STR) as a viable strategic policy option for 
the United States. Recent history provides several examples of presidential decisions to 
leverage U.S. STR operations “to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying 
power” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and most recently, Syria.1 This thesis explores both 
the causes and depths of the legal, political, and organizational obstacles to the employment 
of ARSOF elements in support to indigenous resistance activities and identify feasible 
means to overcome these hurdles. 
A. PREMISES SUPPORTING THIS RESEARCH 
(1) STR activities up to and including unconventional warfare (UW) are a viable 
policy option of U.S. intervention under certain conditions. STR, UW, and similar 
interagency activities, such as covert action, provide a critical “third option” to the 
President, when diplomacy is inadequate and the cost of conventional military intervention 
is unacceptable. While this research cannot refute that UW and covert action sometimes 
fail and that “long-term success” remains a challenge, it has shown that these policy options 
are successful in nearly half of the cases studied. It is not the basic theories of UW and 
covert action that are inadequate, but our (the U.S. government’s) misunderstanding and 
misapplication of the concepts and fundamentals that contributes to failure.  
(2) The United States’ potential adversaries (e.g., China, Russia, and Iran) are 
outperforming the in the realm of hybrid warfare and, more precisely, STR in the modern 
operating environment. The increasing trend of hybrid threats in contemporary conflicts 
indicate an evolving policy space for STR operations. Despite a comparable approach to 
hostilities short of declared war, the United States has not achieved the same success in 
recent foreign intervention as its adversaries. 
                                                 
1 Definition of Unconventional Warfare as outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations, 
(Washington, DC: Office of the CJCS, 16 July 2015), xi. 
 xvi 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE OBSTACLES 
Legal: First, successful STR is planned and resourced in an anticipatory manner 
that recognizes the time it takes to prepare and execute Special Warfare missions. This is 
in contrast to what appears to be the current model of reactionary policy provision, 
Congressional resourcing, and strategic military planning. As a result of this reactionary 
model, STR efforts begin at an inherent disadvantage. current statutory authorities make it 
easier to pursue CT activities because they provide a path of least resistance for rapid DOD 
involvement. Second, UW (and SOF Sensitive Activities) are not clearly defined in USC.2 
Third, although this research has identified some gaps in authorities, the problem is more 
often a lack of approvals than a lack of authorities. 
Political: First, the history of civil-military disconnection between the interagency 
community and DOD demonstrates that efforts to improve this detachment, such as the 
global SOF network, can be nullified by both an imbalanced promotion of one SOF 
capability over another and the perceived militarization of foreign policy. Second, the 
dynamic NSC process, which can change with each presidential election cycle, creates a 
volatile environment for military planners of irregular and high-risk special operations. 
Third, increasing patterns of risk aversion and geopolitical sensitivities driven by 
globalization will likely exacerbate these political obstacles in future conflicts.  
Organizational: In terms of organizational design, this research considered the 
organizational structure and characteristics of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
because it was specifically designed for intelligence collection. We then compared OSS to 
its antecedents in these fields, the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM). The analysis found that the OSS was purpose-built for its 
function and environment, eventually assuming a hybrid structure of a divisional adhocracy 
and employing decentralized decision making. The OSS had direct access to the President, 
exercised control over the strategic direction of it operations, contained all of the necessary 
functions for its assigned mission, and hand selected all of its personnel. When compared 
                                                 
2 Jennifer A.Obernier and Frank N. Sanders. “Enabling Unconventional Warfare to Address Grey 
Zone Conflict.” Small Wars Journal. September 28, 2016. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/enabling-
unconventional-warfare-to-address-grey-zone-conflicts. 
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to the OSS, USSOCOM exhibited many of the same characteristics, however there were 
important differences. The most significant discrepancies in relation to STR are that 
USSOCOM lacks direct access to inform and educate high-level decision makers; its 
organizational structures, priorities, and resources tend toward counterterrorism; the 
TSOCs are under-resourced and lack the special warfare-specific operational-level 
planning capabilities to carry out their critical function; and USSOCOM faces challenges 
in the selection and management of its non-SOF personnel. Finally, in terms of the CIA-
SOF relationship, the two organizations enjoy the best relationship since the days of the 
OSS, although the inter-organizational linkages tend toward counterterrorism and lethal 
operations. Both organizations offer complementary capabilities in STR and Special 
Warfare that should be recognized, developed, and integrated to provide policymakers with 
more effective STR options. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis shows that the legal, political, and organizational obstacles to ARSOF’s 
employment of STR operations vary in their origin, scope, and impact. Moreover, as seen 
in the Syrian case study, the various facets of each category may not apply to all U.S. 
interventions. Certain aspects of these obstacles (e.g., authorizations, funding, and 
organizational culture) can be addressed through the recommendations below; however, 
confronting these issues occur at the appropriate organizational level and must enjoy full 
support, and emanate downward, from the requisite echelon in the military chain of 
command. Some obstacles may require USSOCOM and USASOC to inform, educate, and 
build consensus to garner external support from Congress and the interagency community. 
On the other hand, some obstacles, such as international law and geopolitics, are outside 
of the United States’ control and will pose enduring challenges to all potential STR 
operations. In these instances, studying and accounting for these variables, and 
implementing necessary changes will posture USASOC to provide policymakers with 
effective and appropriate STR policy options. 
An imbalance toward counterterrorism operations was the most significant 
challenge identified by this research, however, ARSOF’s most recent strategic vision 
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outlined in “USASOC 2035” does not address this point. Acknowledging the persistent 
issue of strategic imbalance, the “SOCOM 2020 Strategy” states that “USSOCOM must 
not only continue to pursue terrorists wherever we may find them, we must rebalance the 
force and tenaciously embrace indirect operations in the Human Domain.”3 However, 
multiple areas throughout this analysis have revealed that the current U.S. policy, 
authorities, resources, and organizational structures disproportionately focus on CT 
operations, sustaining a strategic imbalance towards a short-term, direct approach, as 
opposed to the complementary application of the direct and indirect approach (i.e., Surgical 
Strike and Special Warfare). While the terrorist threat to the U.S. and its interests abroad 
is certainly valid, this myopic focus on terrorism has left the door open for actors like 
Russia, Iran, and China to assert themselves through both conventional and unconventional 
means.  
A more effective national security strategy for future hybrid conflicts requires an 
improved balance between, and complementary employment of, the direct and indirect 
approaches. Additionally, any future security strategy must address the unconventional 
threats that state and non-state actors pose in present and future conflicts. Currently, 
USSOCOM remains focused on its designated role as DOD’s synchronizer of global CT, 
but exercises limited operational control over the long-term direction of SOF’s Special 
Warfare activities.4 Instead, responsibility for operational control of these indirect 
activities remains with the TSOCs and GCCs, impeding the efficiency and synchronization 
of USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities. To improve this status quo, this research offers five 
recommendations. The recommendations below emphasize two uniform criteria: 
                                                 
3 United States Special Operations Command, “SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear,” (Tampa, 
FL: USSOCOM, May 2013). 
4 Edward J. Drea, “History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–2012,” (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 92, 107, 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Command_Plan.pdf. 
The most recent Unified Command Plan, dated April 6, 2011 identifies USSOCOM as the “lead 
combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against 
terrorist networks,” as well as the “Joint Proponent for Military Information Support Operations” (formerly 
referred to as psychological operations) and Security Force Assistance. These responsibilities are in 
addition to the USSOCOM’s service component-like responsibilities (i.e., organize, train, and equip SOF). 
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• No new organizations: All recommendations from this research highlight 
the need for review and, possibly, redirection of current resource utilization. 
• Top-down driven and Bottom-up refinement: From the creation of 
USSOCOM by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to 
the restructuring of U.S. Army Special Forces by “ARSOF 2022,” top-down 
driven change a prerequisite from any change affecting special operations. 
As result, ASD SO/LIC and Commander of USSOCOM will be primarily 
responsible for enacting these recommendations through their advocacy at 
the DOD and Joint Staff levels.5 From the bottom-up, all levels of command 
should actively seek and address the issues that emerge through 
recommendations. Only through this active response will the command 
overcome the perpetual challenge of implementation. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Advocate for the incorporation of Irregular Warfare within the National 
Security Strategy 
Recent legislation presents USSOCOM and USASOC with an opportunity to offer 
injects to the NSS that would demonstrate how special operations–and potentially STR–
can support a larger political warfare strategy.6 Due to the classification of this research, 
the proposed injects are generalized, but SOF’s role should directly support the broader 
political warfare strategy. By incorporating both the direct and indirect approaches of U.S. 
capabilities, this policy document will enhance the feasibility of STR development from 
                                                 
5 10 U.S.C § 138 (2016) designates the ASD SO/LIC as the “principal civilian adviser to the Secretary 
of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters.” 10 U.S.C § 167 (2016) designates the 
Commander of USSOCOM as responsible for “preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense 
program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned 
to the special operations command.” 
6 George Kennan originally defined political warfare as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s 
command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They 
range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to such 
covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and 
even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.” This definition can be found in Policy 
Planning Memorandum, “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” dated 30 April 1948. 
Additionally, USASOC describes SOF’s role in political warfare in its “White Paper: SOF Support to 
Political Warfare,” (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, March 10, 2015). 
 xx 
the top-down. From this adjustment to national strategic guidance, USSOCOM and its 
subordinate unified commands can initiate reviews of resource reallocation and operational 
requirements to ensure the optimal utilization of SOF towards national objectives. 
(2) Establish an Irregular Warfare Working Group on within the NSC 
The NSC should reorganize a portion of its Counterterrorism Security Group to 
focus on irregular warfare to analyze hybrid threats to U.S. national interests abroad and, 
when appropriate, develop, resource, and execute indirect warfare policy in response to 
these threats.7 By doing so, the NSC would fulfill the obligation established in the Nunn-
Cohen Amendment to the 1987 DOD Authorization Act mandating the formation of a 
Board for Low Intensity Conflict,” with its primary function being “to coordinate the 
policies of the United States for low intensity conflict.”8 Furthermore, to improve the 
collective understanding of this working group through what the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA) has termed the “preparation of the policy environment,” this research team endorses 
the CNA’s recommendation of including at least one SOF General or flag officer. 
(3) Continue the Momentum for Standing Congressional Authorization and 
Funding Supporting Irregular Warfare 
The FY 16 NDAA requirement for DOD to develop a strategy to “counter 
unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors,” as well as 
the recent passage of the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” 
demonstrate a positive change for improving obstacles to STR.9 Additionally, through the 
proposed allocation of $10 million annually through fiscal year 2021 to support such 
                                                 
7 Historical research on the concept of developing a policy coordination committee focused on 
Unconventional Warfare along with the establishment of a broader Joint Interagency Task Force-
Unconventional Warfare (JIATF-UW) to “leverage the capabilities of the nation’s military manpower and 
resources to wage successful unconventional warfare” can be found in John W. Silkman, “Unconventional 
Warfare and Operational Art: Can We Achieve Continuity in Command and Control?” (master’s thesis, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004), http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWEG/AY_2004-
/Silkman,%20J%202004.pdf. 
8 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,” Pub. L. 99–661 §1311 Stat. 3986 
(1986). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg3816.pdf. 
9 FY ‘16 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 114–92, Sect. 1097 “Department of Defense 
Strategy for Countering Unconventional Warfare” (November 25, 2015). 
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indirect capabilities, Congress has acknowledged the need to redress the strategy imbalance 
through comparable legal and monetary support.10 Nonetheless, there is still much more 
required of Congress vis-à-vis legal parity between the nation’s complementary direct and 
indirect capabilities, such as comparable funding, authorizations, and oversight for a wider 
range of DOD’s Special Warfare activities. Additionally, there should be a congressional 
review of DOD’s FY 18 utilization of funds earmarked for irregular warfare within six 
months of the bill being signed into law by the President, as well as updates on the 
implementation and effect of these funds in the USSOCOM Commander’s annual posture 
statements. 
(4) Acknowledge the Convergence of DOD and the CIA as a Modern 
Necessity and Reform Legislation and Organizational Practices 
Accordingly 
When applicable, updates to Title 10 and 50 should transition ad hoc agreements 
and de facto operating practices into statutory law and reassess the division of labor among 
the two entities, recognizing that the operational environment is constantly evolving. 
Second, the CIA and SOF should increase collaboration and organizational linkages in the 
special warfare realm before crises occur to improve interoperability, operational 
understanding, education, and overall effectiveness. Some specific suggestions are: 
establish an irregular warfare JIATF, directorate, or center; incorporate SOF into the 
planning process earlier and streamline the detailing process; and promote cross-
pollination between SOF and Directorate of Operations officers within educational 
institutions and increasing special warfare-focused liaison positions within the 
organizations themselves. Finally, SOF and the CIA must revisit their division of labor for 
covert action and special operations activities to identify overlap and redundancy, as well 
as those complementary capabilities for future development. 
                                                 
10 H.R. 2810 §1201, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr2810/BILLS-
115hr2810pap.pdf. 
 xxii 
(5) Reform SOF Education for Special Warfare and Non-SOF Personnel 
SOF’s lack of formal education on the legal, political, and organizational challenges 
of special operations was an endemic issue throughout this research. While remaining 
cognizant of its interoperability requirements with conventional forces, the SOCoE should 
take ownership of the curriculum for SOF personnel attending service-provided 
professional military education (PME) institutions. The new curriculum should be SOF-
focused, as opposed to the current construct that incorporates SOF-specific instruction as 
an adjunct to its main focus–conventional force operations. To address the challenges of 
Operational Art in Special Warfare, students at the intermediate PME level should conduct 
campaign design and planning for a special warfare operations, to increase an 
understanding of the challenges specific to special warfare, vice conventional warfare.11 
Finally, the SOCoE should develop a SOF indoctrination course for its non-SOF personnel, 
as well as courses for niche specialties, such as logisticians, lawyers, contracting officers, 
and communications specialists. 
  
                                                 
11 Incorporating more robust Special Warfare planning into intermediate level education (ILE) means 
that all SOF field grade officers will receive this knowledge, versus the current status quo where only a 
portion of SOF field grades receive this education as an elective. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In his books Savage Wars of Peace and Invisible Armies, Max Boot chronicled the 
United States’ involvement in numerous “small wars”— those military actions in the 
ambiguous space between war and peace. Similar to the past, the United States currently 
faces challenges from both state and non-state actors in Ukraine, Crimea, Syria, Yemen, 
Libya and the South China Sea, to name a few. These types of quasi-conflicts are unlikely 
to go away anytime soon, and U.S. presidents will continue look to subordinate agencies 
for viable, timely, cost effective, limited risk and low-exposure options to pursue U.S. 
government interests. With this in mind, this thesis will explore both the causes and depths 
of these obstacles to the employment of ARSOF elements in support to indigenous 
resistance activities and identify feasible means to overcome these hurdles. 
In 2001, as the Twin Towers fell, President Bush looked to his cabinet for solutions. 
Although he was presented with myriad of options from “the Washington Playbook,” it 
was ultimately the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and SOCOM’s plan to hunt down 
Al Qaeda and foment a popular resistance movement to oust the Taliban that won. In less 
than three months, multiple Special Forces Teams, a handful of CIA and JSOC personnel, 
thousands of Northern Alliance Fighters, an earth-shaking amount of airpower and several 
million dollars in cash toppled the Taliban regime while driving Al Qaeda from 
Afghanistan.  
Although supporting indigenous resistance organizations is not always the answer, 
there are certainly instances where leveraging a resistance organization “to coerce, disrupt 
or overthrow a government or occupying power” is a superior choice to diplomatic or 
conventional military options.1  In these situations, U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC) stands ready as SOCOM’s lead component for this particular type 
of mission, or unconventional warfare (UW) as it is formally defined in military doctrine. 
As the military’s lead component in this field, USASOC has heavily emphasized the 
                                                 
1 Definition of Unconventional Warfare as outlined in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-
05, Special Operations, (Washington, DC: Office of the CJCS, July 16, 2015), xi.  
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importance of UW. Examples of this renewed emphasis include: updates to doctrine, 
transformation of entire Special Forces battalions, yearly execution of UW exercises and 
the creation of new training courses focused solely on UW. Despite overwhelming success 
in 2001 and a renewed emphasis on doctrine, training and capabilities, ARSOF has seen 
limited employment in the unconventional warfare realm in recent years.  
Given that direct support to resistance forces (as outlined in Joint Publication 3–0, 
Joint Operations) is a valid solution to achieve specific U.S. government interests, what 
are the significant obstacles to the employment of ARSOF elements in support to 
indigenous resistance activities?2 Furthermore, are there viable means for the force to 
overcome these challenges? 
 
                                                 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, Joint Planning, (Washington, DC: Office of the 
CJCS, January 17, 2017), VI-11. 
 3 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. VIABILITY OF STR AS A STRATEGY 
Since the turn of the century, the U.S. government has provided support to 
resistance movements STR in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, with varying degrees of 
success. While supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was considered a success, 
the creation of a failed state in Libya and an ongoing civil war in Syria with no end in sight 
are cause for introspection and ultimately beg the question: is supporting resistance 
movements still a viable strategy to achieve U.S. interests? Some argue “no,” that forced 
regime change via indigenous surrogates, or “offensive UW” is a losing strategy.3 Others 
argue that in terms of cost, political appetite, risk, visibility or suitability, STR may be the 
best alternative to a conventional military strategy.4 Still others argue that, like any military 
tactic, STR is useful in particular circumstances, when the requirements, risks, rewards and 
costs are well understood.5 
 
                                                 
3 Timothy Ball, “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of Unconventional 
Warfare,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).; John Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert 
Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000), [Ch. 18, ““A Circle in a 
Spiral: What Covert Action Accomplished,” 315–328].; Richard A. Best, Covert Action: An Effective 
Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy?, CRS report no 96–844F, (Washington, DC: CRS, October 21, 1996), 
digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc807565/; The following texts offer arguments against covert 
action from unnamed critics, but ultimately advocate for covert action: Mark Lowenthal Intelligence: From 
Secrets to Policy, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2017) 72–73.; William J. Daugherty. Executive Secrets: 
Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 54–57. 
4 Christopher Rawley, Unconventional Warfare 2.0: A Better Path to Regime Change in the Twenty 
First Century, (Periplus Media, 2014).; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05.1 Unconventional Warfare, 
(Washington, DC: Office of the CJCS, December 15, 2015), I-3. 
5 David S. Maxwell, “Why the New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and Unconventional Warfare,” 
War on the Rocks, August 28, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-new-syrian-army-failed-
washingtonand-unconventional-warfare/; Ryan C. Agee and Maurice K. DuClos, “Why UW: Factoring in 
the Decision Point for Unconventional Warfare,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012).; 
Lowththal, Intelligence, 249–255; David S. Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional 
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal. October 23, 2014. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/do-we-really-
understand-unconventional-warfare. 
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B. MODERN CONFLICT PARADIGM 
While the debate for and against the viability of UW continues, there is also a clear 
need to assess current STR paradigm. Army Special Forces doctrine and training focuses 
on a 7-phase model for a U.S.-sponsored insurgency, which predominantly emphasizes 
guerrilla warfare and the military aspects of STR. Yet, other countries are combining 
military aspects with other, less overt, types of warfare, such as political, cultural or 
economic warfare. Russia’s use of political warfare, little green men and “Gray Zone” 
activities in Georgia, Crimea, and the Ukraine suggests that the United States’ adversaries 
no longer subscribe to this paradigm.6  Iran’s Quds Force activities are another example 
adversaries using cultural warfare, political warfare, and bitter pill deterrence strategies to 
achieve their interests.7 Finally, China’s concept of unrestricted warfare presents a third 
adversary that is exploring new approaches, such as ecological or economic warfare to 
achieve interests and subvert the United States’ status as global hegemon.8 
Nonetheless, these forms of irregular warfare are not foreign concepts to the United 
States, and in fact these countries appear to have stolen pages out of America’s playbook.9 
However, it is unclear if the U.S. government is using a systematic and coordinated whole-
of-government approach as these emerging (or re-emerging) paradigms suggest. U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), under the direction of LTG Charles 
Cleveland has developed the “Project Gray” forum to spur conversation regarding Gray 
Zone activities (referring to the ambiguous condition on the conflict continuum between 
                                                 
6 Maxwell (2015); United States Special Operations Command, “‘Little Green Men’: A Primer on 
Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine, 2013- 2014,” Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent 
Strategies, (Fort Bragg: USASOC, 2015); Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review, 
January-February (2016), 30–38. 
7 Scott Modell and David Asher, “Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network,” (Washington, DC: 
Center for New American Security, September 2013), 5–12. 
8 James Callard and Peter Faber, “An Emerging Synthesis For a New Way of War: Combination 
Warfare and Future Innovation,” Conflict & Security, Winter-Spring (2002), 61–68;  Qiau Liang and Wang 
Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999). 
9 Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right.” 
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steady-state and conventional warfare) suggests that USASOC is assessing their current 
understanding, role, and capabilities within in the “new generation warfare” context.10 
It is with these caveats in mind that U.S. military and government leadership must 
ask: when UW is an appropriate response to threats, what are the significant obstacles to 
the employment of ARSOF elements in support to indigenous resistance activities? To 
focus this analysis, this discussion of obstacles will be divided into three categories: legal, 
political, and organizational. 
C. POLITICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES TO STR 
Political and legal obstacles are arguably the most significant challenges to the 
application of any military strategy in today’s operational environment. Formulating the 
appropriate response requires near-expert understanding of U.S. legal codes and the fine 
line separating the Departments of State and Defense’s activities from the CIA. It is only 
through this expertise that senior advisors and policy makers alike can appreciate the 
mutually supporting roles of the various U.S. government’s instruments of power.11 
Despite this cooperative intent within the legal code, opponents to the military’s execution 
of STR operations may argue that the “institutional culture and affiliation” of military and 
interagency leadership limit the military’s execution of covert actions.12 Furthermore, 
critics highlight that the Presidential Finding authorizing the military’s execution of covert 
actions is outside of the bounds of traditional employment of forces.13 Further exacerbating 
this problem is the reality that a military response to any problem has drastic national 
                                                 
10 Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional 
Warfare in the Gray Zone.” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 80 (1st Quarter 2016). 
11 Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, 
Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard Law School National Security Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 
(2011). 
Dan Madden, Dick Hoffman, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John E. Peters, 
Linda Robinson, Abby Doll, Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research _reports/RR779.html. 
12 Richard H. Schulz JR, “Showstoppers,” The Standard Weekly, 26 January 2004, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/showstoppers/article/4846#!. 
13 Joel T. Meyer, “Supervising the Pentagon: Covert Action and Traditional Military Activities in the 
War on Terror,” Administrative Law Review, vol. 59, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 463–478. 
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security policy implications for the United States. While there is a small contingent who 
argue for almost complete retrenchment from military action, others argue in favor of 
acting early in resistance movements with the proper forces to assuage the “unintended 
precedents that drive in the opposite direction of [previously] declared policy and closely 
held values.”14 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES TO STR 
As an organization, Special Operations has gone through many growing pains since 
Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to Goldwater-Nichols which established 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). Three decades 
later, these entities are still evolving to meet the vision laid out by Senators Nunn and 
Cohen in order to remain at the “tip of the spear.” USSOCOM leaders spent the 1990s 
building the organization, securing resources and “selling” SOF’s capabilities; however, 
this focus on service-like responsibilities detracted from SOCOM’s warfighting focus and 
the ASD SO/LIC’s responsibility to shape policy and strategy to leverage SOF 
operations.15 
At the operational level, several shortcomings are apparent. First, SOF’s 
counterterrorism role, also referred to as Surgical Strike, is overemphasized, often to the 
detriment of other Special Warfare missions which are predominantly executed by 
USASOC. This issue dovetails into the next, which is the lack of advocacy for the Special 
Warfare mission set at Geographical Combatant Command (GCCs) and within the National 
Capital Region (NCR). Although Sean Naylor’s Relentless Strike highlights Joint Special 
Operations Command’s masterful leveraging of their liaison to facilitate counterterrorism 
(CT) missions, this consideration is almost completely untouched with regard to Special 
                                                 
14 Linda Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations Forces,” The Council on Foreign Relations, 
Council Special Report no. 66 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013). 
15 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1997).; Robinson (2013). 
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Warfare.16 Finally, SOF’s operational-level headquarters are deficient in Operational Art, 
Special Warfare Campaign Planning, and the planning and execution of long-term Theater 
Security Cooperation strategies.17 
E. TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGES TO STR 
There has been much debate in recent years concerning the necessary overhaul of 
the 1st Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) elements in order to properly execute its 
designated mission set. While further refining the areas of special warfare and surgical 
strike, the “blueprint for change” outlined through the Commander’s vision in ARSOF 
leaves several areas requiring further examination. For example, a thorough review of 
mission requirements under special warfare with current capabilities and training to 
identify potential deficiencies. Though much has been written on the creation of elite units 
focused on surgical strike capabilities, there is far less academic analysis outside of joint 
publications on requisite training and education for the military to feasibly execute 
clandestine operations under special warfare.18 Previous research in this area has identified 
the noticeable absence of joint and interagency incorporation into UW training which fails 
to prepare units of action for the contemporary operational environment.19 
  
                                                 
16 Sean D. Naylor, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015). 
17 Robinson, “The Future of Special Operations Forces”; Madden et al., Toward Operational Art. 
18 Marquis (1997); Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force, (New York: Dell, 1983). 
19 David. Fox, A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for Special Forces 
in the 21st Century, U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, 18 March 2005; Madden et al., Toward 
Operational Art. 
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III. APPROACH/METHODOLOGY 
This thesis researches the real and perceived obstacles to the employment of 
ARSOF elements in support to indigenous resistance activities. After analyzing and 
identifying these impediments, this research also seeks to determine viable means for the 
force to overcome these challenges. Over the course of five analytical chapters, this thesis 
utilizes the historical case study of Operation Inherent Resolve, as well as personal 
interviews with subject matter experts from various military organizations and U.S. 
government agencies to inform its research. The first two chapters build a common 
framework of understanding regarding support to resistance and unconventional warfare 
operations, which serves as a foundation for the subsequent discussion. From this baseline, 
the focus of research transitions to analyzing input from selected contemporary case studies 
and personal interviews to portray obstacles across the categories of: legal, political, and 
organizational. Finally, this research concludes with four recommendations to improve the 
United States’ capability to leverage an indirect approach to the modern conflict paradigm. 
A. SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS VERSUS 
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Support to resistance movements (STR) and unconventional warfare (UW) are two 
closely associated concepts at the center of this research. While many military planners 
and interagency members may use these terms interchangeably, recognizing their 
differences is vital to understanding the military’s supporting roles to a larger national 
strategy. DOD doctrine defines a resistance movement as an “organized effort by some 
portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or 
an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”20 Using this definition as its 
foundation, the DOD views STR operations as a whole-of-government strategy to leverage 
all instruments of national power towards a coordinated resistance movement.21 
                                                 
20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations, (Washington, DC: CJCS, July 
16, 2015), GL-10. 
21 United States Special Operations Command, “U.S. Government (USG) Support to Resistance 
(STR) Framework,” (unpublished white paper, January 11, 2017), 4. 
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Conversely, DOD doctrine defines UW as “ operations and activities that are conducted to 
enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government 
or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”22 Although UW is a core activity of U.S. SOF, it is a subcomponent 
of a larger STR strategy combining all diplomatic, military, informational, and economic 
activities. 
B. TRADITIONAL WARFARE VERSUS IRREGULAR WARFARE 
While the differences between traditional warfare and irregular warfare seem 
obvious, the absence of formally declared wars in recent history have lead some 
policymakers and military planners to question this theoretical distinction.23 DOD doctrine 
describes traditional warfare as involving “force-on-force military operations in which 
adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) 
against each other in all physical domains as well as the information environment.”24 In 
comparison, DOD doctrine describes irregular warfare (IW) as “a violent struggle among 
state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). In 
IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and 
advantages of a more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation’s 
established government.”25 Additionally, DOD Directive 3000.7 highlights that irregular 
warfare “can include any relevant DOD activity and operation such as counterterrorism; 
unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability 
operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a 
fragile state or territory.”26 
                                                 
22 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, Special Operations, xi. 
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 
(Washington, DC: Office of the CJCS, 25 March 2013), x. 
24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, x. 
25 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, x. 
26 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare, DOD Directive 3000.07, (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 2014), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=757333. 
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C. INDIRECT APPROACH VERSUS DIRECT APPROACH 
While academic and military circles may debate the precise boundaries dividing 
these two methods of military engagement, this research will adhere to the definitions 
formed by international relations professor Ivan Arreguín-Toft. In his now famous 2001 
journal article entitled “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” 
Arreguín-Toft defines the indirect approach as “ seeking to destroy an adversary’s will to 
fight.”27 Under this definition, the indirect approach would encompass portions of such 
SOF core activities as: foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counter-
insurgency, and unconventional warfare. Alternatively, Arreguín-Toft defines the direct 
approach as “ target[ing] an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s 
capacity to fight.”28 Under this definition, the direct approach would encompass such SOF 
core activities as: counterterrorism, and hostage rescue and recovery. 
D. SPECIAL WARFARE VERSUS SURGICAL STRIKE 
U.S. Army Special Operations Command recently coined these terms to categorize 
its critical capabilities and to delineate which Army Special Operations Forces execute 
those critical capabilities. USASOC is the predominant user of these distinguishing terms. 
According to Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3–05 Special Operations, Special 
Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations execute Special warfare, which 
includes the following core activities: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, 
counterinsurgency, stability operations, special reconnaissance, and security force 
assistance. Special warfare is defined as “the execution of activities that involve a 
combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force 
that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit 
tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a 
permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.”29 In contrast, surgical strike is conducted 
                                                 
27 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security, vol. 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 105. 
28 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,”105. 
29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05, 
Special Operations  (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1–4 to 1–5. 
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by the National Mission Forces, Rangers, and Commander’s In-extremis forces, and 
includes these core activities: counterterrorism, hostage rescue and recovery, and 
countering weapons of mass destruction. Defined, surgical strike “is the execution of 
activities in a precise manner that employ special operations forces in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 
designated targets, or influence threats.”30 
E. COMBATING TERRORISM VERSUS COUNTERTERRORISM 
Similar to the discussion on STR vs. UW, the difference between the national 
strategy of combating terrorism and the SOF core activity of counterterrorism is a central 
component of this research. President George W. Bush’s National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism states that combating terrorism is a national level strategy “of direct and 
continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially 
disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations.”31 As a 
national level strategy, combating terrorism entails all instruments of national power (i.e., 
diplomacy, information, military, and economic). A subcomponent of the military strategy 
is the SOF core activity of counterterrorism. DOD doctrine defines counterterrorism as 
“activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks in order to render 
them incapable of using unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce governments or 
societies to achieve their goals.”32 
                                                 
30 Department of the Army, ADP 3-05, Special Operations, 1–4 to 1–5. 
31 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington, DC: White House, 
2013), 2, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. 
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, Special Operations, xi. 
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IV. PREMISE 1: STR IS A VIABLE OPTION 
Since the turn of the century, the U.S. government has provided support to 
resistance movements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, with varying degrees of 
success. While supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was considered a success, 
the creation of a failed state in Libya and an ongoing civil war in Syria with no clear end 
in sight are cause for introspection and ultimately beg the question: is supporting resistance 
movements still a viable strategy to achieve U.S. interests? More pointedly, does 
supporting resistance movements work? In order to review the obstacles to STR in the 
subsequent chapters, the reader must accept STR as a potentially viable strategic policy 
option. To answer these questions, the chapter will briefly outline the arguments against 
STR and its utility, however, it will ultimately reaffirm the notion that STR remains a viable 
policy option under the right circumstances, with a firm understanding of the requirements 
and risks.  
Critics argue that coercive actions up to and including forced regime change via 
indigenous surrogates, or “offensive UW,” is a losing strategy.33 Obviously there is a lot 
of texture to this discussion, but the arguments can be boiled down to three main forms 
which are found in varying combinations: one, the historical record shows that U.S. backed 
UW or covert action is unsuccessful; two, that policymakers are unduly enamored with the 
idea of a low-cost, low-risk alternative to conventional military intervention, or a “magic 
bullet”; and three, that this type of strategy often results in an unpredictable and unstable 
                                                 
33 Timothy Ball, “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of 
Unconventional Warfare,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).; John Nutter, The CIA’s 
Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000), [Ch. 
18, ““A Circle in a Spiral: What Covert Action Accomplished,” 315–328].; Richard A. Best, Covert 
Action: An Effective Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy?, CRS report no 96–844F, (Washington, DC: 
CRS, October 21, 1996), digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc807565/; The following texts offer 
arguments against covert action from unnamed critics, but ultimately advocate for covert action:  Mark 
Lowenthal Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2017) 72–73.; William J. 
Daugherty. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2004), 54–57. 
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situation that is far worse than the original condition.34 Empirical analysis refutes the first 
argument, but the latter arguments require additional context and a brief discussion of UW 
and covert action principles.  
A. A HISTORY OF FAILURE? 
In the history of UW and paramilitary covert actions the U.S. has certainly endured 
its share of failures. A New York Times article, which referenced the findings of a classified 
CIA study, echoed this point. The report, commissioned prior to President Obama’s 
decision to support Syrian Rebels, concluded “that many past attempts by the agency to 
arm foreign forces covertly had a minimal impact on the long-term outcome of a conflict.” 
They were even less effective, the report found, “when the militias fought without any 
direct American support on the ground.”35 After examining several of the most notable 
“offensive” UW cases, Tim Ball, a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, also 
concluded that “The case against offensive unconventional warfare seems clear given its 
history [of failure],” based on qualitative analysis and a review of case studies.36 However, 
this narrative omits some important details. 
First, empirical evidence does not support the claims. A recent RAND study coded 
post-World War II UW cases and found that out of 25 cases, 8 (48%) achieved the U.S. 
government’s short-term interests, 5 (20%) were indeterminate, and 8 (32%) failed to 
achieve U.S. objectives.37 A forty-eight percent success rate is far less than optimal, but it 
certainly does not constitute ‘rare.’ This also doesn’t account for the portion of 
indeterminate cases which resulted in a negotiated solution, but still preserved U.S. core 
                                                 
34 Andrea Filozof, “Unconventional Warfare Is Not the Answer to Your Problem,” War on the Rocks, 
28 September 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/unconventional-warfare-is-not-the-answer-to-
your-problem/; Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 63, 145. 
35 Mark Marzetti, “C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Helped Fuel Skepticism About Helping Syrian 
Rebels,” New York Times, October 14, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/us/politics/cia-study-
says-arming-rebels-seldom-works.html  
36 Ball, “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense,” 2016, 45. 
37 Indeterminate outcomes include negotiated solutions, ongoing conflicts, or the conflict escalated 
into a different form of war. Madden, Dan, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, Bruce R. 
Nardulli, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson and Abby Doll. Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR779.html. 
[Appendix D, Universe of U.S. Special Warfare Outcomes, 34–35]. 
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interests. Finally, a 32% failure rate is cannot be disregarded. The potential for failure 
reinforces the necessity for policymakers to exercise prudent judgement when considering 
the employment of UW and paramilitary covert action. Also, practitioners and 
policymakers should work to decrease the rate of failure, however, it is important to 
remember that UW or Covert action are often the ‘third option.’ These strategic options are 
employed in place of overt military intervention, when diplomatic efforts have proven 
ineffective, to minimize the prospect of conventional war. Furthermore, the ‘third option’ 
is an indirect approach, relying U.S. personnel working ‘through and with’ indigenous 
surrogates and partners to achieve U.S. interests, which places inherent on what can 
realistically be achieved. Thus, STR practitioners must appropriately inform and manage 
policymakers’ expectations of what these approaches are capable of achieving. 
Another important consideration when examining empirical evidence is the 
problem of security classification and its effect on the availability of data. While Title 10 
UW campaigns are overt, or are at least intended to be acknowledged, Title 50 UW and 
covert action by their very nature are intended keep the U.S. government’s role hidden 
indefinitely.38 When operations or programs do come to light, it is often a result of a 
catastrophic failure (i.e., Bay of Pigs) or the fact that the program has grown to the point 
that its effects can no longer be hidden. The congressional oversight reforms following the 
Church Commission’s investigation and the Iran-Contra Affair have effectively mitigated 
any chance for covert action to become a “rogue elephant,” but it has also degraded the 
ability maintain secrecy. The news is full of alleged CIA, DOD, and international 
intelligence programs; however, the problem is that rumors and hearsay to do not equate 
to conclusive evidence which researchers can use to produce comprehensive studies and 
draw effective conclusions regarding the success or failure of these programs. Ultimately, 
this disproportionate declassification of failed operations produces an inaccurate depiction 
of the success/failure ratio.  
Second, it is curious that President Obama would elect to authorize an overt Train 
and Equip program, as well as an alleged covert program, when presented with a history 
                                                 
38 Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, 
Intelligence Activities, and Cove.” Harvard National Security Journal. Volume 3, (2011). 122–130. 
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of failure.39 It seems more plausible that the evidence suggesting a history of failure was 
less than irrefutable, and that the real decision centered on risk-tolerance—could the 
Administration achieve its objectives using an indirect strategy that kept U.S. service 
members and intelligence officers out of harm’s way or did ‘success’ require U.S. boots on 
the ground?  
B. THE “MAGIC BULLET” FALLACY 
A partial explanation for why policymakers repeatedly decide to support 
insurgencies may be the correlation between external support and insurgent ‘success.’ In 
Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, Jeffrey Record argues that while many 
insurgencies fail, external assistance is a commonality among almost all successful 
insurgencies.40 Record caveats this statement by saying that the correlation “does not 
diminish the insurgent requirement for superiority in such intangibles as will, strategy, 
organization, morale, and discipline.”41 So, if a budding insurgency with sufficient 
resistance potential42 exists, and the odds of success are only improved when an external 
power provides support, it may be logical to assume that providing assistance could result 
in a positive outcome. However, Record’s caveat highlights the critical requirement for an 
accurate assessment of resistance potential. If policymakers and military leaders ignore the 
assessment, or fail to conduct one, the blame for a failed intervention does not fall on the 
                                                 
39 Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Helped Fuel Skepticism About Helping Syrian 
Rebels,” The New York Times, October 14, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/us/politics/cia-
study-says-arming-rebels-seldom-works.html; Adam Goldman; Mark Mazzetti; Eric Schmitt, “Behind the 
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concept, but on a general misunderstanding of the requirements, capabilities, and 
limitations of UW or covert action.  
In a 2016 War on the Rocks article, Andrea Filozoff asserts that policymakers see 
UW as a low-risk, cost-effective, politically palatable alternative to military intervention; 
however, she also charges that this is a “dangerous illusion.”43 Recognition of this 
condition and its associated pitfalls are well documented. In Executive Secrets, William 
Daugherty, a former CIA officer, suggests that President Eisenhower, and President 
Kennedy to a lesser degree, saw covert action as a “magic bullet, capable of overthrowing 
governments with ease, on the cheap, and with little loss of life.”44 Daugherty goes on to 
suggest that failures were often quickly forgotten and the subsequent fates of countries 
involved were rarely considered. The only things that mattered were that positives 
outweighed the negatives and that the primary goal of stopping Soviet expansion was 
achieved.45  
Critics of covert action often draw on examples from this era to show that covert 
action and UW do not work. However, this fails to consider the evolution of covert action 
approval, oversight, and funding mechanisms that began in the 1970s. As alluded to earlier, 
reforms following the Church Commission investigation, the Hughes-Ryan Act, President 
Reagan’s Executive Order 12333, and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 have 
fundamentally changed the employment of Covert Action.46 The effects of these legal 
changes can be seen in the number and duration of UW operations since the 
implementation of the Hughes-Ryan Act in 1974. Figure 1 was extracted from the 
previously discussed RAND report. This research team augmented RAND’s work with 
dashed lines to depict some of the seminal oversight changes over time. With this addition, 
the chart shows that between the end of the Cold War and the implementation of the 
Hughes-Ryan Act—a 29-year period—there were 16 UW actions; 9 successes, 7 failures. 
                                                 
43 Andrea Filozof, “Unconventional Warfare Is Not the Answer to Your Problem,” War on the Rocks, 
September 28, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/unconventional-warfare-is-not-the-answer-to-
your-problem/. 
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In the following forty-two-year period, there were 8 actions; 3 successes, 4 indeterminate 
outcomes, and 1 failure. This rudimentary analysis may potentially suggest that oversight 
changes made policymakers more judicious in their application of UW, which contributed 
to more favorable outcomes.  
 19 
Figure 1.  RAND Study on U.S. Special Warfare Operations since World 
War II (2016)47 
 
 
                                                 
47 Source: Madden et. al,  Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, Appendix D, 35. At first 
glance, some ‘successful’ or ‘mixed’ outcomes may appear questionable, namely Afghanistan (2001), Iran 
(1953), Libya (2011), and the current conflict in Syria. However, it is important to remember that these 
cases were coded based on whether or not they achieved policy objectives of the time, not whether or not 
the achieved evolutionary policy objectives years or decades later. Clearly, some cases achieved short term 
policy objectives, while setting the conditions long-term challenges or ‘failure,’ as could be argued in Iran 
(1953), Afghanistan (2001), and Liyba (2011). The challenge of sustaining ‘success’ over the long-term is 
addressed later in this chapter. 
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While oversight has influenced the frequency of employment and possibly changed 
the likelihood of positive outcomes, it has not necessarily improved policymakers’ and 
military leaders’ understanding of covert action or UW. In his article “Do We Really 
Understand Unconventional Warfare?,” COL (Ret.) Dave Maxwell, one of the preeminent 
experts on unconventional warfare, provides an expanded discussion the general lack of 
understanding surrounding UW, Resistance, Revolution and Insurgency (RRI). In the 
article, Maxwell asserts that “policy makers [and strategists] really do not understand the 
nature and conduct of unconventional warfare.”48 He goes on to offer some principles that 
decision makers should consider when contemplating the employment of UW: 
It is neither an abject failure in every case nor is it a war winner in almost 
any case but it is a viable strategic option if used in the right conditions at 
the right time by the right organizations. But most importantly it is both 
risky and hard and what makes it most difficult for policy makers and the 
public is that it is time consuming. It cannot be employed “in extremis” in 
most cases (in the fall of 2001 post 9–11 being an exception) and really 
requires long-term preparation, thorough assessments, and relationships 
with key players to have chance of being successful. And most importantly 
it must absolutely be part of and in support of a coherent policy and 
strategy.49 
Despite historical examples of misguided applications of covert action and 
evidence of a misunderstanding regarding its nature and conduct, the fact remains that both 
covert action and UW can present better alternatives to conventional military intervention 
or simply doing nothing. That is why Presidents, even those who opposed it initially, have 
found utility in the “third option.”50 Covert action should not be employed as a last resort, 
but it is often employed when diplomatic avenues have proved ineffective and something 
must be done. This doesn’t mean, however, that diplomatic activities stop. On the contrary, 
to be truly effective, covert action–like military force–must be employed in concert with 
the other elements of national power.51 Instead of shying away from covert action and UW, 
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it is better to improve our understanding of what these actions can do, what they can’t, their 
requirements, and what institutional and cognitive changes must take place to support the 
optimal application of these tools.52 
C. SHORT-TERM SUCCESS, LONG-TERM FAILURE, AND WINNING 
THE “DAY AFTER” 
Revolutions, rebellions, insurgencies and social movements are inherently 
destabilizing; however, blaming instability solely on U.S. intervention fails to 
acknowledge the reality that these situations were unstable prior to U.S. involvement.   It 
is difficult to argue against the reality that U.S.-supported insurgent activities aimed at 
coercing, disrupting, or overthrowing a sovereign government fail to alleviate–and 
sometimes even exacerbate–volatile situations abroad. Detractors of US-sponsored 
insurgency often tout Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the 1996 ascension of the Taliban to 
power, and isolation of Cuba following the Bay of Pigs operation as examples of the malign 
aftereffects of UW and covert action. However, the perception that U.S. meddling or 
intervention is the unique cause for this instability is inaccurate. It assumes that stability 
and natural order would have be maintained in these countries if the U.S. had done nothing. 
This thought belies the reality that tensions and schisms already existed in these societies, 
the only question is how they will manifest themselves and who would act to influence the 
outcome. On one hand the U.S. could avoid intervention of any sort. The underlying 
tensions may fizzle out and the dissidents may integrate back into the population, or, in the 
worst case, the situation may blossom into something like the Syrian Civil War. Avoiding 
intervention also means that other states and non-state actors could step in and unabatedly 
pursue their own interests. Ultimately, neither avoidance nor intervention can guarantee 
future peace and stability, but employing the “third option” does afford a state actor the 
opportunity to shape events in its favor.  
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The decision to support a resistance movement requires a robust assessment of the 
pre-existing environmental conditions and resistance characteristics to predict potential 
viability of a resistance movement.53 It is important to recognize that the United States’ 
involvement can influence, not control, the resistance movement’s pursuit of its and the 
U.S. government’s goals. Despite efforts to control and predict outcomes, supporting 
resistance movements remains more of an art, than a science. Despite the U.S. 
government’s best efforts, it can be difficult to predict how the movement will manifest 
itself as U.S. support is applied. This uncertainty is underscored by the reality that some 
efforts will, and have failed. As the empirical evidence shows, when the U.S. government 
supports resistance movements short-term “success” is achieved more often than not, but 
long-term success and sustainment is the problem.  
After achieving its short-term political and military goals, the resistance and its U.S. 
government liaisons are now presented with a new challenge–governing.54 At this point, 
the resistance and its foreign supporters are faced with three major dilemmas: demobilizing 
the active support base; translating their theories and ideology into reality via policy 
implementation and institutional restructures; and reconciling with, reintegrating, or 
repressing the other portion of the population that previously supported the government. It 
is this period, referred to in Army doctrine as “Transition” and by the ARIS Project as 
“Resolution,” where short-term ‘success’ often morphs into long-term ‘failure.’55 
There is a distinct lack of substantive military literature regarding the process of 
transitioning (or integrating, in the case of disruptive or coercive objectives) an indigenous 
resistance group into a functioning government over the long-term. Most of the doctrine 
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focuses on conventional joint-force efforts to support and stabilize indigenous governments 
after transition has occurred. Therefore, it is unsurprising that resolution is the point of 
failure in many of the cases of U.S. backed insurgencies. While there are copious amounts 
of professional military literature regarding guerrilla warfare and the military aspects of 
RRI, the recent ARIS Project, “Understanding the Phases of Resistance,” is the only one 
that addresses the “resolution” phase in any substantive detail. Military doctrine often 
espouses the importance of “transition” as it applies to UW, but rarely offers more than a 
page of written discussion in either Joint or Army doctrine. More study regarding the theory 
and application of those theories is required to facilitate long-term success, not only in UW, 
but in the other Special Warfare activities like counterinsurgency and foreign internal 
defense.  
There are also structural challenges to transition. The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace identified seven factors “in a target country favorable to [democratic] 
nation building: strong national identity, effective state capacity, previous experience with 
constitutionalism, elite interest aligned with [external actors’], ability to absorb economic 
assistance, and international legitimacy under multilateral interim administration.”56 While 
the study was focused on large-scale nation building similar to U.S. efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the considerations remain relevant to STR activities as well. Choosing to act 
when the structural conditions are less than favorable will put STR efforts at a disadvantage 
from the get go. Just as military doctrine uses a framework to assess the viability of a 
resistance, it would do well to also establish a framework to assess the feasibility of a stable 
transition.  
Beyond a lack of codified knowledge and inherent structural challenges, is the 
question of responsibility. Is it the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Department of 
State (DOS) that is responsible for guiding, and more importantly sustaining, the transition 
from massive upheaval to relative stability over the long-term? The DOS is the most likely 
candidate for this responsibility, however it is best suited to operate in permissive 
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environments, as opposed to the more volatile environment where diminished security 
presents greater risk to its personnel.57 In these unstable transitional environments, the 
military, and more specifically SOF would be better suited to facilitate and support DOS 
and USAID stabilization objectives. Joint doctrine reinforces this point stating that “the 
military force must be prepared to plan and execute [U.S. government] stabilization efforts 
until it becomes feasible to transition that responsibility to another organization.”58 As 
alluded to earlier, the problem is that joint doctrine assumes that a relatively robust military 
force will be deployed to support these activities, however the purpose of supporting 
indigenous elements via UW or covert action is to avoid large-scale military interventions. 
So, if the level of security is insufficient for DoS and USAID to operate, and there is no 
substantial military force to execute the established doctrinal framework, the question 
becomes what organization fills this void?  
A final consideration is funding. Both constituents and politicians alike have short 
attention spans. After a problem is ‘solved’ policymakers quickly transition to the next 
issue, forgetting that ‘success’ must be sustained. This change in priorities often manifests 
itself through a reallocation or withdrawal of funding, resources, and attention. The 
reallocation of resources often comes within a few years of achieving short-term success, 
however, the long-term ‘failure’ may appear within a few years or decades later. 
Afghanistan is a primary example of this. After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the United 
States and the Soviet Union cut-off funding to the Mujahedeen and the Najibullah Regime, 
respectively. Four months later, the Najibullah Regime fell, and by 1996, the moderate 
Mujahedeen, like Ahmed Shah Massoud, were unable to prevent the Taliban’s ascendance 
to power.59 If the United States had maintained its investments, a more favorable solution 
may have been achieved, but due to a re-prioritization of policy objectives this did not 
occur. 
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This chapter has attempted to refute many of the arguments against viability and 
utility of the United States’ STR activities. Covert action and UW provide a critical “third 
option” to the President, when diplomacy is inadequate and the cost of conventional 
military intervention is unacceptable. Moreover, this “third option” offers an opportunity 
to shape the outcomes of situation, vice doing nothing and accepting a less than optimal 
outcome. While this research cannot refute that UW and covert action sometimes fail and 
that ‘long-term’ success remains a challenge, it has shown that these policy options are 
successful in nearly half of the cases.  
The discussion also asserted that it is not the basic theories of UW and covert action 
that are inadequate, but our (the U.S. government’s) misunderstanding and misapplication 
of the concepts and fundamentals that contributes to failure. This study’s authors concur 
with Dave Maxwell and others who argue that, like any military tactic or strategy, STR is 
useful in particular circumstances, when the conditions, requirements, risks, rewards and 
costs are well understood.,60 Recently, U.S. Special Operations Command, in conjunction 
with other agencies recently developed the “Support to Resistance Framework,” which is 
a large step toward alleviating some of the issues outlined here, and reframing the U.S. 
government’s mindset regarding STR activities.  
Finally, as the subsequent chapter will show, our adversaries are seeing success 
with STR-like strategies. Not only does this reinforce the viability of STR as a policy 
option, but it also demands that our adversary’s tactics and strategies be studied, innovated 
upon, and potentially incorporated into U.S. practices. 
  
                                                 
60 David S. Maxwell, “Why the New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and Unconventional Warfare,” 
War on the Rocks, August 28, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-new-syrian-army-failed-
washingtonand-unconventional-warfare/; Ryan C. Agee and Maurice K. DuClos, “Why UW: Factoring in 
the Decision Point for Unconventional Warfare,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
 26 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 27 
V. PREMISE 2: MODERN CONFLICT PARADIGM CHANGE 
While the debate over the viability of UW continues, the increasing trend of hybrid 
threats in the contemporary operating environment indicate an evolving paradigm for STR 
operations. From Russia’s “Little Green Men” and social media propaganda enabling the 
annexation of Crimea to China expanding its maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea 
via island reclamation, the international status quo is routinely imperiled by unconventional 
and hybrid warfare. Furthermore, the Iranian Quds Force engaged in proxy wars in the 
Middle East vis-a-vis Hezbollah, Popular Mobilization Forces, and other non-state actors 
highlight the breadth of the unconventional problem presented by today’s revisionist 
powers. Given that America retains international supremacy in conventional military 
power, it is not surprising that the nation’s adversaries now turn to combining 
“battlegrounds of perception, coercion, [and] mass atrocity” as their primary means of 
global competition.61 While revitalized concern over hybrid challenges is certainly valid, 
the “blend[ing of] different methods or modes of warfare” to achieve a synergistic effect 
against an adversary is not a new phenomenon to the United States.62 In fact, reflections of 
the these “gray zone” activities under the moniker of hybrid war are visible throughout the 
history of the U.S. military’s lexicon. With references to Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWA), and what is now known as Phase 0 
activities or unconventional warfare, these methods of welding traditional and irregular 
warfare outside of declared wars are not foreign concepts to the United States; instead, the 
nation’s enemies appear to have stolen pages out of America’s playbook. With this being 
the case, U.S. policymakers are asking why, despite having the world’s premier military 
capabilities, America appears to be less successful than its adversaries in the realm of 
hybrid warfare? Properly addressing this question requires analysis of both the adversaries’ 
approaches to warfare and their actions in contemporary conflicts to establish the modern 
environment for unconventional conflicts. By comparing this context to established U.S. 
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doctrine for special operations and unconventional warfare it becomes clear that the U.S. 
maintains a similar doctrinal approach to conflict as its adversaries. Nonetheless, the 
nation’s adversaries appear to have outperformed America’s capabilities in successfully 
converting doctrine into action. 
A. CHINA 
The basis of China’s unconventional approach to warfare was first communicated 
in the book Unrestricted Warfare (1999) and then further highlighted in the “Three 
Warfares” strategy from 2003. In 1999, two Colonels from the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) published Unrestricted Warfare establishing a basis of tactics to overcome 
asymmetry in capabilities or resources in future conflicts. Notably, this work establishes 
ideological tenets for conflict that depart from those traditionally quoted from such military 
theorists as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Jomini in that it embraces warfare beyond the military 
domain. In this vein, these officers claim that these new principles focus on “using all 
means, including armed force or nonarmed force, military and non-military, and lethal and 
non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”63 By combining these 
various means of war, actors can “shrink the effects of weapons” and amplify the “concept 
of modern warfare” in favor of their interests.64 Next, in 2003, the Chinese government 
further inculcated the prescribed concepts in Unrestricted Warfare by approving the PLA’s 
“Three Warfares.” This strategic approach, approved by both the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and Chinese Military Commission (CMC), focuses on leveraging three means of 
information warfare (psychological, media, and legal) “aimed at preconditioning key areas 
of competition in [China’s] favor.”65 Via this comprehensive psychological and legal 
engagement, the Chinese are clearly attempting to combine the “political, economic, 
diplomatic and legal dimensions” of war.66 
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Propelled by its position as the world’s second largest economy, the People’s 
Republic of China leverages hybrid warfare to protect its concept of territorial sovereignty 
in the South China Sea.67 Unlike traditional land warfare, China’s hostilities have focused 
primarily on activities short of armed conflict in its maritime expansion. China’s aggressive 
behavior in this domain exemplifies the nation’s desire to become a global maritime power, 
which has only gained intensity since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012.68 The 
first clear instance of Chinese hybrid aggression came in November 2013 as China’s 
Ministry of National Defense announced the establishment of an air defense identification 
zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. This 200-nautical mile boundary beyond China’ 
territorial sea covers areas where the Chinese dispute sovereignty claims from both Japan 
and Taiwan as well as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) from Japan and South Korea.69 
To further support its territorial claims, China combined the effect of this ADIZ with large-
scale dredging and island building efforts in the Spratly Islands, creating more than 3,200 
acres of new land.70 The buildup of seven Chinese military bases on the islands further 
amplifies the strategic effects of this island reclamation effort. These include a submarine 
base, approximately 3,000 meters of runways, deep-water ports, and radar facilities all at 
separate locations.71 Furthermore, China appears to be masking its development of these 
installations with a thinly veiled disinformation campaign since President Xi stated in 
September 2015 that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” in this region.72 To 
defend these actions, the Chinese government uses the “lawfare” principle to establish its 
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“Three Warfares” approach, stating that Chinese activities in the South China Sea are in 
accordance with established international law, specifically provisions under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).73 Lastly, the Chinese 
government protects its maritime interests in this region through the intelligence and 
reconnaissance activities of dedicated proxy militia forces. Although the exact size and 
composition of this maritime militia, commonly referred to as “Little Blue Men,” is 
unknown, military analysts estimate that this force provides a “peacetime adjunct to 
China’s space-based surveillance systems…closely monitoring China’s seaward 
approaches.”74 With these actions in mind, China is clearly demonstrating competency in 
putting its unconventional and hybrid war doctrine into successful real-life actions. 
B. RUSSIA 
Russia’s Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery 
Gerasimov, conveyed the country’s modern approach to war in a February 2013 article 
published in a popular domestic military publication. In his article entitled “The Value of 
Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods 
of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Gen. Gerasimov states that “the very ‘rules of war’ 
have changed” and “the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals 
has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their 
effectiveness.”75 In this approach, Russia will focus on preparing the operational 
environment ahead of hostilities through asymmetric capabilities and buildup of 
indigenous proxy resistance forces since war “in general is not declared” but simply 
“begins with already developed military forces.”76 What has become known as the 
“Gerasimov Doctrine” is now synonymous with erasing the “boundary between peace and 
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war and relied on emerging technologies to provide a level of deniability for the Russian 
military.”77 Additionally, in this modern approach to conflict, the Russians view the mind 
as the “main battlespace” that is “to be dominated by information and psychological 
warfare…to morally and psychologically depressing the enemy.”78 Accordingly, the 
Gerasimov Doctrine establishes hybrid warfare as Russia’s chief instrument of national 
power in future conflict. 
Russia’s adoption of the Gerasimov Doctrine’s hybrid model of warfare reflects the 
country’s strategic outlook since the end of the Cold War. During this period, the Russian 
Federation has turned to hybrid warfare as its primary means of international competition 
through lessons learned in multiple conflicts. The motivation for a change in tactics and 
strategy in war initially emerged from Russia’s failure to defeat the much smaller and less 
equipped Chechen forces in the First Chechen War from 1994–1996 through a traditional 
war of attrition. As the invading force in Chechnya, the Russian military maintained “big, 
bulky formations” and devastating aerial bombardment of rebel-occupied urban areas.79 
Yet Chechen rebels (estimated at a tenth of the Russians size and with no air support) 
ultimately survived and overcame the Russian offensive by maintaining small, 
decentralized teams executing a “series of simultaneous [swarming] attacks from all 
directions.”80 It was this strategic defeat that would serve as the catalyst for change in the 
future of Russian warfare. 
In the aftermath of the Chechen ceasefire, Russia successfully demonstrated a clear 
departure from its reliance on conventional warfare towards unconventional and hybrid 
warfare in both Chechnya and Georgia. In the Second Chechen War from 1999–2009, 
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Russia defeated the Chechen rebels through combining several modes of warfare. To 
execute ground operations, Russia relied on contract soldiers (kontraktnik) working 
alongside Russian Special Forces (Spetnaz) as masked men hiding their identity while 
conducting “summary executions, torture, arson, and looting.”81 Additionally, the Russians 
maintained an adept information operations campaign that galvanized the support of the 
Russian populace against the Chechen “terrorists.” In their 2008 war with Georgia, the 
Russians further refined their hybrid war capabilities along with enabling indigenous 
resistance forces. During this conflict, Russian forces initiated hostilities with a cyber war 
focused on distributed denial of service (D-DOS) attacks against the Georgian government 
to generate widespread doubt concerning the government’s capabilities of protecting itself 
or its people. Next, the Russians’ used of legal warfare (i.e., “lawfare”) through a “passport 
offensive” to create the veneer of “Russians citizens” in the breakaway regions of South 
Ossetia requiring Russian intervention.82 In the end, Russian military support to the 
Ossetian separatists proved vital to the dissidents’ survival against the Georgian military.83 
As a result, both the Second Chechen and Georgian wars outline the early stages of 
development for the Gerasimov model of hybrid war. 
Most recently, Russia’s 2014 actions in Ukraine exhibited their mastery in this form 
of modern warfare. Beginning as a covert operation utilizing mass rallies in Crimean cities 
to sow the seeds of opposition to the Ukrainian government, this Russian offensive 
combined “ambiguity, disinformation, and the element of surprise at the operational level 
with more traditional aids such as electronic warfare.”84 As opposition to the Ukrainian 
government continued to grow, the Russians combined a traditional military invasion with 
Russian Special Forces and paratrooper with the advantage of contract soldiers operating 
as anonymous “Little Green Men” to assist local self-defense forces securing the Russian 
                                                 
81 Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (London: Rowman, 
2014), 191–196. 
82 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars, 205–208. 
83 Raymond Bonner, “Separatists in Georgia Look to Russia for Protection,” The New York Times, 12 
June 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/world/separatists-in-georgia-look-to-russia-for-
protection.html?mcubz=0. 
84 Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’” Kennan 
Cable, no. 7 (April 2015), 3. 
 33 
occupation.85 Throughout this operation in Ukraine, the Russians leveraged information 
operations through its “[d]omination of television, radio, and social media through the use 
of highly trained operatives, including ‘hacktivists’” to maximize the appearance of pro-
Russian sentiment among the populace.86 The Ukraine case study demonstrates Russia’s 
fulfillment of the Gerasimov Doctrine. While hostilities continue in this Eastern European 
conflict amid ceasefire violations, it is likely that Russia will further utilize similar hybrid 
capabilities to achieve its objectives in the future given this history of success. 
C. IRAN 
In contrast to China and Russia, Iran’s indirect approach to conflict has not been 
published and distributed but, instead, can be surmised from the country’s experiences in 
the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. These initiatives 
stressed the importance of key military organizations such as the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds and Basij Forces to execute its activities within guerilla and 
proxy warfare, as well as cementing the necessity of a strong internal security framework. 
The IRGC initially formed out of militias aligned with Ayatollah Khomeini in the chaos 
following the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The strategic application of this force was soon 
fortified in combat during the Iran-Iraq war as the IRGC supplemented the Iranian regular 
armed forces who quickly became “overwhelmed and overstretched” against the Iraqis’ 
assault.87 This pivotal chapter in the IRGC’s history saw the organization develop 
“guerilla-style” and asymmetric warfare capabilities.88 Furthermore, the IRGC leveraged 
compound warfare through the use of popular local forces, such as the Basij, to enable the 
country’s defense during this bloody eight-year war of attrition.89 This period also saw the 
establishment of the enduring proxy relationship between the IRGC and Hezbollah as a 
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Lebanese Shiite resistance force against Israel to “export the revolution” through foreign 
intervention.90 After the war, the IRGC’s newly formed special operations wing known as 
the “Quds Force” assumed responsibility for the training, organization, and advisement of 
the Hezbollah proxy force. In a similar manner, the Basij militia forces would reorganize 
under the IRGC as the “Basij Resistance Force” now focused on internal security for the 
Regime within Iran.91 The importance of guerilla and proxy warfare along with 
maintaining a strong internal security apparatus remains prevalent within Iranian doctrine 
to this day.  
Next, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked another turning point for the 
Iranians’ way of war. After the coalition’s removal of Saddam Hussein, the Iranians 
renewed their focus on deterrent capabilities, such as nuclear and weapons of mass 
destruction programs, to safeguard themselves from a similar fate. Consequently, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom ushered in the revival of “hardline power” within Iran facilitating 
the “expansion of Iranian influence outside its borders” and a renewed focus on covert 
proxy warfare in Iraq through insurgent and terrorist tactics via the Badr Brigade and other 
Shi’a militias.92 Also during this period, the IRGC established its “mosaic defense” 
doctrine to further strengthen its defenses against foreign intervention. This layered defense 
plan, outlined by the organization in 2005, uses the Quds’ Forces specialties in 
asymmetric/unconventional warfare to, as the former IRGC Chief Commander Safavi 
described, protect Iran through the “spirit of jihad and martyrdom-seeking” to execute “an 
endless defense and long-term warfare on land, air, and sea.”93 Analyzing these 
experiences, Farzan Sabet, a former security fellow at the Center for International Security 
and Cooperation, underlines three basic principles to Iran’s modern approach to war: 1. 
Leave a light footprint; 2. Partner with indigenous forces and use unconventional warfare; 
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3. Create broad non-sectarian coalitions.94 These principles succinctly describe Iran’s 
contemporary strategy of leveraging the Quds Forces as a hybrid “special operations group 
whose presence and leadership improves indigenous forces on the battlefield” instead of a 
traditional “front-line unit.”95 Thus, the IRGC’s evolution of guerilla, proxy, and covert 
warfare signal Iran’s modern approach to conflict. 
Since the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran has expanded several footholds 
within the region through its hybrid use of hard and soft power. When civil protests turned 
to civil war in Syria and the survival of the Assad regime came into question, the Iranians 
quickly came to aid of its longtime ally sending covert support through the Quds Force, 
Hezbollah, and Iranian gendarmerie elements and material aid to buttress the regime’s 
defense.96 Central to the Quds Force’s support was the establishment of the Syrian 
National Defense Forces (NDF), a paramilitary group with approximately 100,000 fighters, 
designed to strengthen the regime’s internal security in similar fashion as the Basij 
Resistance Force.97 Following the intervention of Russian forces in support of the Assad 
regime in September 2015, Iran’s support transitioned from a covert proxy war to open 
acknowledgement of its involvement in Syria with a drastic increase of IRGC Ground 
Forces to augment the indigenous Syrian Forces.98 In addition to its hybrid model of war 
in Syria, the Iranians utilized similar means of warfare in Iraq to aid the defense of various 
Shi’a groups against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Sunni extremist terrorist 
organization. From ISIS’ hyper anti-Shi’a behavior, the Islamic Republic understood that 
this organization posed an existential threat. As a result, Iran leveraged aspects of both 
traditional, political, and unconventional warfare to bolster Shi’a special groups in Iraq.99 
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When ISIS gained control of Mosul in Northern Iraq in June 2014, Iran sent a full 
complement of military advisors and equipment to reinforce the Iraqi military, to include 
members of the Quds Force, seven SU-25 FrogFoot Jets, and reconnaissance 
aircraft/drones.100 Combined with this traditional application of force is Iran’s political 
warfare which leverages historical ties with indigenous Shi’a elements (e.g., the Islamic 
Supreme Council for Iraq [ISCI], Badr militias, and the Dawa party) to ensure the Shi’a 
majority continues to control domestic issues in their favor.101 Additionally, in stark 
similarity to the buildup of the NDF in Syria, Iranian advisors helped form Popular 
Mobilization Forces (PMF) as an internal paramilitary organization ensuring Shi’a 
“supremacy over Iraq” with roughly 140,000 fighters.102 Finally, in Yemen, Iran has 
reached new heights in its hybrid war capabilities while sponsoring Houthi rebels against 
a Saudi-supported Yemeni government. Beginning with their covert equipping of these 
Shi’a rebels in 2011, the Iranians have since expanded their involvement with advisors 
from both the IRGC and Quds Force.103 Furthermore, this proxy war between the two 
regional powers of Iran and Saudi Arabia has seen the Iranians add cyber warfare to its 
accompaniment of guerilla, covert, and traditional military capabilities. Specifically, 
Iranian advisors created the “Yemen Cyber Army” within the Houthi group which has 
executed cyber-attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Foreign, Interior, and Defense Ministries.104 In 
all three conflicts, Iran has taken advantage of the vacuum of control within the region to 
enhance its geopolitical interests by way of unconventional and hybrid warfare. Given its 
pattern of success, it is likely that Iran will continue this model in future conflicts to secure 
its national interests. 
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D. SIMILAR REFLECTIONS WITHIN U.S. DOCTRINE 
The published methods of the U.S. military’s special operations reflect similar 
philosophies as its adversaries’ hybrid strategies. U.S. Army doctrines use similar wording 
to delineate hybrid warfare as the “adaptive combination of conventional and non-
conventional means” to achieve “mutually benefitting effects.”105 DOD doctrine 
categorizes the combination of irregular war and clandestine/covert activities as “Special 
Operations” or, more specifically, unconventional warfare and covert action. Special 
operations are described in joint doctrine as the “unique modes of employment, tactical 
techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, 
clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring 
regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.”106 Applying these concepts to hybrid, 
unconventional and covert action reflect the “non-conventional…covert military, 
paramilitary, and civilian measures” of the adversaries’ hybrid strategies.107  
USSOCOM Directives identify USASOC and its doctrine as the lead component 
for UW.108 Army doctrine describes unconventional warfare as “operations and activities 
that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or 
overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”109 As David Maxwell, security professor 
at Georgetown University, has highlighted, the “various names of hybrid/4th 
generation/irregular warfare all derive from the one overarching form of warfare” known 
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as unconventional warfare (UW).110 The Army’s Training Publication (ATP) 3.05-1 
Unconventional Warfare focuses on a 7-phase model for a U.S. sponsored insurgency, 
which emphasizes guerrilla warfare in concert with auxiliary and underground activities as 
well as integrating these activities with the conventional military forces and interagency 
efforts in the later phases. Furthermore, the military’s joint doctrine underscores the 
importance of integrating kinetic operations with both information (previously referred to 
as psychological operations) and civil affairs operations to “create effects disproportionate 
to the size of the units involved.”111  
To achieve these mutually beneficial effects in the later phases of the UW model, 
DOD doctrine mandates that planners combine the supremacy of its regular forces with the 
unique activities of DOD’s UW operations and other agencies/departments “whole-of-
government effort.”112 Similar to the demonstrated methods of its adversaries, the United 
States’ whole-of-government approach intends to maximize the effectiveness of 
converging interagency and military activities through this UW campaign to reach a 
synergistic effect. This comprehensive approach to modern conflict contains activities 
ranging from the overt diplomatic actions of the DOS to the covert action programs of the 
CIA. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite a comparable approach to hostilities short of declared conventional war, 
the United States has failed to experience the same rate of success in modern conflicts as 
its adversaries. Specifically, the United States’ experience in Operation Inherent Resolve 
while combating ISIS provides a present-day case study of this gap between translating 
policy into action. After nearly three years, this campaign is only now reaching the cusp of 
defeating this asymmetric threat. Furthermore, this conflict has routinely demonstrated 
fissures between America’s strategic application of both UW and STR operations that will 
                                                 
110 David Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” Small Wars Journal, 
October 23, 2014. 
111 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, Special Operations, I-2. 
112 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, II-9. 
 39 
require redress if the nation hopes to remain competitive in future international and regional 
conflicts. With this case study as its backdrop, this paper will analyze several challenges, 
such as: political; legal; organizational; and training and education, as obstacles to the 
employment of ARSOF elements in support to indigenous resistance activities. 
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VI. LEGAL OBSTACLES 
Policy and politics are only one half of the calculation to employ Support to 
Resistance (STR) in the pursuit of policy objectives–the ‘ends.’ International and domestic 
law form the other half of the equation, and regulate the ‘means’ by which policy objectives 
are pursued. In this chapter, the authors will briefly discuss the international legal 
considerations bearing on a decision to employ STR. Then the authors will survey internal 
legal obstacles, such as domestic law, bureaucratic approval processes, funding, and 
oversight that may inhibit the application of STR activities. In this pursuit, the research 
applied an analytical framework consisting of authorities, approvals, funding, permissions, 
exemptions, and oversight—referred to as AAFPEO–to identify specific obstacles. After 
presenting a synopsis of the most prominent domestic legal considerations, the chapter will 
conclude with a summary of the most prominent legal obstacles and considerations as they 
pertain to STR. In the chapter of this research, the authors will submit potential 
prescriptions to alleviate, or at least mitigate, these identified shortcomings.  
A. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
International law bears heavily on policy decisions and potential options available 
to policy makers. As such, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and joint planners 
must understand how international law may constrain or influence the development of 
potential STR strategies and campaign plans. Relying heavily on Michael Schmitt and 
Andru Wall’s 2014 article in the Harvard National Security Journal, “The International 
Law of Unconventional Statecraft,” the following discussion will demonstrate how the 
international law principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, self-defense, and state 
responsibility pose direct implications for STR planning and policy options.  
Similar to STR, Schmitt and Wall broadly define “unconventional statecraft” as 
providing “external support by one state to insurgents in another.” Its purpose is to achieve 
national security objectives through indirect means without escalating into overt armed 
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conflict with another state.113 According to Schmitt and Wall, the act of supporting proxies 
in another state was a generally accepted practice until the mid-20th century, when changes 
in international laws and norms began promoting the concepts of state sovereignty and self-
determination, causing states to employ unconventional statecraft more discreetly.114 
Despite changes in law and sentiment, those writers also point out that “states have 
generally been ambivalent to intervention when it suited their interests, and vehemently 
opposed when it went against.”115 Recognizing the record of ambivalence, an ‘unlawful’ 
decision to support a proxy–most likely in a covert (unattributable or unacknowledged) 
manner–comes down to a value comparison between the potentially malign effect on the 
external actor’s international credibility and the value to be gained from obtaining the 
national security objective.116  
In terms of international law, there are three tiers of escalation: intervention, use of 
force, and armed attack.117 The first tier’s threshold is governed by the principle of non-
intervention. While the principle permits a state to influence another, usually through 
diplomatic, informational, or economic means, it prohibits coercion of another state.118 
Schmitt and Wall define coercion as an act that is intended to compel another state to 
behave in a manner other than how it normally would, or refrain from taking action it would 
otherwise take. Notably, the domestic legal definition of covert action uses the term 
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‘influence,’ whereas the definition of UW uses “coerce, disrupt, or overthrow.,”119 One 
could interpret this as a distinction of peacetime and wartime application of these concepts, 
which are the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) and DOD’s domains, respectively. 
The subsequent tiers of intervention are use of force and armed attack, in that order. 
It is important to note that the distinction between these tiers is slight, and if a gap does 
exist, it enjoys “little practical relevance.”120  Both escalatory tiers trigger the self-defense 
principle (Article 51 of the UN Charter), that allows a proportionate response to an 
aggressor’s actions assuming that other means of resolution have been exhausted. The 
imminence of the attack is another important factor, which allows the targeted nation to 
preemptively defend itself in order to prevent an impending attack.121 There is a dispute 
over whether there is a gap between the use of force and armed attack; however, the United 
States does not recognize this gap. Additionally, what constitutes the use of force is left 
open for interpretation and is discussed more later. 
There are two lawful means for a state to intervene or use force, under U.N. 
resolution or in self-defense, as previously mentioned. Regarding intervention under a U.N. 
resolution, a state’s sovereignty is intertwined with an inherent ‘responsibility to protect’ 
its population. Following humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Kosovo, and Kofi Annan’s 
Millennium Report, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) was organized to discuss whether humanitarian rights should be prioritized over a 
state’s sovereignty.122 In its final report, the commission found that sovereignty entitles a 
state to control its affairs, while simultaneously vesting a responsibility to protect its 
population. If the state fails to do so, the responsibility for action falls on the international 
community.123 This idea was codified into United Nations (UN) resolution 1674 in 2006 
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and was used as justification for use-of-force interventions under UN auspices in Libya, 
South Sudan, and other states.124  
The extent to which unconventional statecraft breaches another state’s sovereignty 
is a matter of degree, based on the type of activities, the threshold of permissible 
intervention, location of those activities, and attribution. Figure 2, presented in Schmitt and 
Wall’s article, addresses the first two factors by cross-referencing the unconventional 
statecraft activities with the level of escalation between state actors.125 The table is a useful 
to determine the threshold of intervention. When coupled with clear policy–or unclear 
policy and sufficient critical thought–the table can help SOF planners proactively identify 
and develop more palatable military options that recognize the boundaries of international 
law. As the table suggests, some activities are easier to legally justify. Category 1 activities 
are legally justifiable and do not meet the threshold of intervention or use of force. Joint 
operations, also referred to as ‘accompany’ operations during Operation Inherent Resolve 
(OIR) in Syria, meet all the criteria for international armed conflict, causing the law of 
armed conflict and a nation’s inherent right to self-defense to come into play, among other 
legal codes.126 
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Figure 2.  Activity-Escalation Crosswalk127 
 
Two final considerations bearing on external support to resistance are territorial 
integrity and the principle of state responsibility. For military planners, both of these legal 
principles, must be understood and considered when developing STR plans that work ‘with 
or through’ a third-countries or when determining where to establish a program’s training 
or logistical sites. Regarding the principle of territorial integrity, providing insurgents ‘non-
lethal military training’ from a third-country does not constitute a breach of integrity, nor 
does it constitute a use of force. However, in the same scenario, if lethal aid or training is 
provided to rebels in a third country, that act would constitute a ‘use of force’ and would 
permit the targeted nation to demand cessation, reparations, or take counter-measures.128 
Corollary to this example is the principle of state responsibility. Although providing ‘non-
lethal’ training or intelligence support to rebels in a third country may not violate territorial 
integrity, states are still responsible for the actions of resistance forces over which they 
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“exercise sufficient control,” assuming they can be legally attributed to the intervening 
state.129 States are also responsible for knowingly assisting another state’s unconventional 
statecraft activities.130 The Syrian conflict provides an example of these principles. Both 
Turkey and Jordan are reported to have provided basing within their territory for the Title 
10 Train and Equip Program, therefore making them complicit in the use of force in Syria–
albeit against ISIS–and would allow the Syrian government to take appropriate legal action 
or counter-measures. If Syria, like the United States, does not recognize a distinction 
between ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’ these actions could potentially leave Turkey and 
Jordan susceptible to self-defense retaliation from the Syria Government. 
The main lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that arming military planners 
with a basic knowledge of international law as it relates to STR will help staffs provide 
commanders and policymakers with suitable, relevant, and palatable strategic options. The 
discussion also highlights the fact that internationally sanctioned actions against 
illegitimate governments open the door for strategic options higher on the proverbial ‘use-
of-force’ spectrum (i.e., along the lines of a Title 10 unconventional warfare campaign). 
Whereas, proposed STR strategies targeting ‘legitimate’ states should tend toward to lower 
end of the spectrum (i.e., intelligence gathering, propaganda, etc.) to avoid potential 
breaches of international law. Ideally, planners would produce scalable options that begin 
in ‘category 1’ and are able to ramp up to lethal support and eventually joint operations, 
when necessary and appropriate. International law also has implications for basing and 
staging, as well as determining which partner nations to work with or through. Finally, as 
the case study analysis will show, familiarity with international law helps military planners 
understand why some ideas prompt indecision, why policies are slow to translate into 
military action, or why approval authority is retained at the Presidential level.  
B. DOMESTIC LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Domestic law, on the other hand, influences the decision to support a resistance 
movement and how STR is employed. The research team analyzed domestic law as it 
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pertains to STR using an adapted analytical framework consisting of: authorities, 
approvals, permissions, exemptions, funding, and oversight (AAPEFO). The analysis 
found that the most significant obstacles to STR reside in the authorities, approvals, and 
funding categories of the framework. However, before examining the results and proposing 
potential solutions, it is important to provide relevant background information on the legal 
aspects of STR. 
The first question to answer is, Who has the statutory authority to authorize an STR 
campaign or operation? Ultimately, the decision authority resides with the President and is 
overseen–and ‘checked’–by Congress, regardless of whether that action is a military 
operation or a covert action. The major legal codes bearing on the decision are the U.S. 
Constitution, United States Code (U.S.C.) Title 10 “The Armed Forces,” which governs 
the employment of conventional and special operations forces; and U.S.C. Title 50 “War 
and National Defense,” which houses the War Powers Resolution and regulates 
intelligence activities and covert action. 
The use of conventional forces, unconventional warfare and covert action all 
require cooperation between the President and Congress to authorize, direct, fund and 
oversee these activities. Constitutionally, the President directs actions, while Congress 
funds the action and declares war. Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to declare war and Article II grants the President ‘Commander-in-Chief’ 
powers.131 However, the War Powers Resolution, enacted in 1973, limited the duration 
that the President could unilaterally commit the Armed Forces to areas where hostilities 
are imminent to 60 days. Commitments longer than that require a declaration of war, 
statutory authorization, or a national emergency resulting from an attack on the United 
States.132 A contemporary example of this is the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), a statutory authorization, which allowed the President to use military force 
against the “nations, organizations, or persons” that “planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
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organizations or persons.”133 Many of SOF’s and general purpose forces’ current activities 
still fall under the purview of this document, despite the ongoing argument between 
Congress and the President over whether or not a new AUMF is necessary to combat ISIS 
and other terrorist organizations.134 
Based on the provisions outlined in U.S. Code, employing conventional forces in 
hostilities is relatively straight forward, but using the Armed Forces or CIA to take indirect 
action (i.e., providing support to a foreign resistance movement) becomes more 
convoluted. To understand which portions of Title 10 and Title 50 apply to an operation or 
activity, the first determination to make whether the activity is a traditional military activity 
(TMA)135 or covert action. Many of the activities associated with STR, such as intelligence 
gathering, psychological operations, paramilitary training, appear similar or 
indistinguishable in practice, but are governed by distinct sections of U.S.C. Based on the 
authors’ analysis, the most significant distinguishing factors between a covert action and a 
TMA are the intent to acknowledge the U.S. government’s role and whether the operation 
is conducted under the direction and control of a military chain of command.136 
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When considering the spectrum of STR activities, it is helpful to divide them into 
covert action, unconventional warfare, and SOF sensitive activities. Statutory law clearly 
defines covert action as activities of the U.S. Government “to influence political, economic, 
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the [U.S. government] 
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”137 It requires a Presidential Finding, 
Congressional notification within 48 hours of execution, and is overseen by the House and 
Senate intelligence committees. Additionally, Executive Order (EO) 12333, issued in 1981, 
mandates that “no agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time 
of war declared by the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President 
to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution) may conduct any covert action activity 
unless the president determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular 
objective.”138 The parenthetical caveat from EO 12333 alludes to the division of labor 
between the CIA and DOD to conduct covert action in times of war and peace, and was 
instituted following the dissolution of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the 
creation of the CIA.139 It is also important to note that this caveat does not prohibit the 
practice of detailing military personnel to the CIA to conduct covert action. Nor does it 
limit the ability of DOD to provide support covert action programs via authorized title 10 
activities.140  
Although similar in nature to covert action, UW is a TMA, designated in Title 10. 
This designation does not, however, negate the fact that a UW campaign may involve 
activities executed under Title 50 auspices and that UW is roughly a wartime equivalent to 
paramilitary action. It is Title 10 because war has been declared or Congress has authorized 
use of force, allowing the U.S. government is to openly acknowledge its involvement, if 
discovered. Additionally, Congress assigned UW as a Special Operations Activity in Title 
10 as part of USSOCOM’s Combatant Command designation, making UW a Traditional 
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Military Activity (TMA). Similar to covert action, which requires a Presidential Finding, 
UW requires an execute order (EXORD) issued by the president. The EXORD grants the 
SECDEF the authority carry out the activities, placing them under a military chain of 
command.141 As with other traditional military Activities, UW is overseen by the Armed 
Forces Committees in the House and Senate. Finally, unlike Covert Action, the definition 
of UW is maintained by the military, and is not codified in statutory law.142 Joint Doctrine 
defines UW as “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or 
with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.”143 
The final category on the STR spectrum is Sensitive Special Operations (SSOPS), 
which are essentially Preparation of the Environment (PE) activities conducted by SOF in 
politically sensitive environments where national level oversight is required due to the 
potential risks and repercussions.144 These activities are critical for gathering intelligence 
and preparing of the environment for potential special operations, such as UW.145 
Although preparation of the environment activities may lead to a UW or STR campaign, it 
is important to recognize the distinction between PE activities and a UW or STR campaign 
itself, as the two have different approval, authorization, and oversight requirements. Many 
of these activities appear to straddle the line between Titles 10 and 50, and leave substantial 
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room for differing interpretations of the law or policies and creating oversight issues and a 
perception of DOD-CIA ‘convergence.’  
Convergence refers to the malign perception that DOD has ventured outside its 
military intelligence boundaries into the CIA’s national intelligence gathering mandate, or 
that the CIA’s counterterrorism activities have moved too far into DOD’s direct action 
mandate.146 Most of the ‘convergence’ debate revolves around the appropriate oversight 
and reporting for SSO activities, not STR or UW campaigns, prompts Intelligence 
Committees’ concern that DOD is developing intelligence capabilities to bypass 
Congressional oversight.147 Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 304 attempted to 
alleviate some of this by requiring all members of the Intelligence Community (IC)–which 
includes DOD–to coordinate intelligence gathering activities with the CIA.148 In a more 
recent effort to address the problem, Congress included a provision in the FY 17 NDAA 
mandating a pilot program to “assess the feasibility and advisability of establishing a 
military division within the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency” 
to improve the coordination of clandestine HUMINT collection.149  
Aside from Title 10 and Title 50, the execution of support to resistance is regulated 
by yearly congressional authorization acts for national defense (NDAAs), intelligence, and 
occasionally, foreign relations. Currently, there are no enduring authorizations or funding 
for STR, which places limitation’s on SOCOM’s ability to react to emerging situations, 
execute the appropriate PE activities, and provide the National Authority with viable 
strategic options. In contrast, counterterrorism (CT) operations are codified in 10 U.S.C 
Section 127(e)–formerly section 1208–to develop and execute CT operations abroad with 
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a yearly funding authorization of $100 million.150 There are three current, but temporary, 
NDAA authorizations which relate specifically to DOD’s role in STR–sections 1209, 1236, 
and 1201. Operations in Iraq and Syria which support resistance forces–albeit for CT 
purposes–are being executed under the authority and funding of sections 1236 and 1209, 
respectively, of the FY 15 NDAA.,151152  
Although there is no enduring authorization or funding specific to STR, Section 
1201 of the forthcoming FY 18 NDAA is certainly a step in the right direction because it 
allocates funding through FY 21 for irregular warfare activities, such as STR. Titled 
“Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare,” this section authorizes “The 
Secretary of Defense [to], with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission, expend 
up to $10,000,000 during each of fiscal years 2018 through 2021 to provide support to 
foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating 
ongoing irregular warfare operations by United States Special Operations Forces.”153 
Section 1201 is likely a result of Section 1097 of the FY 16 which ordered DOD to 
“develop a strategy…to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state 
and non-state actors” and to “analyze the adequacy of current authorities and command 
structures necessary for countering unconventional warfare.”154 The use of the 
overarching term ‘irregular warfare’ suggests that the authorization was not uniquely 
intended for UW, but for the broader concept of STR or Counter-UW activities to “[enable] 
or [prepare partner nations] for resistance activities, potentially as part of a deterrence or 
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national defense strategy.”155 As outlined in the recently drafted “U.S. Government 
Support to Resistance Framework,” an example of these preparatory activities may be 
identifying and organizing resistance groups to act as ‘bitter-pill’ deterrents in areas 
susceptible to foreign infiltration or invasion from state or non-state actors, where the 
partner nation government has a limited ability to exert its power or has been displaced.156  
Finally, establishing proactive and adaptive funding options for current and 
emerging STR requirements is important. Examining funding levels of the current STR 
authorizations shows how Congress is able to control and direct DOD’s activities through 
the provision or limitation of funds. The Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) in 
Iraq and Syria are appropriated $1.269 billion and $250 million, respectively, for FY 17.157 
Whereas, section 1201 provides $10 million,158 which limits the scale of these activities, 
but does allow USSOCOM to proactively posture its forces and infrastructure for future 
STR policy options. If a policy decision is made to ramp up U.S. government support to a 
foreign resistance element, Congress would authorize and fund the effort in a subsequent 
NDAA, as we will examine in the Syria discussion. However, this can be problematic if 
the policy decision is off-cycle with the passage of the NDAA or there is an unanticipated 
requirement. In these circumstances, DOD can leverage the Emergency Expense (EEE, 
colloquially known as “triple E”) provision in section 127 of Title 10 U.S.C., which allows 
DOD to reallocate previously appropriated Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds, for 
confidential military purposes or unanticipated emergency requirements.159 However, this 
is a temporary bridging solution and would be insufficient to fund a campaign of significant 
scale. Other avenues to funding are through a continuing resolution, as was used to initially 
finance the Train and Equip Program in 2014, or through emergency supplemental 
appropriations, which involve a summarized version of the annual appropriations process.  
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C. SUMMARY 
This chapter concludes with a distillation of the key legal judgements, 
considerations, and obstacles affecting the employment of STR strategies. First, successful 
STR is planned and resourced in an anticipatory manner that recognizes the time it takes 
to prepare and execute Special Warfare missions. This is a contrast to what appears to be 
the current model of reactionary policy provision, congressional resourcing, and strategic 
military planning. As a result of this reactionary model, STR efforts begin at an inherent 
disadvantage. Delays in policy and resource provisions limit options and decision space, 
ultimately creating ‘in extremis’ or ‘cold-start’ situations where the U.S. government was 
forced to choose the ‘least worst’ resistance partner, as discussed in the Syria case study. 
Related to this idea is the concept of “UW in a proactive fashion (Pr-UW),” which was 
outlined in a 2015 USASOC Whitepaper on SOF support to political warfare. This 
approach to UW leverages “SOF and the whole-of-government assets” to prepare the 
environment and to establish and maintain trust and influence with likely potential 
resistance groups in a region “before U.S. leaders are constrained to react to a crisis.”160 
Finally, with regard to authorizations and appropriations, the legislation should be written 
after the development of a military strategy, or at least in conjunction with it, to ensure 
Congress is able to provide necessary resources and authorizations to execute the strategy–
an authority-strategy match. This also provides Congress the opportunity to wittingly 
restrict aspects of a proposed strategy, as opposed to the unwitting and unintended 
restrictions that will be discussed in the Syria case study. Establishing the necessary posture 
will require greater efforts from SOCOM, the TSOCs, and ASDSOLIC to take proactive 
planning measures to identify how future law and policy must be shaped. 
The second conclusion is that current statutory authorities make it easier to pursue 
CT activities because they provide a path of least resistance for rapid DOD involvement. 
However, this method creates ad hoc mechanisms that present immediate solutions, but do 
little to fix inherent shortcomings in the bureaucracy or establish enduring solutions to 
security challenges. In a 2013 Council on Foreign Relations study, Linda Robinson quotes 
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Admiral Mcraven’s 2012 posture statement, in which he states “The direct approach alone 
is not the solution to the challenges our nation faces today, as it ultimately only buys time 
and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less 
well-known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the complementary 
element that can counter the systemic components of the threat.”161 Robinson goes on to 
argue that although SOCOM leaders agree that the indirect approach (Special Warfare) is 
decisive, “it has not been prioritized in practice. The lion’s share of attention, effort, and 
resources in the past decade has been devoted to honing and applying the direct approach 
[Surgical Strike]. In fact, both the general public and many policymakers now equate 
special operations forces almost exclusively with the direct approach.”162 
The third conclusion is that UW (and SOF Sensitive Activities) are not clearly 
defined in USC.163 Jennifer Obernier, an official in the Office of Undersecretary of 
Defense for Intelligence initially expressed in Small Wars Journal. Obernier argues the 
lack of a codified definition contributes to congressional misunderstanding of what exactly 
UW is and how it should be employed. Unlike its Title 50 cousin, covert action, UW–and 
now STR–has no clearly defined process to garner approval, get interagency stakeholder 
feedback, and report activities to Congress.164 The process is more ad hoc due to the 
infrequency in which Title 10 UW has been employed. The lack of a codified definition 
and approval process creates a potentially limiting factor for the employment of UW or 
STR. 
Next, although this research has identified some gaps in authorities, the problem is 
more often a lack of approvals than a lack of authorities. As several interviewees from 
different organizations noted, even when there is an authorities gap, if political will exists, 
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authorities and funding will quickly follow, as the nation saw in Afghanistan in 2001.165 
Where approvals do exist, a lack of knowledge regarding international and domestic law 
on the part of military planners creates the potential for those same planners to provide 
Combatant Commanders–and ultimately policymakers–with unacceptable strategic 
options. In the same vein, STR activities that require national level approval must clearly 
support policy objectives and their benefits should outweigh the potential risks. As special 
operations are often bottom-up driven, a lack policy understanding at lower echelons 
creates the potential for delay or disapproval of critical operations. Finally, as described in 
the Syria case study, the excessive use and reliance on CONOPs as part of the approval 
process–vice the use of OPORDs and fragmentary orders, which provide subordinates with 
clear commander’s intent, tasks, requirements and constraints–degrades operational 
flexibility by delaying decision making and stifling the ability of subordinate commanders 
to “exercise disciplined initiative.”166 
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VII. POLITICAL OBSTACLES 
It is not possible to discuss obstacles to military planning without accounting for 
political considerations. Highlighting the interplay of politics and armed conflict, military 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously posited that “War is not merely an act of policy but 
a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other 
means.”167 Echoing this sentiment, strategist Thomas K. Adams states that “there is an area 
where the degree of interconnection … between these [political and military] spheres is 
contentious and poorly defined: this is the area of UW.”168 Accordingly, politics and UW 
are inextricably linked by their very nature. Refining this connection between the political 
and military spheres further, political scientist Hans Morgenthau cautions that the Armed 
Forces as “the instrument of foreign policy should not become the master of foreign 
policy.”169 Therefore, Morgenthau continues, “an indispensable prerequisite” to any 
foreign policy is “the subordination of the military under the civilian authorities which are 
constitutionally responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs.”170 Thus, to fulfill this 
prerequisite, any proposed UW or STR planning effort must endure immense scrutiny from 
civilian authorities to ensure the increased risk and wide ranging effects directly tie to U.S. 
foreign policy objectives or, at least the very least, to approved contingency and operation 
plans (OPLANs).  
However, given the frequency of disconnections between civil and military 
leadership, it is becoming increasingly difficult to develop feasible military options that 
suitably address the threat to the United States or its allies, while reflecting foreign policy 
objectives and political sensitives. To mitigate at least a portion of this obstacle, 
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USSOCOM has established a network of liaison officers within the national capital region 
(NCR) to represent its equities among the interagency community. While effective in its 
promotion of counter-terrorism (CT) initiatives, this network has not been able to provide 
adequate representation to USSOCOM’s UW/STR capabilities for a myriad of reasons, 
such as the national priority of CT since 9/11 and the perceived over-militarization of 
foreign policy. Compounding this difficulty further is the necessary, yet cumbersome, 
national security policy system which varies and evolves during each administration. 
Furthermore, politicians’ risk aversion and the focus on larger geopolitical priorities 
exacerbates the challenges that military planners will face. It is true that elected officials’ 
hesitation to risk neither the lives of military members nor domestic and international 
political capital is unquestionably valid in certain cases; however, in other instances, this 
trend of reluctance creates a cognitive barrier that restricts free-thinking and the formation 
of non-traditional military options among planners.  
This chapter will analyze political challenges to UW and STR planning under the 
broad categories of grand strategy, civil-military disconnection, the NSC process, risk 
aversion, and geopolitics. Following this analysis, further examination of these challenges 
through the lens of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) will demonstrate that these 
complications continue to significantly impact the United States’ national security strategy 
while hindering the progress of UW or STR initiatives. 
A. CHALLENGES OF BRIDGING CIVIL-MILITARY DISCONNECTION 
THROUGH A GLOBAL SOF NETWORK 
The first political obstacle to military planning is often the civil-military disconnect 
stemming from the separation of powers enshrined in the constitution. Political scientist 
Eliot Cohen begins his book Commandos and Politicians by discussing Alexander 
Hamilton’s “fundamental anxiety…that the guardians of the polity might turn against 
it.”171 Additionally, in his book The Soldier and the State, military sociologist Samuel 
Huntington further elaborated on the need to separate the “guardians” from the “polity,” 
writing that “[p]olitics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of 
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military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional 
competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for 
professional values.”172 These concerns led America’s founding fathers to establish civilian 
control of the military within the first two articles of the U.S. Constitution.173 
Although now considered an axiom of the American government, this necessary 
separation is not without repercussions. This separation of civil and military leadership has 
over time contributed to a substantial lack of common understanding between the two 
elements. In his speech at Duke University in 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates described civil-military detachment more broadly, stating: 
whatever their fond sentiments for men and women in uniform, for most 
Americans the wars remain an abstraction. A distant and unpleasant series 
of news items that does not affect them personally… [W]ith each passing 
decade fewer and fewer Americans know someone with military experience 
in their family or social circle.174 
Historical analysis from the Pew Research Center quantifies this disconnect 
between America’s elected leadership. Specifically, in the 115th U.S. Congress, which took 
office January 2017, Pew found that only 20% of senators and 19% of representatives have 
any record of service in the military.175 Moreover, independent research of the 115th 
Congress determined that only 31% of the members of the House Armed Service 
Committee (HASC) and 37% of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC) have any history of military service, either active or reserve.176 Additionally, the 
Pew Center’s research underscored that this modest level of military experience within all 
                                                 
172 Samuel Huntington, The Solider and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1957), 71. 
173 U.S. Const. Art. I, §8 states that Congress shall have the power “to raise and support Armies …” 
and “to provide and maintain a Navy;” U.S. Const. Art. II, §2 states that “The President shall be the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States 
when called into the actual Service of the United States.” 
174 Robert M. Gates, “All-Volunteer Force,” (lecture, Duke University, Durham, NC, September 29, 
2010). 
175 “The changing face of Congress in 5 charts,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, (February 2, 
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/02/the-changing-face-of-congress-in-5-charts/. 
176 Authors of this research found that 19 of the 62 members of the House Armed Services Committee 
and 10 of the 27 members of the Senate Armed Service Committee held a record of active or reserve 
military service.  
 60 
of Congress was a significant decrease from prior sessions, such as its peak in 1967 at 75% 
in both chambers and levels of 37% and 27% for senator and representatives, respectively, 
in 2001.177 Not only do these findings signal a potential increase in the civil-military 
disconnect in the future, but they also demonstrate the extent of the current deficit of 
military experience within present-day civilian leadership. Although military experience is 
rightfully not a prerequisite for elected office within the United States, this absence of a 
frame of reference for elected officials hampers their ability to understand complex and, at 
times, ambiguous military operations, such as UW and STR. Consequently, political 
leaders require sound advice and consultation from qualified individuals within the 
country’s military establishment to ensure all means of executing national security policy 
are explored prior to the final decision.  
1. SOF’S Global Network to Improve the Civil–Military Disconnect 
To ameliorate the effects of such civil-military disconnect, USSOCOM leverages 
its global SOF network. Military doctrine acknowledges the importance of SOF influence 
and support to national policymakers through an intricate liaison network referred to as the 
“global SOF network.” Specifically, JP 3–05 Special Operations outlines this liaison 
structure as a “synchronized network of people and technology (U.S., allies, and partner 
nations) designed to support commanders through inter-operable capabilities that enable 
special operations.”178 For the National Capital Region (NCR), the global SOF network’s 
efforts were, at one point, funneled through a single conduit: USSOCOM-NCR.  
Attempting to improve this disconnection, Admiral McRaven established 
USSOCOM-NCR as a means to enhance the interagency community’s understanding of 
SOF formations and capabilities by leveraging SOF liaison officers to help shape future 
U.S policy. In his 2013 statement to the HASC, then USSOCOM commander Admiral 
McRaven highlighted the two central functions of the USSOCOM-NCR: “support[ing] 
coordination and decision making with interagency partners” and “ensur[ing] that the 
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perspectives and capabilities of interagency and international mission partners are 
incorporated into all phases of SOF planning efforts”179 In other words, this portion of the 
global SOF network informs both interagency and USSOCOM leadership above and below 
their level to facilitate both a common operational picture and unity of effort. 
Further demonstrating the importance of this network, USSOCOM placed its Vice-
Commander in Washington, DC, to lead this effort through the management of SOF 
liaisons, referred to as Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs). From their inception 
in 2012, these teams of one to three persons have embedded throughout various 
departments and agencies of the U.S. government with the stated purpose of “facilitating 
the exchange of information” for the SOF community.180 By placing these nodes within 
the various interagency headquarters, USSOCOM intended to improve its operational 
picture within the nation’s capital and reduced disconnection between civil and military 
leadership. However, Congress blocked funding for this USSOCOM initiative under the 
FY 14 National Defense Authorization Act until DOD provided more information on the 
funding and justification for this regional organization.181 Although this action effectively 
ended the USSOCOM level NCR initiative, lower level regional liaison networks, such as 
the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-NCR, continue to support at least a portion of 
USSOCOM equities through their access to interagency partners.  
2. Impediments to the Global SOF Network’s Effectiveness 
By maintaining an imbalanced focus on CT operations, the improvements afforded 
to civil-military intercourse by the global SOF network are potentially negated for other 
SOF capabilities, such as UW. Since 9/11, the United States’ defense has been noticeably 
fixed on combatting terrorism. Chapter II of JP 3–05 Special Operations outlines 12 core 
activities for U.S. SOF, “reflect[ing] the collective capabilities of all joint SOF rather than 
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those of any one Service or unit.”182 Yet, despite this broad range of capabilities, from 
surgical strike to special warfare, “prioritize[d] targeted counterterrorism operations” 
remain at the core of the country’s national security strategy.183 Viewed by a majority of 
Americans as the “leading threat” to national security, terrorist groups such as the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) advance this narrative that the defense of the United States 
must center on CT.184 Therefore, that USSOCOM-NCR and its SOST liaisons focus 
primarily on promoting CT initiatives as spokesmen for the “pre-eminent Counterterrorism 
force.”185 
The nation’s CT focus unduly narrows civilian leaders’ understanding of how other 
SOF capabilities, such as UW and STR, help preserve America’s national interests abroad. 
While highlighting USSOCOM’s role as DOD’s global synchronizer for CT efforts, 
current USSOCOM Commander General Raymond A. Thomas mentioned terrorism and 
CT effort a total of 10 times in his most recent posture statement to CT. Conversely, GEN. 
Thomas did not mention UW and STR once.186 This form of routine emphasis on CT when 
addressing political leadership ultimately relegates SOF’s other 11 core activities to the 
background. In her book How Everything Became War and the Military Became 
Everything, Georgetown law professor and former counselor to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy Rosa Brooks notes that “after 9/11, the expansion of [SOF] activities 
was virtually inevitable” since “terrorist organizations don’t fight like conventional 
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armies” and SOF “were designed to handle unconventional threats.”187 Yet, when the 
global SOF network promotes only CT forces/capabilities to combat these “unconventional 
threats,” it effectively sustains the civil-military disconnection by minimizing potential 
advantages that other SOF activities could offer to the interagency community. 
USSOCOM’s continued expansion in both size and influence sustains the civil-
military disconnect and adds to interagency concerns over the militarization of foreign 
policy. Although many of the concerns discussed within this research are based in 
qualitative analysis, the interagency community’s concern over the exceptional growth of 
DOD and USSOCOM since 9/11 is quantifiable. The annual size and budget of the DOD 
far outweigh that of almost every other government entity. For example, in FY17, the 
Department of State had a total of 75,604 employees and a budget of $50.1 billion.188 This 
is dwarfed by the DOD’s approximately 1.3 million employees and $560.4 billion 
(including both base and overseas contingency operations funding) budget.189 Moreover, 
USSOCOM has experienced record growth in the 16 years since 9/11 with twice the 
number of personnel and three times as much budget.190 With only 6% of the personnel 
and 9% of the budget of DOD, it is clear why the foreign service and members of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) are apprehensive about SOCOM’s 
liaison network. While the other organizations under the U.S. government may have larger 
budgets or number of personnel than DoS, none compare with the size and scope of the 
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DOD. Furthermore, with the proposed decrease in soft power and increase to military 
spending in the current administration’s budgets requests, there is a strong potential for this 
disparity to grow even larger in the near future.191 This concern over the ascendency of 
the military is further exacerbated by the multiple areas of overlap between DOD and 
certain interagency activities that are discussed further in the legal chapter. Therefore, the 
“gutting of America’s soft power” (a term coined by Rosa Brooks) leads to what Secretary 
Gates warns is the DOD taking on “many of [the] burdens that might have been assumed 
by civilian agencies in the past.”192 As a result, it is plain to see why the USSOCOM-NCR 
faces an uphill battle when attempting interagency collaboration and facilitating a common 
understanding of SOF capabilities. 
B. SUBJECTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NSC 
PROCESS 
Proposed STR operations must also navigate a dynamic NSC approvals process 
that changes with each administration. Since its establishment by the National Security Act 
of 1947, the NSC has provided the nation’s primary analysis and adjudication process for 
all national security policy options reaching the President’s office for decision. As outlined 
in Title 50 of the United States Code (USC), the NSC serves to “assess and appraise the 
objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to the actual and 
potential military power of the United States, and make recommendations thereon to the 
President.”193 For this reason, JP 5–0 Joint Operations Planning identifies the NSC system 
as “the principal forum for interagency deliberation of national security policy issues 
requiring Presidential decision.”194 Yet, despite this acknowledged primacy, few military 
members thoroughly understand the inner workings of the NSC Staff that will ultimately 
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review, analyze, and discard or recommend their courses of action for decision at higher 
levels. Moreover, few military members outside of the Pentagon or Washington, DC, have 
ever even dealt with the subordinate Policy Coordination Committees (formerly known as 
Interagency Policy Committees) or Deputies Committee supporting the Principals 
Committee and NSC; therefore, the process of the NSC has remained a concept foreign to 
most military members since its creation.  
The evolution of the NSC through several periods of success and failure for the 
national security policy process has current implications for special operations. The 
Eisenhower administration provides several salient examples of effective NSC 
management enhancing covert operations. From the council’s onset in the early years of 
the Cold War, the benefits of thorough analysis and informed advice provided by the NSC 
staff were evident as Soviet expansion routinely threatened U.S. interests abroad. This 
period was later referred to as the “golden age of covert action” since “movements of U.S. 
troops in any sizeable numbers risked superpower confrontation [e.g., the Korean 
War]…[and] traditional diplomacy seemed cumbersome at best and counterproductive at 
worst.”195 As the prominence of covert action grew through the CIA’s activities in such 
contentious places as Iran, Guatemala, and Indochina, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
leveraged over four decades of military experience managing complex and dynamic staffs 
to establish an NSC system based on “trust and effective enforcement measures.”196 
Specifically, President Eisenhower institutionalized the structure and functions of the NSC 
through the creation of the NSA position (originally named Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs), the Operations Coordinating Board, and the Board of Consultants on 
Foreign Intelligence Activities. From that point forward, the NSA would serve the 
President as “a source of advice” instead of a policymaker, managing the preparation of 
studies, and policy recommendations/drafts for policy coordination, enabling the NSC to 
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“handle an increasing volume of [national security] matters.”197 While President Kennedy 
initially eliminated both boards upon taking office in an attempt to reduce the “pyramid 
structure…[and] needless paperwork and machinery between the president and his 
responsible officers,” similar functioning bodies were reinstituted within the NSC 
following the CIA’s failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs.198 Though President Eisenhower’s 
manning and management of the NSC was without a doubt extensive, a properly 
functioning and managed NSC proved essential to the success of covert operations during 
a vital period American history. 
 In contrast to the Eisenhower administration, the Reagan administration revealed 
the clear danger that mismanagement of the NSC process presents to special operations 
and covert action. Describing this period of American history, author and former chief of 
the CIA’s Problem Analysis Branch George J. A. O’Toole notes that special operations 
and covert action were the “favorite instrument of the Reagan administration…most 
notably in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, despite congressional opposition.”199 Upon taking 
office, President Reagan reorganized the NSC Staff identifying his Secretary of State as 
his “principal foreign policy advisor” and creating three “Senior Interagency Groups” to 
direct policy formation in the areas of foreign policy, defense, and intelligence.200 This 
reorganization, while intended to “restore cabinet leadership” that had eroded through 
divisions dating back to the Nixon administration, eventually resulted in the swelling of 
the NSC staff due to “uncertain lines of responsibility” and the absence of “orderly decision 
making” by the President.201 
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The consequences of this lack of authority over the NSC came to the forefront when 
NSC staffers, notably Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, moved beyond policy formation 
and into policy implementation during the Iran-Contra affair.202 Congress’ subsequent 
Tower Commission investigation into this incident would determine that flawed and 
informal decision making processes were contributing factors to the failed covert program, 
which “appeared to run directly counter to declared U.S. policies.”203 In the fallout from 
this international blunder, President Reagan restored central authority within the NSC to 
the NSA appointing then Lieutenant General Colin Powell to the position. Among other 
things, General Powell is credited with restoring integrity and effective rule enforcement 
to the NSC staff while “emphasizing that he worked for the statutory Cabinet members of 
the NSC, not just the president.”204 
The malleable organization, size, and direction of the NSC process highlight how 
much of this advisory staff is shaped by the administration and by significant events. 
Although the NSC itself is codified in law, the organization and process of the council are 
left to the discretion of the administration and its designated National Security Advisor 
(NSA). Stephen Hadley, former NSA to President George W. Bush, underscored the 
impact of this executive discretion stating that “Presidents get the national security process 
they deserve.”205 Therefore, the management style and experience of the President, or lack 
thereof, will largely influence the NSC organization and process. The current framework 
of the NSC, which consists of three subgroups (Principals Committee, Deputies 
Committee, and subordinate interagency groups of varying names), was established by 
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Brent Scowcroft during President George H.W. Bush’s administration.206 Supporting this 
framework is the NSC staff, which varies in size and focus with each administration as 
well. For example, the NSC Staff in 1991 was estimated at 45 personnel, compared to 
nearly 400 personnel at its zenith in 2016 under the Obama administration.207 Former NSA 
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attributed the increase to a merger with the 
Homeland Security Council, which formed following the 9/11 attacks, and also to the 
“intensification of emerging security challenges, from cyber threats to public health 
emergencies such as Ebola.”208 Public opposition to this immense interagency system 
within the White House has grown in recent years, culminating in the FY 16 NDAA 
mandate that the NSC Staff be limited to 100–150 staff members, including detailees.209 
While the “right-sizing” of the NSC is outside the scope of this research, its notable history 
of expansion and retraction demonstrates the volatility of this interagency environment.210 
C. POLITICAL RISK AVERSION 
The increased risk for STR and UW operations puts them in direct conflict with the 
culture of risk aversion that is firmly rooted in the democratic foundations and history of 
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the U.S. government. As outlined in JP 3–05 Special Operations, SOF’s “smaller units” 
and “unique capabilities” are defining characteristics making Special Operations more 
palatable for elected officials than the employment of larger Conventional Forces.211 Yet, 
in a similar fashion to covert action, the advantages of leveraging SOF in STR and UW 
will come with increased political risks inherent these operations. For this reason, military 
planners must fully understand and appreciate the culture of risk aversion within the U.S. 
government to ensure that the gains for any purposed military operations outweigh the risks 
involved. While many conflate risk aversion with political posturing or shortcomings, the 
Constitution provides a more comprehensive explanation for this aversion. To prevent 
potential misuse of the military, the nation’s founding fathers explicitly divided 
administration and command of the military between Congress and the President, 
respectively. By dividing these powers between the two branches of government, the 
framers of the Constitution not only established a safeguard against the abuse of power vis-
à-vis the military, but also demonstrated their intention to maintain these services as a 
defensive force.212 Through maintaining a Navy and raising an Army, Congress could 
provide the necessary protection for America’s commerce and limit the possibility that the 
Executive branch could misuse a standing Army against the American people or other 
foreign states for malign interests.  
This defensive use of the Armed Forces is further reflected in both the Federalist 
Papers and President George Washington’s Farewell Address. In Federalist Paper No. 3, 
the U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay states that “[t]he just causes of war, for the 
most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence.”213 By limiting 
justified armed engagement to these two central infringements, Jay promotes the Federalist 
position that military intervention should focus solely on the defense of U.S. interests. 
President George Washington echoed this Federalist concept during his 1796 Farewell 
Address. While this address primarily focused on urging Americans to remain cautious of 
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foreign alliances, Washington added that future American leadership would be well-served 
to “always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectably defensive 
posture.”214 Again, this forethought of the military as a defensive force clearly permeated 
the thoughts of the nation’s founders.  
Further evidence of America’s efforts to limit risk is found within the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973. Near the end of the Vietnam War, Congress took action to establish 
statutory checks on the President’s powers as Commander in Chief. Describing this period, 
legal scholar John Hart Ely writes that it was at this point in American history that Congress 
finally realized that “it had been dodging its constitutional duty to make the decision 
whether to commit American troops to combat” since the end of WWII.215 To rectify this 
dereliction of duty, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution of 1973, overriding 
President Nixon’s veto. This joint resolution attempted to clarify several “gray areas” under 
the authorities of the Legislative and Executive Branches concerning military action.216 
Specifically, the resolution intended to “insure that the collective judgement of both the 
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities.”217 Congress underpinned this “collective judgement” with several 
requirements for what it referred to as “undeclared wars.” Examples of these requirements 
are a mandatory notification to Congress within 48 hours of deploying U.S. Armed Forces 
and a 60-day limit to this deployment of Armed Forces unless otherwise approved by 
Congress (other examples are discussed in Chapter VI [legal obstacles] of this research). 
While all subsequent Presidents have continued to challenge the constitutionality of this 
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resolution, the message sent by Congress to the Executive Branch was clear: prepare for 
restrained use of military intervention in the future.218 
America’s elected officials’ risk aversion was further engendered by the country’s 
checkered history with foreign intervention after Vietnam. Approaching the end of the Cold 
War, the United States experienced several impressive covert and overt military victories 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Specifically, the United States’ enabled the Mujahedeen’s 
successful overthrow of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan through nearly a decade of 
covert support in Operation Cyclone; militarily ousted Panamanian General Manuel 
Noriega in Operation Just Cause; and expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in Desert Storm. 
Through these successful overt and covert operations, multiple levels of the United States’ 
instruments of national power appeared adept at foreign intervention.  
Despite this pattern of successive victories at the end of the Cold War, the United 
States experienced limited success in military intervention after Desert Storm. Beginning 
in 1993, with the death of 19 military personnel during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 
both civil and military leadership began to view resolving the nation’s “uncoordinated and 
unclear” foreign policies through intervention as a precarious measure.219 This jarring 
experience in Somalia affected President William Clinton’s and Congress’ decisions not to 
intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and, in 1995 to delay intervention in the Serbian 
massacre in Bosnia.220 Moreover, the dawn of the 21st century reflected a similar aversion 
to intervention, as President George W. Bush’s administration focused on a retaliatory 
response to 9/11 in Afghanistan and in Iraq in 2003 while genocide and civil war in the 
Sudan went unchecked for nearly a decade. Although scholars may argue about whether 
the United States’ aversion to foreign intervention stems from concern over costs, 
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casualties, domestic support, or a combination thereof, America’s difficult experience with 
foreign intervention in the post-Cold War era has contributed to the culture of aversion.221 
In the modern interagency operating environment, political risk aversion ultimately 
transcends the boundary between civil and military leadership and now pervades senior 
military leadership as well. In his 2004 article from The Weekly Standard entitled 
“Showstoppers,” international politics scholar Richard Schultz Jr. proposes that the 
diffusion of risk aversion throughout senior military ranks is one of several why the United 
States did not pursue terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, prior to 9/11.222 Schultz 
quotes a military official with special operations and Joint Staff experience, stating that 
“risk aversion emerges as senior officers move into higher positions …. They get caught 
up in interagency politics and the bureaucratic process, and get risk-averse.”223 Within the 
military, the penchant towards risk aversion promotes what has been coined a “zero-
defects” mentality, which requires “perfect operations, no casualties, no failure.”224 
Historical research from the Center for Strategic International Studies on American 
military culture in the 21st century found that this mentality of mandatory perfection within 
the military and civilian leadership soon leads to an environment of “dysfunctional 
conformity” and micromanagement.225 With this in mind, it appears that military planners 
will need to confront risk aversion both outside and within their organization. 
D. GEOPOLITICS 
The fourth and final political obstacle military planners must contend with are the 
sensitivities of geopolitics given the likelihood of pervading regional, and potentially 
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global, impacts triggered by any STR campaign. In his book Geography and Politics in a 
Divided World, American geographer Saul B. Cohen defined geopolitics as “the relation 
of international political power to the geographical setting.”226 In joint doctrine, this 
interaction of international political power and geography is captured within the definition 
of special operations as the environment of “hostile, denied, or politically and/or 
diplomatically” sensitivities in which SOF operates.227 Furthermore, joint doctrine 
highlights that it is this degree of “political and/or diplomatic risk” that may separate 
special operations from conventional operations. Reflecting this fusion of political 
sensitivities and “specially trained” forces, Eliot Cohen notes that small wars, such as UW 
and STR campaigns, take their “peculiar coloration from the geopolitical circumstances 
which call it forth, and hence [require] special means for its conduct.”228 Accordingly, 
geopolitics are a central element to nearly all special operations. 
During the Cold War, geopolitical fault lines propelled American foreign policy 
towards increasingly restrictive warfare. Former National Security Advisor and Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger described geopolitics within the modern international system as 
an “equilibrium” or “balance of power.”229 Additionally, Kissinger maintained that the 
“nuclear age has destroyed [the] traditional measure” of maintaining this balance of power 
through “military polarity.”230 With this perspective in mind, limited war has emerged in 
the nuclear age as the precondition for all military engagements. In his 1957 book Limited 
War, foreign policy scholar Robert Osgood explains this concept of restrictive warfare as 
relegating military objectives to political objectives that “do not demand the utmost 
military effort of which belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a 
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negotiated settlement.”231 Consequently, by restraining military force in an armed conflict 
to below its fullest capabilities, the United States could accommodate for various 
geographical considerations in pursuit of its political objective by way of negotiated 
settlement. 
Numerous historical cases in the post-World War II era demonstrate how 
geopolitical considerations have rightfully dictated the feasibility of the United States’ 
intervention abroad. In Korea, President Truman chose a limited war military strategy to 
avoid overcommitting resources against the Chinese and North Koreans amid potential 
Soviet expansion in Europe. Similar geopolitical considerations of Soviet expansion led 
President Eisenhower to promulgate the “falling domino” principle as the source of South 
Vietnam’s strategic importance and the imperative to defend it through U.S. military and 
economic support.232 In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, although Presidents Carter and 
Reagan took ideologically different approaches to national defense, regional conflicts in 
both the Middle East and South America against communist influences continued to 
dominate America’s foreign policy agenda. Finally, with the close of Cold War, the 
importance of geopolitics has expanded as “transnational issues,” such as “terrorism, 
narcotics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime” 
now direct America’s foreign policy outlook.233 Given the expansive reach of these issues 
across traditional sovereign international, economic, and social border, the importance for 
military planners to understand and account for geopolitics cannot be overstated. 
Globalization magnifies the impact of geopolitics on all foreign policy decisions 
requiring greater consideration for any STR planning effort. In its January 2017 report on 
global trends, the U.S National Intelligence Council found that “geopolitical competition 
is on the rise” as America’s adversaries (e.g., China and Russia) “seek to exert more sway 
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over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which U.S. influence does not 
dominate.”234 To sustain its global hegemony, the United States acknowledges and 
accounts for modern economic and social interdependence increasingly fueled by 
technological advances. Concurrently, military leadership must expand its focus beyond 
traditional boundaries to prepare for and, when necessary, address transnational threats that 
will undoubtedly define future conflicts. While discussing the nature of 21st century 
conflict, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford concedes that 
“transregional, multidomain, multifunctional conflicts” are the future of modern warfare 
and will require the military to review its traditional “command-and-control construct in 
place to integrate joint capabilities.”235 Likewise, STR plans must account for the 
constraints posed by geopolitical issues against transregional threats to ensure viability in 
future conflicts. 
E. SUMMARY 
The collective impact of political obstacles to STR planning restrains the viability 
of these strategies. The history of civil-military disconnection between the interagency 
community and DOD demonstrates that efforts to improve this detachment, such as liaison 
officer networks, can be nullified by both an imbalanced promotion of one SOF capability 
over another and the perceived militarization of foreign policy. Furthermore, the dynamic 
NSC process, which can change with each Presidential election cycle, creates a volatile 
environment for military planners of irregular and high-risk Special Operations. While 
developers of Special Operations have dealt with similar issues while creating options for 
foreign intervention in the contemporary era (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya), it is 
important to note that increasing patterns of risk aversion and geopolitical sensitivities 
driven by globalization will likely exacerbate these obstacles in future conflicts. If military 
planners hope to enhance the viability of STR or UW operations in the future, they must 
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VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES 
To consider what constitutes an effective support to resistance organization, this 
study reviews William Donovan’s 1941 vision for the Office of Strategic (OSS). The 
authors of this research selected the OSS, which grew out of the Coordinator of Information 
(CoI), because it was an innovative organization, built to “handle research, intelligence, 
propaganda, subversion, and commando and guerrilla operations in modern war”– the 
critical components of irregular warfare.236 Although USSOCOM is a descendent of the 
OSS, as one might expect, many of Donovan’s criteria, considerations, and challenges to 
building an effective special warfare organization remain relevant to USASOC and the 
broader SOF community today. In fact, “USASOC 2035,” published in May 2017, 
identifies and attempts to address a number of the same challenges that Donovan faced, as 
the analysis will show. After reviewing the OSS’ organization, this chapter will put the 
analysis into a contemporary context by comparing the OSS to its descendent organizations 
and, finally, consider the current relationship between SOF and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
A. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
ANALYSIS 
It is important that Donovan’s organization was ‘purpose built’ for irregular warfare 
because a specific type of organization–an ‘adhocracy’–is optimal for the complex and 
unstable nature of the irregular warfare environment. The adhocracy model, coined by 
Henry Mintzberg in Structure in Fives, is characterized by mutual adjustment among those 
people carrying out the work; low formalization; high degrees of specialization, training, 
and acquired expertise; and the use of liaisons and multi-disciplinary teams formed based 
on the needs of specific projects.237 The dominant part of an adhocracy is the support staff 
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which provides support to both operations and administration; however, the lines between 
the staffs and operations often blur.238 
Selecting the right personnel, both staff and operators, is important. An adhocracy 
is an adaptive learning organization that operates in a dynamically complex environment, 
and therefore requires innovative personnel who take initiative and think critically. When 
recruiting for the Coordinator of Information (CoI), Donovan valued these traits because 
he recognized that the organization would be “learning [its] way in new forms of 
warfare.”239 As such, Donovan wanted subordinates who were willing to try new things, 
take calculated risks and did not fear failure, but learned from it. He prioritized a person’s 
ability to “think quickly and clearly and find innovative solutions to difficult situations” 
over previous military experience.240 He also looked for individuals with existing language 
capability or expertise in cultural and international affairs. Members of the organization 
spanned the social strata from socialites, business professionals, and ivy-league academics 
to the lower classes.241 
Aside from selecting the right personnel for his unique organization, Donovan 
cultivated an environment for initiative, unconventional thinking, and experimentation to 
grow.242 In Team of Teams, General Stanley McChrystal cites the importance of 
cultivating this type of environment. Instead of the chess master of military strategy, 
McChrystal saw himself as a gardener that tirelessly maintained an environment for free-
thinking and decentralization.243 Donovan’s subordinate, Arthur Schlesinger, recalls the 
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innovative culture that Donovan facilitated, stating “He was open-minded. He’d listen to 
anything. He’d try anything. He was adventuresome. He was not a conventional figure.”244 
As McChrystal and Donovan recognized, a critical component of an optimally 
functioning adhocracy is decentralized decision making, which requires a clear articulation 
of the organization’s mission, vision, and priorities. Instead of becoming caught up in the 
minutia of daily operations and overloaded by the excess of information, this ‘gardener’ 
approach allowed McChrystal, as the Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, 
to consider the organization’s strategic direction and to provide clear purpose and vision to 
the organization for the decentralized execution its tasks. For the OSS, decentralized 
decision making was part of the culture, but also a practical matter related to the speed of 
communications and nature of its operations. Unlike the current era of constant and real-
time communications, OSS elements were often provided clear–albeit sometimes vague–
guidance, requirements, and restrictions, and expected to innovate and adapt in the pursuit 
of those goals with limited direction. Behind the Burma Road, written by former OSS 
personnel Richard Peers and Dean Brellis, provides a first-hand account of Detachment 
101’s activities in Burma during World War II. This book is just one example of the 
necessity of decentralized decision making in an unconventional warfare environment and 
the results empowered subordinates can achieve, given a clear purpose and the appropriate 
degree of latitude to pursue those goals.245 
Although the OSS began as an adhocracy, throughout World War II, it evolved into 
a hybrid structure (adhocracy and divisional) structure due to its size, the bureaucratic 
requirements of the USG, and the diversification of its functions and geographic 
regions.246 However, the operating core (the OSS’ tactical level elements) generally 
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retained its ad hoc characteristics, even if their structures were codified in doctrine.247 
Mintzberg and several other organizational design scholars attribute the phenomenon of 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational growth to several “contingency factors” such 
as an organization’s age and size, the centrality of a technical system to the work being 
performed, and power, which is a product of the managerial style of key leaders.248 Larger, 
older organizations generally have more formalized behavior and a more elaborate 
structure resultant from increased specialization and differentiation among employees, 
which ultimately requires increased administration.249 Regarding the centrality of 
technical systems, Mintzberg suggests that “…the more [the technical system] controls the 
work of the operators–the more formalized is their work and the more bureaucratic is the 
structure of the operating core.” Moreover, the increase in size is directly correlated to the 
complexity of the technical system.250 Finally, the leadership style of decision makers will 
contribute to the consolidation or decentralization of decision making authority.251 
As the OSS expanded, it created all the functions necessary to carry out its 
intelligence and guerrilla warfare mandates under a single organizational hierarchy. In 
terms of mission, the OSS was “an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with 
collecting and analyzing strategic information and secret intelligence required for military 
operations, and with planning and executing programs of physical sabotage and morale 
subversion against the enemy to support military operations.”252 This was a broad mission 
that required a considerable amount of resources to accomplish. The OSS, under 
Donovan’s direction, grew to encompass all the necessities for irregular warfare and 
intelligence collections. At its height, intelligence collection and analysis personnel made 
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up 25% of the organization (over 3,000 personnel), with Special Operations branch 
accounting for another 25%, administrative services accounting for 18%, and 
administration making up 14%.253 On top of its operational duties, the OSS managed its 
own recruiting, training, research and development, research analysis, strategic planning, 
and even monitored the political tensions of ethnic minorities within the U.S.254 Although 
the OSS remained a civilian agency, it was effectively another armed service, filling a 
strategic role for the U.S.255 
Despite its increased hierarchy and bureaucratic expansion, the OSS continuously 
adapted to meet the changing circumstances and requirements of its mission and the war. 
As the OSS’ manual on function and organization states, “the OSS is dynamic. It is 
constantly changing organizationally and in scope of activity. It is in a continual state of 
adaptation to the needs of the war in the United States and to peculiar conditions in the 
various theaters of operations.” Figure 3 shows the final structure of the OSS in 1945. 
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Figure 3.  OSS Organization (1945)256 
 
In terms of organizational design theory, a matrixed structure combines both 
divisional and functional forms. This combination necessitates horizontal and vertical 
information flow to allow the organization’s functional and divisional entities to adjust to 
changes in the environment. Increasing information flow requires the appropriate degree 
of vertical and horizontal linkages to facilitate communication, adjustment, and control.257 
The degree of coordination necessary is directly relational to the complexity of the 
environment.258 To increase vertical linkages, organizations can employ the following 
methods: hierarchical referral (sending decision requests up the chain of command), rules 
and plans (standardizing routine procedures or decisions, communicating a centralized 
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plan), adding positions to the hierarchy (creating positions to decrease the span of control), 
or vertical information systems (increase the efficiency of reporting information). 
Mechanisms to increase horizontal linkages are information systems, direct contact (point-
to-point discussions), task forces (a temporary group of representatives from the affected 
departments), full-time integrators (project managers), or teams (permanent task 
forces).259 
To account for the uncertain nature of its environment, and to address the full 
breadth of its missions, the OSS used a matrixed structure.260 By 1945 the OSS was 
functionally divided into two main branches, the intelligence services and strategic services 
operations, and a smaller catch-all branch consisting of the Headquarters, Schools and 
Training, communications, and research and development.261 In these three branches, the 
OSS housed everything it routinely needed to execute its mission. The Intelligence Services 
and Strategic Services Operations were, again, functionally divided into sections such as: 
Special Operations Branch, Morale Operations, Secret Intelligence, X-2, etc.262 Generally, 
these operational branches were divisionally structured and regionally oriented. The field 
components of the OSS’s intelligence and special operations branches fell under the 
Theater Commander’s hierarchy and took direction from the Strategic Services Officer 
(SSO). The SSO was a member of the Theater Commander’s staff, but was effectively a 
coordinating mechanism (vertical and horizontal linkage) between OSS Headquarters, the 
Theater Commander, and the subordinate OG elements.263 Finally, the various functional 
branches supported the OSS’ field elements on an ad hoc basis with intelligence, personnel, 
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materiel, and other functions as the missions required, giving it characteristics of a matrixed 
organization.264 
As the organizational design scholar Henry Mintzberg suggests, a divisional 
structure’s ‘middle line’ is the organization’s center of gravity; however, the interplay 
between the organization’s other components can inhibit its effectiveness. The role of the 
strategic apex (the OSS Headquarters) is to establish “mechanisms that coordinate the goals 
of the division with its own, without sacrificing divisional autonomy.”265 Mintzberg also 
discusses the tension between the strategic apex, the middle line, and the operational core. 
While the strategic apex attempts to centralize decision making, both the middle line and 
the operational core attempt to increase control and decrease the influence that the other 
components have over them. For the OSS, the Strategic Services (SS) Officers and their 
staffs formed the OSS’ middle line and were directly subordinate to the Theater 
Commanders, and indirectly to OSS Headquarters.266 The SS Officer’s Staff was 
organized along the same lines as the OSS Headquarters in Washington. The Strategic 
Service Officer and Staff coordinated the activities of the Operational Group field elements 
and the Theater Command, as well as requesting support for the field elements from OSS 
Headquarters in Washington.267 Like the role of today’s Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOCs), the SS Officer and staff were responsible for translating strategic 
plans into operational and tactical results.  
The Office of Strategic Services Headquarters enjoyed a substantial degree of 
control over its long-term operational direction, despite the fact that the Allied Theater 
Commanders maintained operational control (OPCON) over OSS’ field elements. 
According to the 1945 manual, Operational Groups (OGs)the organization’s operating 
core–supported the Theater Commander’s priorities and were under the Theater 
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Commander’s operational control (OPCON).268 However, OSS Headquarters developed 
the long-term strategic plans for the utilization of both OG and Morale Branch operations, 
which were submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval and subsequently sent to the 
theater commander.269 This arrangement allowed ‘conventional force’ commanders to 
focus on their form of warfare, while the OSS could leverage its expertise in irregular 
warfare and special intelligence to shape long-term plans that supported theater 
commander’s priorities, as well as Washington’s. 
Finally, despite being subordinated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on paper, the OSS 
retained access to the President of the United States through General Donovan. When the 
Coordinator of Information was created in 1941, its purpose was to “collect and assemble 
information” pertaining to national security issues from the disparate–and sometimes, 
disconnected–intelligence agencies of the U.S., which was transformed into finished 
intelligence for the President’s use.270 Prior to this, no agency, except the White House, 
had ever filled such a role. This unique role gave Donovan, as Director of the CoI, a direct 
line to the President.271 When the CoI evolved to into the OSS in 1942 it was placed under 
the “auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” which provided mutual benefit to the military 
in the form of intelligence and to the OSS in the form of military resources. However, the 
OSS retained much of its autonomy as a civilian organization, and the Director of the OSS, 
General Donovan, still reported directly to the President.272 As Ryan Agee and Maurice 
DuClos’ Naval Postgraduate School thesis “Factoring the Decision Point for UW” found, 
the presence of an “extant UW capability” and a “positive unconventional warfare 
feedback loop,” often in the form of a “UW experienced individual [with] direct access or 
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influence on the decision maker,” increases the probability of employing UW.273 This 
appears to be true for the OSS, as evidenced by the organization’s meteoric growth during 
World War II and its extensive employment in the same war.  
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OSS AND ITS DESCENDANTS 
There are many structural similarities between the Office of Strategic Services and 
today’s irregular warfare and intelligence organizations. The Central Intelligence Agency 
appears to be the most similar to Donovan’s purpose-built organization; while U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM), which has retained many OSS organizational 
characteristics, has adopted several characteristics of the military services. The CIA is a 
divisional organization with adhocracy-like characteristics that possesses strong horizontal 
and vertical linkages both internally and externally, and retains operational direction and 
control over its activities in support of the President. It specially selects all of its personnel; 
generally, houses all of the capabilities necessary to accomplish its foreign intelligence, 
counterintelligence, and covert action missions; and it reports directly to the President.274 
Like the Office of Strategic Services and Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) operates in an unstable and complex environment, but 
employs a divisional structure that leverages internal and external horizontal and vertical 
linkages. USSOCOM uses mechanisms, such as information systems, the chain of 
command, issuance of direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH), and Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOCs) to promote internal control and coordination. External 
coordination is accomplished via liaisons, Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), Special 
Operations Command and Control Elements, and Special Operations Support Teams 
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(SOSTs), and various other mechanisms of the global SOF network.275 With influence 
from Commanders of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), like GEN Stanley 
McChrystal, USSOCOM has increased its use of horizontal linkages, or ‘flat comms,’ more 
so than its ‘general purpose’ counterparts. However, the organization still relies on the 
chain of command and standardized units of action, which can–and sometimes should–
limit the development of adhocracy-like characteristics. While the global SOF network has 
many benefits, its expansiveness can present challenges to command and control. The 
volume of information produced and sent in such a vast network has the potential to 
overwhelm the organization’s information processing power, convoluting decision making 
instead of enhancing it. 
In contrast to the OSS and the CIA, USSOCOM exercises limited influence on the 
strategic direction of its operational elements, except in specific circumstances, which 
usually involve surgical strike operations.276 The responsibility for strategy, policy, 
employment, and control of SOF operations is divided among three organizations, the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-intensity 
Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), USSOCOM, and the Theater Special Operations Commands.   
In terms of access to the U.S. President, the USSOCOM Commander is several 
layers of contact from the White House, as compared to the OSS Chief, which limits the 
USSOCOM Commanders ability to directly inform policy and strategy. The National 
Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the National Security Council 
in order to improve the management of the national security apparatus. However, this also 
created layers between the decision makers and the SOF headquarters. As previously 
discussed, Agee and Duclos point out UW experienced individuals with access to the 
decision maker often contributes to the decision to employ UW. This distancing ultimately 
degrades USSOCOM’s ability to inform and educate decision makers on the potential 
utility of STR options. In 2016, the CNA interviewed former Senior SOF Commanders and 
DOD officials to consider the next administration’s use of SOF, which corroborates SOF’s 
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lack of access to senior policy makers. According to the report SOF “often [relies] on non-
SOF experts to represent their capabilities and interests” in policy and resource 
discussions.277 To remedy this, the participants offered three suggestions for SOF. First, 
SOF needs to clearly articulate its narrative and expand the current narrative to encompass 
all of SOF’s core activities, not just direct action. Second, SOF should “proactively engage 
influential civilians inside and outside to educate them on SOF capabilities, limitations, 
and requirements.” Finally, SOF should “seek a more active voice when the use of SOF is 
considered as a policy option,” potentially by placing a senior SOF officer on the National 
Security Council.278 
Unlike OSS Headquarters, which exercised a direct role in strategic planning, 
development, and employment of its forces, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) performs these 
functions indirectly. The ASD SO/LIC serves as the primary advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict matters, and is responsible for 
informing and supervising policy, and administering to the organization, training, and 
equipping of Special Operations Forces.279 Statutorily, the Office should be capable of 
assuming a role similar to OSS Headquarters; however, it has not. In a 2013 report on the 
future of special operations, defense analyst Linda Robinson attributes this to several 
reasons, two of which are addressed here. First, the office is insufficiently staffed to provide 
oversight, advice, and coordination for all of SOF’s activities. Robinson asserts that this is 
partially due to the acquisition of new responsibilities, as well as, a misplaced focus on 
“counterterrorism and tactical and operational matters” instead of strategy and policy for 
the full range of special operations.280 Second, the ASD SO/LIC is viewed as an advocate 
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for USSOCOM, as opposed to “an independent source of advice and expertise,” 
diminishing the ASD SO/LIC’s influence on policy and defense strategy.281  
Since Robinson’s report, two developments occurred, which may enhance the ASD 
SO/LIC’s role in policy and strategy development, oversight, and influence. First, the 
Department of Defense issued an Irregular Warfare (IW) directive in 2008 (and reissued in 
August 2014), which emphasized that Irregular Warfare is equal in importance to 
‘traditional warfare’ and mandated that DOD “will be proficient in IW.”282  Second, 
congress enacted FY 17 legislation to establish a Special Operations Functional Integration 
and Oversight Team under the ASD SO/LIC’s Office. The team is responsible for 
“develop[ing] and continuously improve[ing] policy, joint processes, and procedures that 
facilitate the development, acquisition, integration, employment, and sustainment of 
special operations capabilities.”283  
Similar to the Office of the ASD SO/LIC, U.S. Special Operations Command 
focuses on its responsibilities to organize, train and equip the force, but exercises limited 
control over SOF strategy and execution. Furthermore, when USSOCOM does exercise 
control, it focuses mainly on counterterrorism. Title 10 U.S.C. ordered USSOCOM to 
prepare SOF units for deployment in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, 
and “exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.”284 Based on these Title 10 responsibilities, 
USSOCOM and its subordinate elements primarily focus on their service-like 
responsibilities. The one exception under USSOCOM is Joint Special Operations 
Command, which, as a subordinate unified command, exercises operational control over 
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its assigned forces in addition to carrying out its service-like responsibilities.285 Unlike the 
OSS, which was responsible for the strategic planning for all of its operational activities, 
USSOCOM’s unified command plan (UCP) authorities are limited to synchronizing global 
counterterrorism and counter threat finance planning and “integrating and coordinating” 
DOD’s psychological operations activities.286 This designation as ‘global synchronizer’ 
incentivizes SOCOM’s focus on CT and CTF activities, leaving the direction of SOCOM’s 
other special warfare missions, such as UW, Foreign Internal Defense, and 
counterinsurgency, under the purview and long-term direction of the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders and their staffs–albeit with advice and assistance from the Theater 
Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).   
The United States Special Operations Command has attempted to gain more control 
over its operational forces, but Congress and the Geographic Combatant Commands have 
stymied those efforts. Some argue that the United States government and USSOCOM are 
inadequately organized to carry out its Special Warfare mission, and that an intermediate 
command which focuses on developing special warfare strategy, identifying policy 
requirements, and synchronizing TSOC operations across the GCCs is necessary.287 
Beginning in 2012, Admiral William McRaven, then USSOCOM Commander, attempted 
to rectify these challenges by initiating efforts to increase USSOCOM’s control over the 
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).288 Despite pushback from the 
Geographic Combatant Commands, Mcraven’s efforts reportedly gave the USSOCOM 
Commander greater authority to directly interact with TSOC Commanders (as opposed to 
going through the GCCs), and to move SOF forces around the area of responsibility (AOR) 
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with the consent of the appropriate Ambassador and Geographic Combatant 
Commander.289 However, as discussed in Chapter VII (political obstacles), Mcraven’s 
efforts to establish a USSOCOM headquarters in the National Capital Region to liaise with 
the interagency communities were put on hold by Congress and ultimately abandoned in 
2014.290 Although Admiral McRaven partially realigned USSOCOM with the OSS’ 
wartime command and control structure, challenges remain with regard to SOF’s ability to 
control the strategic direction of its special warfare operations and integration with unified 
action partners.  
The final entity to consider in the special operations hierarchy are the Theater 
Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) which form USSOCOM’s ‘middle line’–the most 
critical part of a divisional structure. Despite their criticality, the TSOCs are habitually 
under-resourced to optimally carry out this function.291 Linda Robinson, in a 2016 RAND 
report titled “Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare,” argues that the TSOC is 
“egregiously short of sufficient quantity and quality of staff and intelligence, analytical, 
and planning resources.” Furthermore, the TSOCs are manned at 20% below the identified 
requirement; that the assigned personnel are on short tours or are reservists; and those 
assigned to TSOC have diminished chances for promotion. This, she asserts, makes it hard 
to recruit or retain talents and creates an ill-trained workforce with limited incentives to 
enhance performance.292 
The Theater Special Operations Commands’ personnel problems contribute to a 
lack of operational-level planning capability and creates obstacles to carrying out its 
function.293 RAND’s “Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare” points out that the 
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GCCs view the TSOCs as subordinate commands to be tasked, as opposed to incorporated 
in the initial development of broader theater strategy.294 The study attributed some of these 
challenge to “rice bowl” issues, but the TSOC’s operational-level planning challenges 
provide some justification. RAND’s Study identified a lack of educated special warfare 
planners, a lack of special warfare planning culture, a lack of codified literature explaining 
how ‘conventional’ operational art is adapted for the uniqueness of special warfare, as 
major shortcomings.295 As a response, SOF developed several programs, such as the 
Unconventional Warfare Operational Design Course (UWODC) and the Special 
Operations Campaign Artist Program (SOCAP), but these efforts have yet to achieve the 
intended effects.296 Ultimately, the TSOC is responsible for coordinating tactical and 
operational actions to achieve strategic objectives, but these shortcomings prevent it from 
doing so. A former senior military officer summarized the problem with a musical analogy, 
“we’re great at the tactical level because we’re jazz musicians, but as that levels up [to the 
operational and strategic level] we all need a score to play off of.”297 
Unlike the OSS, USSOCOM–with the exception of Joint Special Operations 
Command–does not specially select its support personnel, which creates problems in 
quality and continuity. Although USASOC hand selects its SOF operators, the Army 
assigns its support personnel. The uniqueness of SOF operationsespecially STR activities–
in contrast to conventional operations, means that support personnel require valuable time 
to understand SOF operations and culture, and to learn the SOF-specific nuances of their 
new position.298 There is no formal training for non-SOF personnel entering SOF 
organizations; all of the knowledge is acquired on the job. Often, once support personnel 
become proficient in their duties, they are transferred back to the conventional force within 
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a few years to remain competitive for promotion.299 This starts the process over again. In 
response to these concerns, the army created the K9 additional skill identifier (ASI) to 
designate personnel who have successfully served in SOF organizations, however, it does 
not mitigate the problem of changes in personnel every few years or a lack of SOF-specific 
formal education. “USASOC 2035” recognizes these challenges and is pursuing options to 
create alternative career models for its personnel and is developing systems to retain 
enabler personnel for longer portions of their careers.300 
Similar to the Office of Strategic Services, USSOCOM and USASOC embrace 
decentralized decision making, or “mission command,” but the politically sensitive nature 
of support to resistance activities and the Internet’s ability to exponentially compound 
failure can cause leaders to increasingly centralize decision making. In this type of 
environment, the SOF maxim “humans are more important than hardware” should–and 
generally does–guide improvements to SOF mission command. Compared to combat 
zones, operating in denied and/or politically sensitive environments requires specially 
trained, educated, and experienced individuals. The 4th Battalion redesign intended to 
address these challenges by building such personnel and increasing Special Forces’ 
organizational credibility with decision makers and other Joint and Interagency 
organizations.301 Education, training, and experience increase the trust a commander has 
in his or her subordinates, however, trust is a two-way street. As the “ARSOF 2022 
Operating Concept” states, “senior leadership must adopt new expectations of the type and 
volume of communications exchanged with operationally engaged ARSOF units…[which] 
involve accepting risk and empowering junior leaders to execute mission-type orders.”302 
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SOF commanders must balance trust and decentralization with synchronization of 
operations to achieve effects. SOF Commanders recognize that the ‘guy on the ground’ 
often has the best situational awareness and issue broad guidance to give those subordinates 
the necessary latitude to determining what needs to be done. However, this may result in 
disjointed operations and a lack of unity of effort.303 An operational-level command’s 
purpose is to link tactical actions to achieve operational and strategic effects. Thus, 
balancing decentralization and unity of effort requires a clear articulation of the 
Commander’s goals, vision, and priorities and two-way feedback mechanisms that promote 
‘mutual adjustment.’ 
While technical systems can facilitate mission command, they can simultaneously 
inhibit both mission command and situational understanding if not properly managed, 
supported with personnel, and judiciously employed. The availability of real-time 
communications platforms and information systems tends to increase centralization and 
can pose challenges to managing the increased volume of information, which may in turn 
cloud decision making, as opposed to facilitating it.304 Horizontal linkages (‘flat comms’) 
are ideal for adaptive organizations, but these linkages require the analytical capacity to 
manage, process, and disseminate the information acquired.305 As discussed, SOF’s 
middle line (i.e., TSOCs) are habitually undermanned meaning that more information must 
be processed with less personnel, which degrades the quality and quantity of outputs. 
Ultimately, SOF must find a balance between investing in personnel who can operate 
reliably in ambiguous and politically sensitive environments and mission commands 
systems and processes which facilitate the appropriate degree of mutual understanding and 
control. The strategic documents, “ARSOF 2022” and “USASOC 2035,” are attempting to 
find this balance. “ARSOF 2022,” published in 2014, focused on the organizational 
command and control structures, both scalable and hybrid, that facilitate mission command 
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in a variety of environments, with a variety of unified action partners.306 “USASOC 2035” 
is a continuation of these efforts to improve mission command, but the strategy transitions 
from improving organizational structures toward in personnel and mission command 
systems. These efforts include education for operating in ambiguous, technical systems, 
information systems, and processes to increase situational understanding, improve 
information processing, and empower decision making at lower levels.307 It appears that 
USASOC clearly understands what must be done, but the challenge of implementing these 
changes remains. 
C. SOF-CIA RELATIONSHIP: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE 
AMONG OSS DECEDENTS 
What began as a single agency responsible for collecting intelligence and 
conducting irregular warfare, the OSS, was split into two distinct entities, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and USSOCOM. These entities are separated by legal, 
bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles. The closeness of the CIA’s relationship with SOF 
has vacillated over time based on the nation’s security requirements, statutory legislation, 
and bureaucratic posturing between the CIA and Department of Defense. Despite their 
separations, the CIA and SOF are natural partners and complementary elements in the 
prosecution of irregular warfare, and more specifically STR. This portion determines that 
the contemporary environment requires greater collaboration and ‘convergence’ between 
the CIA and SOF in the special warfare and support to resistance, on top of the current 
counterterrorism-focused collaboration. The following section examines the history of the 
CIA and SOF’s relationship, complementary capabilities among the two, and use of 
coordinating mechanisms.   
The peacetime-wartime division of responsibilities between the CIA and the U.S. 
military was established early in the Cold War and generally remains in place today. 
Although the Army recognized the utility of unconventional warfare, it ceded control over 
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peacetime covert operations and psychological warfare to the CIA in 1949, choosing to 
focus on conventional warfare as a result of resource and personnel constraints.308 Thus, 
the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) assumed responsibility for all aspects of 
these activities to include: political warfare, non-attributed and mis-attributed propaganda, 
economic warfare, guerrilla and partisan warfare, and sabotage and counter-espionage.309 
This was a relatively harmonious period between the military the CIA, until the Korean 
War caused the Army to reconsider the need to establish its own psychological and 
unconventional warfare capabilities. In 1950, General Robert McClure was appointed to 
lead of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, where he championed the notion 
that psychological and unconventional warfare were interrelated fields. This allowed him 
to expand the office’s purview to unconventional warfare, and eventually led to the 
establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center and 10th Special Forces Group at Ft. 
Bragg, NC, which the OPC opposed.310 As part of the OPCW staff, LTC Russell 
Volckmann offered the initial definition of what ‘special forces operations’ entailed, which, 
in his estimation, included guerrilla warfare, sabotage and subversion, evasion and escape, 
commando-like operations, long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance, and 
psychological warfare (through these activities).311 Volckmann’s definition created 
overlap in between the OCPW’s forces and the CIA’s role in Korea, which created an initial 
tension between the two organizations.  
Although title 10 and 50 U.S.C. attempt to separate the CIA and SOF activities, the 
inherent overlap in their missions inevitably causes convergence between the two 
organization, especially in today’s “gray zone” environments. The most significant area of 
overlap, or ‘convergence,’ is intelligence. DOD has relied on the CIA for intelligence 
support to its operations, but the CIA’s has a finite number of personnel and cannot fulfil 
every intelligence requirement, which has caused DOD to establish its own intelligence 
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capabilities.312 In Eyes, Ears, and Daggers, Thomas Henriksen identifies Operations Eagle 
Claw as the catalyst for SOF’s pursuit of a unilateral intelligence capability. As Delta Force 
prepared to rescue America hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the CIA stated that it 
had pulled its case officers and did not have assets to support the military’s intelligence 
requirements for the rescue. In response, a recently retired Richard Meadows, with Special 
Forces members from Berlin’s ‘Det-A,’ volunteered to go to Tehran to gather the required 
intelligence. Many considered this to be the low point of SOF-CIA relations.313   
In early 1980s Army’s Chief of Staff, General Edward “Shy” Meyer, lamented that 
America’s “adversaries were affecting us below the threshold of war,” and suggested that 
the United States should build its capacity to address the threat. Instead of advocating for 
an expansion of the CIA’s role, Meyer felt the military should “expand its capacity to fight 
in the shadows,” ultimately authorizing the creation of the DOD’s Intelligence Support 
Activity to satisfy DOD’s intelligence requirements.314 In many ways, the 9/11 
Commission report confirmed Meyer’s prescient assessment. The report attributed Al 
Qaeda’s successful attack to the CIA’s dispersion across its three missions “flat budgets, 
and outmoded structure,” preventing the allocation of sufficient resources to foreign 
intelligence and creating vulnerabilities. The committee also suggested that the CIA 
transfer some of its covert action requirements to the DOD to allow for a reallocation of 
intelligence resources.315 
The Department of Defense alone in over-stepping its boundaries, as the Central 
Intelligence Agency also encroached on the DOD’s territory, conducting lethal operations 
of its own. As Robert Chesney points out, the CIA’s employment of lethal force was not 
new, but it was generally used to pursue foreign policy aims. However, the increase of 
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terrorism in the 1980s changed the dynamics of the situation, causing the CIA to use lethal 
force to prevent terrorist plots, which was a self-defense justification traditionally 
associated with military action.316 Although these activities were often criticized, they 
have drastically expanded in the post-9/11 era with the CIA’s controversial drone 
program.317 Moreover, the CIA and DOD’s special mission units have developed a 
synergistic relationship to find, fix, and finish terrorist threats, however some would argue 
that these valiant efforts are not back-stopped with a more comprehensive, and costly effort 
to stop the threat of terrorism.318 As Henriksen concludes his book, “the SOF-CIA weapon 
can hold terrorism at bay until the unlikely prospect that the Islamist fervor burns itself out 
before an unforeseen catastrophic event takes place. Or the United States and its allies can 
resolve to win the war on terrorism.”319 
The 9/11 Commission’s recommendation and the subsequent changes offer insight 
into the Central Intelligence Agency and Special Operations Forces’ relationship in 
paramilitary covert action, a component of support to resistance. In 2004, the commission 
recommended that the “responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, 
whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be 
consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations 
already being developed by [USSOCOM].”320 The commission justified this assertion 
arguing that the CIA’s paramilitary skills had atrophied and that its operatives did not have 
the necessary training, and that the United States government could not afford to have 
duplicative organizations for the conduct of these activities. However, the commission 
commended the joint CIA-SOF collaboration in response to 9/11, stating that 
complementary activities should be pursued to increase the US’ comparative advantage, 
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that operations should be planned jointly in the early stages, and that “the CIA’s experts 
should be integrated into the military’s training, exercises, and planning.”321 In 2011, a 
Washington Times article reviewed the implementation of these recommendations. The 
CIA did not relinquish control of paramilitary covert action, but agreed to support SOF as 
necessary with facilities and resources. The article quoted retired General Gerry Boykin, 
who stated that turf wars played a role, suggesting that the CIA feared relinquishing control 
would “result in a reduction of resources…[and] authority.” Boykin also highlighted 
USSOCOM’s concerns that assuming responsibility “would absorb huge amounts of time 
and resources and would be a distraction.” 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to delineate those Special Operations 
Forces and Central Intelligence Agency capabilities that complement one another to 
provide a competitive advantage in support to resistance operations, and should therefore 
be enhanced. USSOCOM’s advantages in STR are its expertise in training and organizing 
paramilitary and guerrilla forces, access to military resources, a large volume of manpower 
trained in special warfare, and a greater ability to transition the conflict from covert 
operations to overt operations, such as Foreign Internal Defense, as the situation evolves. 
The CIA excels and complements USSOCOM’s in the following areas: intelligence 
collection and analysis in support of UW, interagency integration, subversion, political 
action, ‘black’ and ‘gray’ propaganda, leveraging the cyber domain and social media, and 
insurgency and counterinsurgency research. Nearly all of these capabilities are 
acknowledged by USASOC as required capabilities to improve ARSOF’s posture for UW. 
Another point to consider is that “there has been a growing interest in UW operations that 
leverage existing social movements, and non-violent, civil resistance-based movements” 
that have enjoyed more favorable outcomes compared to armed movements, as Generals 
Joseph Votel and Charles Cleveland point out in a Joint Forces Quarterly article.322 
ARSOF’s civil affairs and psychological operations are currently evaluating their role in 
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UW to develop doctrine for their respective communities. As such, these elements may do 
well to leverage the CIA’s knowledge and expertise as they chart their course forward. 
A final consideration in the Central Intelligence Agency-Special Operations Forces 
relationship are the coordinating mechanisms that contribute to successful cooperation 
between the two organizations. The main mechanisms are liaisons, joint interagency task 
forces, and the CIA’s Associate Director for Military (ADMA) Affairs.323 This research 
has found that most of the liaison efforts are oriented toward lethal strike operations and 
are filled by SOF personnel experienced in surgical strike. Eyes, Ears, and Daggers 
provided several examples of this issue. According to Henriksen, the CIA Deputy Director 
for the Special Activates Division has habitually been a JSOC officer.324 Additionally, 
Henriksen details General Stanley McChrystal’s success in establishing JIATFs to increase 
interagency collaboration and synergy in the fight against terrorism.325 Additionally, 
USSOCOM established Interagency Task Forces (IATF) USSOCOM in 2004 which 
consists of over 100 interagency personnel.326 In a 2009 posture statement to Congress, 
Admiral Eric Olson stated the IATF’s purpose was “to rapidly facilitate CT collaboration 
within the U.S. government against trans-regional, functional and strategic level problem 
sets and opportunities.”327 The last coordinating mechanism, the ADMA, is staffed with a 
large proportion of DOD personnel, and is charged with advising CIA leaders on DOD 
issues, representing the CIA to DOD leaders, and facilitating mutual support (personnel, 
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logistics, equipment) between the two agencies, based on priorities established by the 
Director of the CIA.328 Regarding special warfare, it appears that collaboration occurred 
on an as needed basis. The quintessential example of this is the joint CIA-SOF UW 
campaign in Afghanistan in 2001. Relying on solely open source information, it is unclear 
to if there are enduring collaboration mechanisms for special warfare. 
D. SUMMARY 
This summary chapter considers the organizational design and characteristics of the 
Office of Strategic Services, the antecedent for the United States Special Operations 
Command and the Central Intelligence Agency. The analysis found that the OSS was 
purpose built for its function and environment, eventually assuming a hybrid structure of a 
divisional adhocracy and employing decentralized decision making. The OSS had direct 
access to the President, exercised control over the strategic direction of it operations, 
contained all of the necessary functions for its assigned mission, and hand selected all of 
its personnel. When compared to the OSS, USSOCOM exhibited many of the same 
characteristics, however there were important differences. The most significant 
discrepancies in relation to STR are that USSOCOM lacks direct access to inform and 
educate high-level decision makers, its organizational priorities and resources tend toward 
counterterrorism. Additionally, the TSOCs are under-resourced to carry out their critical 
function within the structure, and USSOCOM faces challenges in the selection and 
management of its non-SOF personnel. Finally, in terms of the CIA-SOF relationship, the 
two organizations enjoy the best relationship since the days of the OSS, although the inter-
organizational linkages tend toward counterterrorism and lethal operations. Both 
organizations offer complementary capabilities in STR and Special Warfare that must be 
recognized, developed, and integrated to provide policymakers with more effective STR 
options.  
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IX. SYRIA CASE STUDY 
The United States’ approach to the Syrian conflict provides a modern example of 
the obstacles to ARSOF’s execution of support to resistance and unconventional warfare, 
highlighting how the combined influence of legal, political, and organizational obstacles 
can preclude unconventional methods of military intervention. Beginning as a popular 
social movement spurred by the “Arab Spring” of 2011, the unrest in Syria quickly 
immersed the country in a civil war that affected both American allies and adversaries in 
the Middle East. Though repeatedly calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to “step 
aside,” President Barack Obama resisted military intervention, stating that America 
“cannot resolve someone else’s civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.”329 Despite a textbook environment for STR operations where 
the local population endured oppression from Assad’s hostile government and the 
occupying power of ISIS, the Obama administration chose instead to combat this issue 
through diplomacy and covert action, rather than direct military intervention, for 
approximately three years. Although this decision was primarily based on the absence of 
legal justification to support intervention, this choice was not without ramifications. As 
conditions in both Syria and neighboring Iraq deteriorated, enabling ISIS to gain control 
over large swaths of territory between the two countries, the administration’s strategy 
transitioned to military intervention through coalition airstrikes and an overt “Train and 
Equip” (T&E) program to advise and assist moderate indigenous partners under Operation 
Inherent Resolve (OIR). While the coalition effort reached its stated objective of 
“defeat[ing] ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria” (e.g., Mosul and Raqqa) by the fall 
of 2017, the issues encountered along the course of this U.S. intervention provide 
additional credibility to the obstacles previously discussed this research.330 
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A. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA 
To understand the legal considerations to support to resistance movements (STR), 
this section outlines the international and domestic legal factors that led up to intervention 
and eventually influenced the execution of the Train and Equip Program. To summarize, 
this research team found the major legal obstacles to STR activities in Syria to be: (1) 
necessary adherence to international and domestic laws; (2) delays in authorities and 
appropriations to act in Syria once intervention was legally justified; and (3) the influence 
of CT policy, authorities, and funding on strategy.  
The U.S. government’s adherence to International law was arguably the largest 
factor that influenced if, when, and how the United States decided to intervene in Syria. As 
conditions in Syria evolved, new legal pathways opened for United States and international 
intervention, resulting in an escalatory response. There were two seminal periods that 
triggered pathways to intervention and changes in strategy, the creation of a humanitarian 
crisis in 2011 and the Islamic State’s territorial expansion in mid-2014. Of note, although 
the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in 2013 was a breach of international law, it 
did not result in any significant UNSC resolutions that authorized the use of force. This 
was because the United States and Russia’s diplomatic efforts facilitated a plan that led to 
the verification and destruction of those chemical weapons by 2015, and was therefore 
omitted as a seminal event.331  
The Assad regime’s use of lethal force against its population, beginning in 2011, 
created a humanitarian crisis and triggered the Responsibility to Protect Principle.332 
Although the UNSC did not authorize the use of force to stop the crisis or enact regime 
change–largely, because China and Russia exercised their veto powers during early 
resolution votes–it eventually authorized states to provide humanitarian aid to the Syrian 
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population in July 2014.,333 Despite a delayed UNSC resolution, President Barack Obama 
authorized U.S. intervention in Syria in early 2013–as did other European states–with the 
provision of non-lethal aid to the Syrian Rebels under the auspices of humanitarian 
intervention to protect civilians.334 This action violated the customary international 
principle of non-intervention, but did not constitute a ‘use of force,’ which would have 
allowed Syria to respond in self-defense with necessary and proportionate use of force 
actions. Without access to the White House Legal Council’s opinions, the exact legal 
justification for sending non-lethal humanitarian aid to the Syrian Rebels are not entirely 
clear, but as Wall and Schmitt suggest, states are generally ambivalent to breaches of the 
non-intervention principle, except when it is contrary to their interests.335 Syria was no 
exception; Russia and Iran were outraged, but the rest of the international community 
generally accepted or directly supported the intervention. 
The United States’ alleged covert action program targeting the Syrian regime 
potentially violated the ‘use of force’ principle. According to wide-spread reporting from 
independent media outlets, President Obama’s 2013 authorization for humanitarian aid in 
Syria was accompanied by a covert action program to “help moderate Syrian rebels fight 
the Assad regime.”336 Without knowing the full details of the size, scope, and intent of this 
program, it is difficult to assess whether or not President Obama’s authorization constitutes 
a violation of international law under the ‘use of force’ principle. If it were determined 
later that this program focused on providing non-lethal assistance, such as 
leadership/organizational training and intelligence sharing, to Syria opposition forces, then 
the program would not constitute a ‘use of force’ violation. However, if it were determined 
that the program provided lethal means, such as lethal training and materiel (i.e., military 
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arms, vehicles, and communications), to the Syrian opposition forces, then America’s 
adversaries (e.g., China, Russia, or Iran) could argue that this covert program was an 
unlawful foreign intervention. This fine line dividing non-lethal and lethal assistance under 
the ‘use of force’ principle highlights a key legal consideration the United States’ decision 
to intervene in Syria. Furthermore, this consideration demonstrates that providing lethal 
materiel to rebels, in Syria or elsewhere in future conflicts, is new stage within the STR 
construct: Under the legal guidelines of international law, this stage appears closer to 
military support than diplomatic or humanitarian assistance. 
The rise of ISIS and its establishment of a physical caliphate in mid-2014 jump-
started direct U.S. intervention in Syria. Based on this development, the U.S. government 
reoriented its strategy from away Bashar Al Assad’s removal, toward a CT-centric effort 
to defeat ISIS. In legal terms, ISIS’ territorial expansion into Iraq triggered the collective 
self-defense principle, Article 51 of the UN Charter. Additionally, ISIS’ plotting against 
western targets created an imminent threat to the United States, which presented a self-
defense justification for use of force against the group, specifically its affiliate ISIS-
Khorasan (ISIS-K).337 These structural changes in the situation opened the door to existing 
CT legal pathways for action (e.g., the 2001 AUMF; the 2003 Iraq AUMF; and U.S.C. 10, 
127e).  
Until this time, “the President and some members of Congress” had been reticent 
about authorizing an overt Train and Equip program for Syria, partly out of concern that 
the United States would become excessively entangled in nation-building efforts within 
Syria. However, the failure of a UN-facilitated negotiation to end the Syrian Conflict and 
the rise of ISIS caused a shift in U.S. policy. In June 2014, these new dynamics led 
President Obama to request Congress grant authorizations and appropriations to overtly 
train and equip vetted members of the opposition.338 It was not until September 2014 that 
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Congress issued temporary approval of the program as part of an FY 15 continuing 
resolution (CR). In contrast to the President’s initial request, the CR limited the program’s 
purpose to defending the Syrian population from ISIS and other terrorist threats, and 
avoided explicit authorizations to take action against Assad Regime forces.339 
Concurrently, the President authorized the first round of airstrikes against ISIS and ISIS-
K targets within Syrian in late September 2014.340 
The final shift in policy and strategy followed the UNSC’s passage of Resolution 
2249, on November 20, 2015. This resolution called upon member states to “take all 
necessary measures” to “prevent and suppress terrorist acts” from ISIS, Al Nusra Front, Al 
Qaeda, and other UN-designated terrorist organizations and “to eradicate the safe haven 
they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria.”341 Until this point, there 
were ‘one-off’ special operations missions into Syria, but in November 2015, President 
Obama authorized an enduring U.S. advisory presence on the ground in Syria.342 
Previously, overt train and equip activities were based in countries adjacent to Syria, as 
were the staging areas for raids and bombing efforts.343 Although there are likely pragmatic 
security and logistics purposes for executing the effort from these locations, a significant 
consideration was the legal status of forces operating in Syria. Operating under the 
protection of the internationally recognized UNSCR afforded service members a clear legal 
status, as opposed to a more disputed and ambiguous one afforded by the United States’ 
unilateral interpretation of international law. Until the UN resolution was passed, it could 
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be argued that service members captured by the Syrian Regime, Russians, or Iranians 
would be operating outside Geneva Convention protections and could be treated as spies.  
The fact that Train & Equip efforts were not approved until late-2014, coupled with 
Turkish reticence supporting to Kurdish forces and the vetting restrictions imposed in the 
fiscal year 2015 authorization, effected the availability of viable partner forces capable of 
effectively supporting the United States’ counter-ISIS strategy. The delay in authorization 
meant that the United States was “late to the dance,” further constraining its already limited 
options in terms of resistance partners.344 As the conflict dragged on between 2011 and 
2014, those would-be-US-partners began forming coalitions, factionalizing or even 
fighting one another.345 In the absence of U.S. support, some of those same groups searched 
for materiel, financial, and personnel support, often cooperating with terrorist affiliated 
groups as a pragmatic way to sustain their fight. When Congress finally authorized the 
T&E effort in 2014, it mandated a vetting requirement to deny assistance to forces with 
terrorist ties or to Shi’a militias supporting Iran or Syria. Furthermore, this vetting process 
required that prospective partners make a commitment to adhere to human rights laws and 
the law of armed conflict and only target ISIS.346 Aside from excluding those groups that 
made seemingly pragmatic alliances, the authorization formalized a shift away from anti-
Assad efforts, which forced prospective fighters to prioritize fighting ISIS over ousting 
Assad.347 The disconnect between vetting policy and the reality on the ground–among other 
factors–limited the size and effectiveness of T&E forces, leading the former Commander 
of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) General Lloyd Austin’s statement to Congress 
that there were only “four or five [rebels]…still in the fight.”348 This testimony resulted in 
a general revamping of the T&E program. The program shifted away from recruiting and 
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training individuals to create new units, and toward supporting existing units and only 
vetting the leaders of those units.349 Finally, as a 2017 Congressional Research Service 
report states, the approach became “transactional and performance-based, with Syrian 
beneficiaries receiving U.S. support as opportunities presented themselves and relative to 
their effectiveness on the battlefield and the alignment of their actions with U.S. 
interests.”350  
For many STR activities, the decision authority resided at the strategic level, which 
meant that proposed activities or operations had to filter through both U.S. Central 
Command and/or the National Security Council Staff before reaching the strategic decision 
makers, which extended approval timelines and degraded operational flexibility. 
Additionally, many activities were approved via individual ‘CONOPs,’ as opposed to an 
overarching operations order (OPORD) that would have provided the guidance and latitude 
necessary to adapt to conditions on the ground.351 The use of CONOPs created additional 
requirements that had to matriculate through the approval process. Stein’s report states that 
“the T&E program appears to have had a reporting line that made it susceptible to 
micromanagement from the National Security Council and CENTCOM.” Former Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates corroborated this in a televised interview stating “it was the 
operational micromanagement that drove me nuts. Of White House and NSC Staffers 
calling Senior Commanders in the field, asking questions, [and] second guessing 
commanders.”352 In the interview, Secretary Gates elaborates on his efforts to curtail what 
he saw as staffers’ efforts to bypass the appropriate chain of command.353 Stein and 
Secretary Gates’ comments, describing operations during the Obama Administration, 
contrast with President Trump’s hands-off approach. In an August 2017 White House press 
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briefing to discuss the recent gains against ISIS, Brett McGurk, the Special Presidential 
Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, stated that “the delegation of tactical 
authority from the White House, from Washington, down through the chain of command 
to our commanders on the ground…has made a fairly tremendous difference in our ability 
to actually seize opportunities from ISIS.”354  
B. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA 
This section chronologically follows the sequence of events contributing to the 
political challenges for U.S. intervention in Syria beginning with the planning for 
Operation Inherent Resolve in 2014. In summary, this research team found the major 
political obstacles to UW and STR activities in Syria were: (1) a general lack of support 
for foreign intervention; (2) an over-dependence on CT-strategy; (3) dysfunctional NSC 
management; (4) prohibition of accompaniment authorities; and (5) geopolitical 
sensitivities surrounding a capable indigenous partner. 
The largest political factor affecting the Obama administration’s initial decisions in 
Syria was a general lack of support for foreign intervention. When the popular movement 
in Syria devolved into a civil war by late 2011, the United States was simultaneously 
drawing down military forces in Iraq. President Obama viewed this drawdown as the initial 
fulfillment of his campaign pledge to end U.S. commitments to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; committing resources in Syria could possibly contravene this obligation.355 
Adding to the administration’s apprehension to commit more resources abroad, historical 
research from this period reveals a lack of political will among the populace with only 25% 
of Americans supporting intervention in Syria.356 This combined trepidation between the 
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highest levels of government and the general sentiment of the American people shows that 
there was little appetite for any form of intervention in Syria. 
At the outset of planning for Operation Inherent Resolve, the global SOF network 
proved unable to overcome the country’s dependence on counter-terrorist strategy as the 
singular valid military option for ground intervention. Beginning with a campaign of 
targeted airstrikes against terrorist locations, the multi-national coalition under this 
operation made it clear that its military operations would focus on CT efforts against ISIS 
and not on the Assad regime.357 Moreover, General Lloyd Austin highlighted, in his 2015 
speech to Congress, that coalition operations would focus on the “ultimate defeat of ISIL 
and the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Assad Regime.”358 This reliance on 
a CT strategy appears to contradict the recognized linkage between the oppression and 
insecurity created by the authoritarian Syrian government and rise of ISIS. Providing 
further emphasis on the limitations of continued dependence on CT, a recent report from 
the Atlantic Council’s “Middle East Strategy Task Force” found that “[a] strategy for the 
region cannot focus solely on counterterrorism.”359 Furthermore, the report notes that 
“[e]ven if these groups disappeared tomorrow, the conflicts of the region would continue 
to burn, and other groups would arise in their place.”360 By continuing dependence on a 
CT strategy in Iraq and Syria, Operation Inherent Resolve failed to address the underlying 
issues which perpetuate insecurity and permitted the rise of ISIS in the first place. As a 
result, while the global SOF network was properly embedded within the interagency 
community, and while it was completely capable of advising the country’s leadership on 
the full range of capabilities available to both destroy the enemy and address the underlying 
issues that lead to its development, the political leadership’s myopic focus on CT was one 
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of several factors that ruled out the feasibility of UW or STR for intervention in Iraq and 
Syria. 
Additionally, operational inflexibility was further deepened by the Unites State’s 
disproportionate emphasis on a kinetic counter-terrorist strategy. In retrospect, it appears 
the CT strategy was facilitated by political priorities, an outdated AUMF, and the 
availability of CT funding and authorities, as compared to other funding and authorities 
which may have supported indirect approaches. As result, this inadvertently forced the 
adoption of a CT-focused strategy–making the number of bombs dropped, body counts, 
and terrain re-captured the primary measures of effect–while doing little to address the 
underlying causes of the conflict or move toward a sustainable solution. The degradation 
of ISIS, coupled with Russia and Iran’s support to degrade opposition forces, created 
options for the Assad Regime instead of constraining them. In contrast, a bifurcated 
approach that prioritized ISIS’ defeat in the near-term, while laying the groundwork to 
advantageously position the Syrian opposition for negotiations with the Assad regime 
following the collapse of the terrorist organization may have achieved better outcomes for 
the US. 
In formulating the United States’ counter-ISIS strategy, President Obama’s 
National Security Council proved resistant to any option of unconventional special 
operations for intervention in Syria. In his first inaugural address in 2009, President Obama 
highlighted that a clear objective for his time in office was focusing the United States’ 
foreign policy around the “tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”361 Under this 
maxim, it was clear that President Obama and those he selected to advise him would 
attempt to reverse the previous administrations’ culture of haphazard intervention abroad 
vis-à-vis Iraq. When faced with both international and domestic calls for the United States 
to confront the insecurity in Syria that fed the development of ISIS, President Obama was 
reticent to commit U.S. forces to potential ground combat.362 With this in mind, the 
military planners developing options for Operation Inherent Resolve to present to the NSC 
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viewed UW as a “toxic term.”363 Consequently, this led to the initial development and 
implementation of the overt T&E program which limited military ground efforts to third-
party countries outside of Syria, restricted operations to “advise and assist” but not 
accompany operations, and implemented a multinational chain of command with, at times, 
conflicting objectives.364 While a portion of Special Forces leadership may argue that these 
are, in fact, UW activities, regardless of the designation of the boarder campaign, this fails 
to acknowledge the NSC’s clear reluctance to consider fully supported UW as a potential 
military option. Analyzing these issues, foreign policy professor David Rothkopf finds that 
the “poorly functioning NSC process” under the Obama administration was as bad as “we 
have seen since Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney back-doored the process in the early 
years of the Bush administration.”365 Under these conditions, it was clear early on that 
UW would not be a viable option for military intervention in Syria. 
Risk aversion on the part of the Obama administration played a significant role in 
prohibiting accompaniment authorities to coalition advisors at the start of Operation 
Inherent Resolve. Among the first official authorizations for this operation was Congress’ 
approval of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Under Section 
1209 of this NDAA, Secretary of Defense was authorized to provide “assistance, including 
training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training and associated facilities, 
and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other 
appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals.”366 Noticeably absent from this litany 
of authorized activities is the ability to accompany “vetted elements of the Syrian 
opposition” into the operational environment, reflecting the White House’s goals of 
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prohibiting “American boots on the ground in Syria” to avoid an “open-ended action like 
Iraq or Afghanistan.”367 When pushed by members of his Cabinet for military action in 
Syria, President Obama evoked the memory of the United States’ protracted involvement 
in Vietnam, stating America’s involvement in that conflict began under similar 
circumstances.368 As a result, U.S. advisors to indigenous ground forces turned to an 
emerging concept coined as “remote advise and assist” operations, which leveraged 
modern technology to enhance partnered advisor connectivity to “bridge the gap between 
a direct combat advisory mission” and prohibited accompaniment.369 
When the strategy for the U.S. led coalition against ISIS failed to gain momentum 
in the fall of 2015, Turkey’s geopolitical sensitivities concerning the Kurdish rebels in 
Syria impeded transition to a more effective indigenous partner. On July 31, 2015 the first 
tranche of fighters from the T&E program were overrun by insurgents of the Al Nursa 
Front, an Al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization.370 Within two months, Russian officials 
announced the introduction of both ground and air forces into Syria to reinforce the Assad 
regime and target terrorist organizations such as ISIS.371 The impacts of these two events 
left the coalition searching for a new strategy. Operating mainly in Northeastern Syria, the 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had already proved themselves as a capable indigenous 
force defeating ISIS in Kobani, Hasakah, and Tal Abyad. However, with a majority of this 
force comprised of Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Forces (YPG) and Women’s 
Protection Units (YPJ), Turkey remained adamantly opposed to any provision of assistance 
to this organization.372 The basis of Turkish opposition stemmed from the Kurdish groups’ 
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familial affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), an acknowledged terrorist 
organization by the United States, which has maintained an active insurgency in Turkey 
since the mid-1980s.373 Discussing this geopolitical obstacle to prospective support to the 
SDF, Atlantic Council senior fellow Aaron Stein suggests that this relationship, born of 
tactical necessity, to achieve immediate objectives risked compromising long-term U.S.-
Turkey relations.374 Prioritizing speed and effectiveness over politics, the United States 
increasingly ignored Turkish reticence to the new partnership, especially as the Kurdish 
groups joined forces with the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC) to form the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) and began seizing control of ISIS occupied territories in Northern Syria.375 
Yet, this fissure in the coalition, which centered around support to the SDF, encapsulates 
the larger geopolitical issues at work in Syria where the importance for “boarder U.S. 
national security policy objectives may be linked more to its consequences for regional and 
global stability than to the details and outcome of the Syrian conflict itself.”376 While 
President Trump officially authorized the provision of military assistance to the Kurdish 
forces in Syria in May 2017, the coalition to defeat ISIS remains fractured over this 
controversial support.377 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES TO U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA 
To analyze the organizational challenges to the United States’ intervention in Syria, 
this section will discuss a short history of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Syria 
(CJIATF-S), as well as the events surrounding the SDF’s contentious seizure of Manbij, 
Syria in the summer of 2016 and the subsequent backlash from Turkey. In summary, this 
research team found the major organizational obstacles to STR activities in Syria were: (1) 
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separating special operations commands by geography instead of function, (2) overloading 
a Theater Special Operations Command, and (3) delays in achieving a unity of effort 
between adjacent organizations. 
CJIATF-S’ history in Syria demonstrates the effects of an organizational structure 
that fails to match the conditions of its operational environment. From its formation in 
2014, CENTCOM assigned CJIATF-S the responsibility of “vetting, training, and 
equipping moderate Syrian opposition forces to defend the Syrian people, defend 
opposition-controlled areas in Syria, counter ISIL, and promote the conditions for a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict in Syria.”378 Notably absent from this mandate were 
mission command responsibilities for special operations in Iraq, where ISIS controlled an 
estimated one-third of the country.379 Instead, CENTCOM planners chose to allocate these 
responsibilities to a separate newly established command, Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force-Iraq (CJSOTF-I). By dividing the mission command of special 
operations against ISIS into separate headquarters, CENTCOM planners ignored the clear 
interconnection between these two countries and the combined effort required to defeat 
ISIS in both areas. Specifically, this geographic division of responsibilities failed to 
understand how the insecurity of both Iraq and Syria fueled the rise and sustainment of 
ISIS and the synchronization required to defeat the enemy. International relations professor 
Fawaz Gerges described the significance of the connection, stating that ISIS’ ability to 
appeal to disenfranchised Sunni communities in both Iraq and Syria enabled “a systematic 
effort to build a solid foothold and to expand their influence.”380 In other words, the 
marginalization of Sunni communities and insecurity within both Iraq and Syria was a 
catalyst for ISIS control. Therefore, both countries required commensurate and integrated 
efforts to degrade and defeat the growing influence of ISIS.  
                                                 
378 U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Execute Order Operation Inherent Resolve, Establishing 
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This separation of operations by geography further complicated the logistical and 
operational support for indigenous operations, which failed to recognize these boundaries. 
As the operational tempo increased, the negative impact of this decision was evident in 
continuous disputes over finite resources, such as surveillance asset allocation, and 
laborious adjacent unit coordination. With CJIATF-S authorized as a two-star command 
and CJSOTF-I commanded by a colonel, there was a noticeable disparity in representation 
that affected competition for resources and expedient coordination. Ultimately, 
CENTCOM and DOD corrected this error in January 2016 with the Pentagon authorizing 
the reorganization of CJIATF-S into what would become Special Joint Operations Task 
Force-OIR (SOJTF-OIR). The reformed two-star command would assume responsibility 
for “synchroniz[ing] the effects and activities of multiple subordinate commands in the 
fight against ISIS across Syria and Iraq.”381 Although this reorganization improved 
efficiency and coordination activities for special operations in both countries, the previous 
15 months of geographically separating operations would take additional time to fully 
resolve. Meanwhile, the fight against ISIS had yet to gain momentum in either country. 
Additionally, CENTCOM planners tasked the Theater Special Operations 
Command (TSOC) as the headquarters element for CJAITF-S. As the lead component for 
all special operations within the CENTCOM area covering 20 countries within the “least 
secure and stable regions of the world,” Special Operations Command Central 
(SOCCENT) is among the most active commands in the U.S. military.382 While it is not 
uncommon for military planners to identify a TSOC as the lead component for initial 
establishment of operations under the Joint Task Force, retaining both command 
responsibilities at this headquarters beyond the development phase can quickly overwhelm 
an organization. In the case of CJIATF-S, SOCCENT was quickly engulfed by what its 
Commander, Major General Michael Nagata, describes as “start-up” costs, such as land 
                                                 
381 United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF 
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agreements, facilities production, vetting procedures, and adjacent unit coordination.383 
Furthering complicating SOCCENT’s ability to address these  start-up costs were the 
TSOC’s daily responsibilities managing the region’s wide-ranging special operations 
activities, such as joint combined exchange training, civil-military engagement, military 
information support, and other sensitive special operations. 
To help support this increase in mission command responsibilities in the 
headquarters, CJIATF-S filled the majority of its staff positions through joint individual 
augmentees, which did not require any prior experience or education in special operations. 
While this manning processing is also not uncommon, especially when establishing a joint 
task force for contingency operations, it limits the optimization of special operations, given 
that the headquarters staff will likely have minimal, if any, experience in working special 
operations.384 The extent of this issue was soon visible within CJIATF-S as the operational 
and legal complexities of vetting indigenous forces, divestiture of military equipment, and 
battle-tracking within a denied area quickly consumed the staff capacity. For example, with 
regard to vetting, the established process required screening the indigenous fighters 
through multiple means, to include “psychological evaluations, biometrics checks[,] stress 
tests,” and extensive interagency coordination and deconfliction.385 While details on the 
average length of this process are not available at the unclassified level, it is fair to assume 
that this process required a considerable amount of time since many of the staff personnel 
responsible for operationally managing this process were inexperienced with these 
procedures and, more broadly, special operations.  
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CENTCOM addressed these issues following Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s 
October 9th, 2015 announcement that the focus of the Train and Equip program would shift 
to enabling indigenous groups already fighting ISIS in Syria.386 As a part of this strategy 
shift, the reformation of CJIATF-S into SOJTF-OIR required the transition of 
responsibilities for the counter-ISIS headquarters element to 1st Special Forces Command 
(Airborne). By removing SOCCENT’s mission command responsibilities, CENTCOM 
acknowledged the need to relieve SOCCENT of the pressures of manning two operational 
headquarters elements. At this point, President Obama removed the prohibition against 
American advisors entering Syria.387 While these two decisions were most likely 
disconnected, the benefit of this coincidence was soon clear as indigenous forces gained 
momentum against ISIS in several key areas, such as the Tishreen Dam, Al-Shaddai, and 
Ramadi, in the beginning of 2016. 
As ISIS began to lose terrain in Syria, the importance of thorough coordination 
between advisors of disparate indigenous forces intensified. This issue came to the 
forefront on August 12, 2016 when the SDF cleared the remnants of ISIS from Manbij, a 
little-known outpost located approximately 38 km south of a main border crossing point 
between Syria Turkey at the city of Jarabulus.388 Within two weeks, Turkey, a member of 
the OIR multi-national coalition, sent tanks, special forces, separate rebel forces with 
Turkish affiliations into Syria to secure the border crossing and establish a bulwark against 
further SDF advances under what the Turks referred to as Operation Euphrates Shield.389 
With U.S. SOF advisors on both sides of this conflict, the United States faced the dilemma 
                                                 
386 Lisa Ferdinando, “Pentagon Shifts Focus in Syria,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 9, 2015, 
accessed November 13, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/622663/pentagon-pauses-
moderate-syrian-train-and-equip-mission/. 
387 Josh Earnest, “Daily Press Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest 10/30/15,” Obama White 
House Archive, October 30, 2015, accessed November 13, 2017, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/30/daily-press-briefing-press-secretary-
josh-earnest-103015. 
388 Faysal Imani, “Why Turkey Went to War in Syria,” Foreign Policy Magazine, August 24, 2016, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/24/why-turkey-finally-went-to-war-in-syria-jarablus-invasion-kurds/. 
389 Tim Arango, Anne Barnard, and Ceylan Yeginsu,"Turkey’s Military Plunges Into Syria, Enabling 
Rebels to Capture ISIS Stronghold,” The New York Times, August 24, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-isis.html. 
 120 
of quelling heated rhetoric and rebuilding trust between indigenous partners. Turkey’s 
actions in Syria in response to the SDF’s victory in Manbij demonstrate the impact that a 
lack of unity of effort within a coalition can have on dynamic operating environments. 
Although the establishment of SOJTF-OIR as the single SOF headquarters for the fight 
against ISIS in Iraq and Syria did improve the coordination and synchronization of most 
special operations, there was still a large gap in cooperation and coordination of objectives 
between multi-national units at the tactical level. With advisors collocated to both SDF and 
Turkish forces, U.S. SOF were central to enabling a collective understanding of both 
partners’ intent and planned future operations. However, the history of enmity between 
these partners appears to have restricted any feasibility for coordination leading up to the 
Turk’s Operation Euphrates Shield. This lack of a common objective and coordination 
between the separate elements of the SOF coalition took time and resources away from the 
fight against the common enemy, ISIS. 
D. SUMMARY 
By examining the Syrian conflict, the legal, political, and organizational challenges 
to support to resistance operations become clear. From the onset of the civil war to the 
emergence and decline of ISIS, the international and domestic legal requirements played a 
large role in controlling the pace and scope of U.S. intervention. While many of the political 
challenges were subjective to contemporary circumstances surrounding this conflict, rigid 
strategy and NSC conditions for intervention, as well as the reluctance to commit U.S. 
forces and vacillating U.S. policy are enduring difficulties facing any potential military 
intervention. Finally, the organizational challenges reveal the necessity for adaptive 
mission command structures that match the rate of evolution for the operating environment. 
While the territory under ISIS control had declined significantly since the fall of Mosul in 
2014, there are clearly several issues that stymied the progress of this effort along the way. 
E. WHAT IF? 
Despite the collective impact of these challenges on the U.S. strategy for Syria, this 
case study analysis leads to a fundamental question: could the United States have achieved 
its stated policy objectives if it had mitigated these obstacles and employed a support to 
 121 
resistance-focused strategy earlier?390 To briefly explore this counterfactual, the authors 
of this research will divide the periods of potential U.S. intervention into two phases 
reflecting the shifts in U.S. policy for Syria (i.e., focused on dislodging the Assad regime 
versus defeating ISIS). Phase One is defined as immediately following the initial 
declaration on August 18, 2011 by President Obama that the “time has come for President 
Assad to step aside.”391 Phase Two is defined as immediately following ISIS’ successful 
capture of Mosul in June 2014. 
1. Phase One: Assad Must Go 
The strategic value that Iran has placed on maintaining the Assad regime makes it 
unlikely that any U.S. strategy for phase one, short of direct military intervention, would 
have succeeded. The strategic importance of Syria to Iran is well documented. Regarding 
Iran’s strategic relationship with Syria, national security professor Afshon Ostovar notes 
that Syria is a “vital intermediary for its support to Hezbollah in Lebanon.”392 Supporting 
the argument that Syria is critical to Iran, Dr. Ostovar quotes, among other evidence, a 
September 2013 interview with a former Iranian Basij Commander, stating “Syria is the 
35th province and a strategic province for [Iran]…if Syria were lost, we [Iran] would not 
be able to keep even Tehran.”393  
Iran demonstrated the strategic value of Syria further in 2015 by soliciting the 
intervention of Russian forces to bolster the failing defense of the Assad regime. Faced 
with mounting losses among its IRGC advisors and a “depleted and exhausted” partner 
force in the Syrian army with desertions on the rise, Iran overcame its modern aversion 
foreign alliances with world superpowers by assisting with the introduction of Russian 
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forces.394 Following the IRGC’s Quds Force Commander’s visit to Moscow in July 2015, 
Russia announced its intervention to reinforce the pro-Assad coalition by early October.395 
Within weeks, the Iranians’ decision proved indispensable as the tides had turned in favor 
the Assad regime.396 Based on these examples, Iran showed it was willing to risk direct 
military confrontation with the United States when the Assad Regime’s survival hung in 
the balance. Whereas, the United States’ brinksmanship in Syria would have most likely 
stopped short of direct military confrontation. For this reason, it is doubtful that support to 
resistance operations would have achieved the United States’ policy objectives in Syria 
during phase one. Finally, this research also found that ‘the problem of transition’ (e.g., 
what happens after Assad goes?) was a complicating factor in the United States’ 
brinksmanship calculus.  
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2. Phase Two: ISIS Must Go 
Given the proven effectiveness of external intervention against the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in both Iraq and Syria, it likely that the United States could have 
defeated the Islamic State sooner, with earlier and more efficient support to resistance 
operations. A 2017 RAND report entitled Rolling Back the Islamic State found that “a 
combination of Syrian, Turkish, Kurdish, and allied military operations” reduced 
approximately 55% of the population and 37% of the territory controlled by ISIS over a 3-
year period (Figure 4 provides a depiction of the reduction of ISIS control over this 
period).397 Through such external intervention as the “United States in the north, and, to a 
lesser degree, from Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah in the west,” ISIS has declined 
to the point of near-territorial extinction in 2017.398 For this reason, it is probable that fully 
enabled support to resistance operations would have achieved the United States’ policy 
objective in Syria for phase two. However, it is worth mentioning that the physical defeat 
of ISIS is only one side of the equation. Again, the transition from conflict to stability is 
the other half. As witnessed from the removal of ISIS from large urban areas, such as Mosul 
and Raqqa, restoring security to these liberated areas and ensuring regional stability 
following the removal of ISIS is a considerable challenge, to say the least. With President 
Trump declaring that the United States is “not nation-building” in Afghanistan, it seems 
unlikely that the current administration will support separate large-scale reconstruction 
efforts in Syria.399  
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Figure 4.  RAND Estimates of the Decline of ISIS-Controlled Territory in 
Iraq and Syria (2017)400  
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X. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis shows that the legal, political, and organizational obstacles to ARSOF’s 
employment of STR operations vary in their origin, scope, and impact. Moreover, as seen 
in the Syrian case study, the various facets of each category may not apply to all U.S. 
interventions. Certain aspects of these obstacles (e.g., authorizations, funding, and 
organizational culture) can be addressed through the following recommendations; 
however, confrontation of these issues must occur at the appropriate organizational level 
and must have full support of, and emanate downward from, the requisite echelon in the 
military chain of command. Some obstacles may require USSOCOM and USASOC to 
inform, educate, and build consensus to garner external support from Congress and the 
interagency community. On the other hand, some obstacles, such as international law and 
geopolitics, are outside of the United States’ control and will pose enduring challenges to 
all potential STR operations. In these instances, studying and accounting for these 
variables, and implementing necessary changes will posture USASOC to provide 
policymakers with effective and appropriate STR policy options.  
To address ARSOF’s preparation for future conflict, the United States Army 
Special Operations Command (USASOC) published its “USASOC 2035 Strategy” in April 
2017, focusing primarily on the “further development of ARSOF institutional and 
operational capabilities needed to counter future threats across the spectrum of conflict, 
especially in gray zones between peace and overt war.”401 Additionally, the USASOC 
commander’s vision repeatedly highlights the imperative for ARSOF to provide a 
“portfolio of complementary capabilities to address future hybrid threats.”402 This reflects 
the DOD policy on irregular warfare outlined in DOD Directive 300.07, which 
acknowledges that irregular warfare, which encompasses UW, “is as strategically 
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important as traditional warfare and [DOD] must be equally capable in both.”403 This 
study’s research occurred concurrently with the development and publishing of “USASOC 
2035.” As a result, this research reiterates many of the obstacles captured in “USASOC 
2035,” such as “identify more responsive mechanisms to deploy forces when needed” (i.e., 
develop proactive authorizations and funding), “improve understanding of the full range of 
ARSOF capabilities with external audiences” (i.e., decrease civil-military disconnection), 
and “develop and integrate systems and processes that enable operator/leader level decision 
making” (i.e., empower decentralized decision making). Furthermore, the Commander’s 
vision outlines several other aspects of STR that fell outside this paper’s scope, such as 
technology modernization, cyber integration, training, and career management. While it is 
imperative that all commands within USASOC pursue directives and, as necessary, update 
the USASOC Commander on issues requiring command leverage, they must also account 
for persistent implementation challenges.404 
A bias toward counterterrorism operations was the most significant challenge 
identified by this research, however, “USASOC 2035” does not address this point. 
Acknowledging the persistent issue of strategic imbalance, the “SOCOM 2020 Strategy” 
states that “USSOCOM must not only continue to pursue terrorists wherever we may find 
them, we must rebalance the force and tenaciously embrace indirect operations in the 
Human Domain.”405 However, multiple areas throughout this analysis have revealed that 
the current U.S. policy, authorities, resources, and organizational structures 
disproportionately focus on CT operations, sustaining a strategic imbalance towards a 
short-term, direct approach, as opposed to the complementary application of the direct and 
indirect approach (i.e., Surgical Strike and Special Warfare). While the terrorist threat to 
the U.S. and its interests abroad is certainly valid, this myopic focus on terrorism has left 
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the door open for actors like Russia, Iran, and China to assert themselves through both 
conventional and unconventional means.  
Two other sources of this asymmetry in authorities, resources, and organization 
between the direct and indirect approach stem from a lack of a unified SOF narrative and 
a ‘path of least resistance’ to employ CT Forces. Currently, the disjointed SOF narrative 
fails to inform and educate policymakers on the full spectrum of SOF core activities. 
Armed with partial information, policymakers may inadvertently limit military 
intervention to a single SOF capability or organization. Eventually, this limitation increases 
organizational credibility and creates a positive feedback loop for employment. 
Additionally, with accelerated funding and approval streams, prioritization within the 
global SOF network, and adaptive mission command structures, USSOCOM’s internal 
disproportionate support towards this single core activity transcends all three categories of 
obstacles to STR. Over time, this lack of optimized efficiency for all other special 
operations outside of CT creates a “path of least resistance” for military planners and 
commands facing complex and dynamic problems. Through this “path of least resistance,” 
USSOCOM and policymakers fall victim to the cognitive “blunder” referred to by national 
securities professor Zachery Shore as “cure-allism.” By depending on CT operations 
beyond their intended short-term duration and objectives, military planners are taking an 
approach that has worked well in the past and universally applying it to all future 
problems.406 Although applying the CT approach to various circumstances for U.S. 
intervention may reduce obstacles to approval within policymaking circles, it also 
reinforces a rigid operational mindset that fails to account for the full complement of SOF 
capabilities. 
A more effective National Security Strategy (NSS) for future hybrid conflicts 
requires an improved balance between, and complementary employment of, the direct and 
indirect approaches. Additionally, any future security strategy must address the 
unconventional threats that state and non-state actors pose in present and future conflicts. 
Currently, USSOCOM remains focused on its designated role as DOD’s synchronizer of 
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global CT, but exercises limited operational control over the long-term direction of SOF’s 
Special Warfare activities.407 Instead, responsibility for operational control of these 
indirect activities remains with the TSOCs and GCCs, impeding the efficiency and 
synchronization of USSOCOM’s indirect capabilities. To improve this status quo, this 
research offers five recommendations. The recommendations below emphasize two 
uniform criteria: 
• No new organizations: All recommendations from this research highlight 
the need for review, redirection, and, possibly, restructuring of current 
resource utilization. 
• Top-down driven and Bottom-up refinement: From the creation of 
USSOCOM by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 to 
the restructuring of U.S. Army Special Forces by “ARSOF 2022,” top-down 
driven change a prerequisite from any change affecting special operations. 
As result, ASD SO/LIC and Commander of USSOCOM will be primarily 
responsible for enacting these recommendations through their advocacy at 
the DOD and Joint Staff levels.408 However, the ‘top-down’ approach will 
require subordinate organizations to identify issues, offer solutions and 
provide feedback and refinements during implementation. Only through 
this two-way interaction will the command overcome the perpetual 
challenge of implementation. 
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A. RECOMMENDATION #1: ADVOCATE FOR THE INCORPORATION 
OF IRREGULAR WARFARE WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
The current National Security Strategy remains fixed on combating terrorism. Since 
9/11, this congressionally mandated “comprehensive report” has centered on protecting the 
homeland from future terrorist attacks but fails to reflect the full spectrum of U.S. national 
power in the realm of hybrid warfare and gray area conflict.409 Consequently, SOF CT 
capabilities have emerged as the primary vehicle for addressing U.S. intervention abroad. 
To resolve this impediment towards the viability of future STR operations, security policy 
should incorporate irregular warfare guidance alongside combating terrorism initiatives.  
Russian and Iranian unconventional warfare activities, coupled with recent 
Congressional legislation, present a potential catalyst for a rebalancing between the 
nation’s direct and indirect approaches, as well as irregular warfare injects into the 
forthcoming National Security Strategy (NSS). The “Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act” orders “the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence [to] jointly develop and 
submit … a strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and 
threats that directly threaten the United States and key allies in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and beyond.”410 The legislation, which is reminiscent of George Kennan’s ‘political 
warfare’ concept, presents USSOCOM and USASOC with an opportunity to contribute to 
the NSS that would demonstrate how special operations–and potentially STR–can support 
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a larger political warfare strategy.411 Due to the classification of this research, the proposed 
injects are generalized, but SOF’s role should directly support the broader political warfare 
strategy. Potential proposals should consider efforts to shape Iran’s political evolution, 
rollback Iran’s expansion abroad, and promote other nations’ resiliency to Iranian influence 
and political or cultural infiltration. By incorporating both the direct and indirect 
approaches of U.S. capabilities, this policy document will enhance the feasibility of STR 
development from the top-down. From this adjustment to national strategic guidance, 
USSOCOM and its subordinate unified commands can initiate reviews of resource 
reallocation and operational requirements to ensure the optimal utilization of SOF towards 
national objectives. 
B. RECOMMENDATION #2: ESTABLISH AN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
WORKING GROUP WITHIN THE NSC 
The National Security Council (NSC) should re-task an element within the 
Counterterrorism Security Group to focus on irregular warfare to analyze hybrid threats to 
U.S. national interests abroad and, when appropriate, develop, resource, and execute 
indirect warfare policy in response to these threats.412 While the intended charter for this 
working group disregards current organizational and geographic boundaries, this purpose 
is not without precedent. In fact, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the 1987 DOD 
Authorization Act mandated the establishment of a Board for Low Intensity Conflict,” with 
its primary function being “to coordinate the policies of the United States for low intensity 
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conflict.”413 Historical research on this subject suggests that the board was only nominally 
established within the NSC under the Reagan administration and met only twice in the 
George H.W. Bush administration.414 No further information on this board could be found. 
While this research team recommends initiating this proposal through the restructuring of 
an established entity of the NSC, it is likely that the focus and functions of this working 
group would branch into a separate policy coordination committee or directorate under the 
NSC over time. Furthermore, to improve the collective understanding of this working 
group through what the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) has termed the “preparation of 
the policy environment,” this research team endorses the CNA’s recommendation of 
including at least one SOF General or flag officer.415  
C. RECOMMENDATION #3: CONTINUE THE MOMENTUM FOR 
STANDING CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND FUNDING 
SUPPORTING IRREGULAR WARFARE 
To address the disparity in authorization and funding streams between SOF 
activities, special operations leadership should capitalize on the recent momentum in 
Congressional support to facilitate DOD’s prosecution of irregular warfare. Chapter VI 
(legal obstacles) highlighted the FY 16 NDAA requirement for DOD to develop a strategy 
to “counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors,” 
as well as the recent passage of the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act.”416 Finally, through the proposed allocation of $10 million annually through fiscal 
year 2021 to support such indirect capabilities, Congress has acknowledged the need to 
redress the strategy imbalance through comparable legal and monetary support.417 
Nonetheless, there is still much more required of Congress vis-à-vis legal parity between 
                                                 
413 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987,” Pub. L. 99–661 §1311 Stat. 3986 
(1986). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg3816.pdf. 
414 William G. Boykin, “Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was It 
Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled” (study project, Army War College, 1991), 46. 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA235154. 
415 Powell, “Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration,” 4. 
416 FY ‘16 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 114–92, Sect. 1097 “Department of Defense 
Strategy for Countering Unconventional Warfare” (November 25, 2015). 
417 H.R. 2810 §1201, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr2810/BILLS-
115hr2810pap.pdf. 
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the nation’s complementary direct and indirect capabilities, such as comparable funding, 
authorizations, liaison mechanisms, and oversight for a wider range of DOD’s Special 
Warfare activities. Furthermore, USSOCOM must assuage the recent concern voiced by 
many political leaders in the 2017 Congressional review of the 9/11 AUMF that 
authorizations such as these become “mere authorities of convenience…to conduct military 
activities anywhere in the world.”418  
To that end, this research team recommends that the USSOCOM Commander 
include a review of the force’s utilization of funds earmarked for irregular warfare in annual 
posture statements. Through these updates, the SOF leadership can ensure funding levels 
are adequate to affect the pursuit of national interests through irregular warfare and to 
identify areas that may require adjustments to 1201 funding in the future. 
D. RECOMMENDATION #4: ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONVERGENCE OF 
DOD AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS A MODERN 
NECESSITY AND REFORM LEGISLATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
PRACTICES ACCORDINGLY 
SOF and the CIA are complementary organizations and natural partners, born out 
of necessity and shared organizational history, as shown in Chapter VIII (organizational 
obstacles) of this study. Review and reform of the legislation governing DOD-CIA 
intelligence collection and covert action capabilities is overdue. When applicable, updates 
to Title 10 and 50 should transition ad hoc agreements and de facto operating practices into 
statutory law and reassess the division of labor among the two entities, recognizing that the 
operational environment is constantly evolving. Second, the CIA and SOF should increase 
collaboration and organizational linkages in the special warfare realm before crises occur 
to improve interoperability, operational understanding, education, and overall 
effectiveness. Some specific suggestions are: establish an irregular warfare JIATF, 
directorate, or center; incorporate SOF into the planning process earlier and streamline the 
                                                 
418 To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks 
launched against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf; Charlie Savage, “No Need 
to Update 9/11 War Law Trump Officials Tell Congress,” The New York Times, October 30, 2017, 
accessed November 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/us/politics/9-11-war-law-aumf-
trump.html. 
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detailing process; and promote cross-pollination between SOF and Directorate of 
Operations officers within educational institutions and increasing special warfare-focused 
liaison positions within the organizations themselves. Finally, SOF and the CIA must 
revisit their division of labor for covert action and special operations activities to identify 
overlap and redundancy, as well as those complementary capabilities that each 
organization should develop and invest in, as discussed in Chapter VIII (organizational 
obstacles). 
E. RECOMMENDATION #5: REFORM SOF EDUCATION FOR SPECIAL 
WARFARE AND NON-SOF PERSONNEL 
Special Operations Forces’ lack of formal education on the legal, political, and 
organizational challenges of special operations was an endemic issue throughout this 
research. In nearly every interview, commands and staffs of various organizations 
mentioned the absence of a proper SOF education framework at the operational level as a 
contributing factor to ARSOF’s execution of STR operations. Echoing this sentiment, 
“USASOC 2035” highlights several areas of SOF education that require improvements to 
prepare the force for future conflict. Specifically, this strategy highlights the need to “create 
and implement education models that train operators to rapidly integrate into, and excel 
within, ambiguous environments” and investment in “hybrid conflict research/education” 
as a mid-term objective for the command.419 For ARSOF, all suggested reforms to 
education in special operations will be developed, resourced, and managed by the Special 
Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE).420 
As “USASOC 2035” recognizes, educating the force for special warfare and 
derivative activities is critically important for all echelons of professional military 
education. As a center of excellence, U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School (USJFKSWCS)–where it has not already–must assert itself as the leading innovator 
in the development of special warfare doctrine and concepts and training of all of 
                                                 
419 USASOC, USASOC 2035, 33. 
420 “USASOC 2035” highlights that AR 5–22, Army Force Modernization Proponency System, 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2015) “establishes USASOC and SOCoE authorities as force 
modernization and branch proponents.” 
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USASOC’s assigned personnel, to include its non-SOF members. While remaining 
cognizant of its interoperability requirements with conventional forces, the SOCoE should 
take ownership of the curriculum for SOF personnel attending service-provided 
professional military education (PME) institutions. The new curriculum should be SOF-
focused, as opposed to the current construct that incorporates SOF-specific instruction as 
an adjunct to its main focus–conventional force operations. To address the challenges of 
Operational Art in Special Warfare, students at the intermediate PME level should conduct 
campaign design and planning for a special warfare operations, to increase an 
understanding of the challenges specific to special warfare, vice conventional warfare.421 
Finally, the SOCoE should develop a SOF indoctrination course for its non-SOF personnel, 
as well as courses for niche specialties, such as logisticians, lawyers, contracting officers, 
and communications specialists. Investing early will provide better long-term results. Joint 
Special Operations University does provide some of the specialty education suggested, but 
there are no formal requirements for attendance or completion, nor is there specific time 
allotted for personnel to attend. These are only a few the potential changes, but this research 
identified them as a most necessary and most likely to generate impact. 
F. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The authors captured the magnitude of at least a portion of the challenges facing 
any proposed STR operation, but this analysis is by no means exhaustive. To further 
enhance DOD’s collective understanding of the vast issues facing ARSOF’s execution of 
STR operations, this research team recommends additional study in the following areas: 
• A study to determine the next steps for the “Support to Resistance 
Framework” that USSOCOM and interagency partners developed. Is more 
socialization required for the concept to take hold?  What are the 
interagency community’s remaining concerns? Are organizational changes 
required?  
                                                 
421 Incorporating more robust Special Warfare planning into intermediate level education (ILE) means 
that all SOF field grade officers will receive this knowledge, versus the current status quo where only a 
portion of SOF field grades receive this education as an elective or by attending SOCAP and SAMS. 
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• Assess the influence and utility of emerging technologies and 
tactics/strategies in STR and UW, such as social media, cyber-enabled 
operations, and non-lethal resistance. 
• Integration of all ‘SOF tribes’ within STR and UW. The study should 
consider the evolving role of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 
role in these activities, what authorities and organization changes are 
required, and potential interagency sensitives within this realm. 
• A study on how SOF and unified action partners facilitate transition from 
resistance operations toward enduring stability following the employment 
of STR. The study should consider a range of STR objectives (e.g., coerce, 
disrupt, or overthrow, etc.) and long-term challenges following conflict 
termination and transition (e.g., Thermidorian Reaction, reconciliation, 
reintegration, etc.), as well as the requisite structural conditions for long-
term ‘success.’ 
• An assessment, from a Department of State Perspective, that examines the 
obstacles and opportunities that the Department of State presents to STR. 
The study should also consider what coordinating mechanisms promote 
unified action and how efforts to downsize the DoS will affect special 
warfare and STR campaigns. 
 
 136 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 137 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, Thomas K. U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of 
Unconventional Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. 
Agee, Ryan C., and Maurice K. DuClos. “Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for 
Unconventional Warfare.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 
Albright, Madeleine, and Stephen Hadley. Middle East Strategy Task Force: Final 
Report of the Co-chairs. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2016. 
http://mest.atlanticcouncil.org/final-report-co-chairs/.  
Almoner, Ali. “The Basij Resistance Force.” The Iran Primer. United States Institute of 
Peace, 6 October 2010, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force. 
Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” 
International Security, vol. 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 93–128. 
Arquilla, John. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare 
Have Shaped Our World. Chicago: Dee, 2011. 
Austin III, Lloyd J. “Testimony to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve.” Speech, 
United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 16 September 
2015. 
Bakal, Justin, Steven Crowe and Adam Wachob, “Innovative Practices for Special 
Warfare.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 
Ball, Timothy. “From Successful Defense to Problematic Offense: The Devolution of 
Unconventional Warfare.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. 
Bartles, Charles K. “Getting Gerasimov Right.” Military Review. January-February 2016: 
30–38. 
BBC News (Persian Service). February 14, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2013/02/130214_nm_tayeb_syria_basij.shtml. 
Beckhusen, Robert. “Why Iraq War III is Headed Into a Long, Bloody Stalemate.” War Is 
Boring, 15 June 2014. 
Beckwith, Charlie A., and Donald Knox. Delta Force. New York: Dell, 1983. 
Belasco, Amy, and Christopher M. Blanchard. Train and Equip Program for Syria: 
Authorities, Funding and Issues for Congress. CRS Report No. R43727. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43727.pdf. 
 138 
Benmelech, Efraim, and Esteban F. Klor. “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to 
ISIS?” Working Paper 22190, National Bureau of Economic Research April 2016. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22190.pdf. 
Best Jr., Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. CRS 
Report No. RL 30840. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30840.pdf. 
Best, Richard A. Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy?. 
CRS report no 96–844F. Washington, DC: CRS, October 21, 1996. 
digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc807565/ 
Blanchard, Christopher, Carla Humud, and Mary Beth Nikitin. “Armed Conflict in Syria: 
Overview and U.S. Response,” Congressional Research Service Report RL33487, 
October 9, 2015. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=787917. 
———. Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, Congressional Research 
Service, Report RL33487, August 10, 2017. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=803624. 
Blanchard, Christopher M., and Jeremy M. Sharp. Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: 
Issues for Congress. CRS Report No. R 43201. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2013. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43201.pdf. 
Bloom, Mia, Hicham Tiflati, and John Horgan. “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: 
Telegram 1.” Terrorism and Political Violence (July 9, 2017). 
Bolton, John, “Overkill: Army Mission Command Systems Inhibit Mission Command,” 
Small Wars Journal, August 29, 2017. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/overkill-army-mission-command-systems-
inhibit-mission-command. 
Bond, Margaret S. “Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing 
States.” Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. March 30, 2007. 
Bose, Meena. Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision 
Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy. College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 1998. 
Boyer, Dave. “Pentagon: Successful military campaign against ISIS moving to ‘phase 
two.’” The Washington Times 13 April 2016. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/13/pentagon-military-campaign-
against-isis-phase-two/. 
Boykin, William G. “Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why 
Was It Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled.” Study Project, Army War 
College, 1991. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA235154. 
 139 
Brellis, Dean and William Peers, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most 
Successful Guerrilla Force. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963. 
Brooks, Rosa. How Everything Became War and The Military Became Everything: Tales 
From The Pentagon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016. 
Brunner, Jordan. “Iran Has Built an Army of Cyber-Proxies.” The Tower 29 (2015). 
Bucala, Paul. “Iran’s New Way of War in Syria.” Institute for the Study of War. 
(February 2017). 
Bucala, Paul, and Frederick W. Kagan. Iran’s Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC 
Fights in Syria. American Enterprise Institute. Critical Threats Project (March 
2016). 
Bush, George W. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Washington, DC: White 
House, 2013. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-
terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. 
Callard, James and Peter Faber. “An Emerging Synthesis For a New Way of War: 
Combination Warfare and Future Innovation.” Conflict & Security. Winter-Spring 
2002. 61–68. 
Cancian, Mark. “Limiting the Size of the NSC Staff.” Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, July 1, 2016. Accessed October 2, 2017. 
https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/160902_Limiting_Size_NSC_Staff.pdf. 
Cantwell, Douglas. “The ETF and the Legality of U.S. Intervention in Syria Under 
International Law.” Lawfare, March 28, 2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/etf-
and-legality-us-intervention-syria-under-international-law. 
Central Intelligence Agency. “CIA Organization Chart,” June 5, 2017. 
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/leadership/cia-organization-chart.html. 
———. “CIA Support the Military during the Persian Gulf War,” June 16, 1997, last 
updated April 24, 2007. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-
1/gulfwar/061997/support.htm. 
———. “Military Affairs,” November 30, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-
cia/military-affairs. 
———. “The Office of Strategic Services: Forerunner to Today’s CIA,” Central 




———. “Unclassified Version of March 6, 2015 Message to the Workforce from CIA 
Director John Brennan: Our Agency’s Blueprint for the Future,” March 6, 2015. 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2015-press-
releases-statements/message-to-workforce-agencys-blueprint-for-the-future.html. 
Chambers II, John Whiteclay. OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in 
World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Park Service, 2008. 22. 
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/oss/. 
Chesney, Robert. “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 
50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, vol. 5, no. 2 (2012): 539–
629. 
Cohen, Elliot A. Commandos and Politicians. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1978.  
Cohen, Eliot A. “Constraints on America’s conduct of small wars.” International 
Security, vol. 9, no. 2 (1984): 151–181. 
Cohen, Saul B. Geography and Politics in a World Divided. London: Methuen, 1964. 
Collins, Joseph J. American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of 
the CSIS International Security Program, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
International Studies, 2000. 
“Country: China.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. accessed 21 August 
2017.https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/. 
Daft, Richard. Essentials Organizational Theory & Design. Mason, Ohio: South Western 
College Publishing, 2003. 
Dag Hammarskjold Library. “Security Council Veto List,” accessed October 20, 2019. 
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. 
Daugherty, William J. Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency. Lexington: 
Univ. of Kentucky, 2004. 
Department of Defense. “Defense Budget Overview.” Washington, DC: Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2016. 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_
Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 
———. DOD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low-intensity Conflict (Mar. 22, 1995). 
———. Irregular Warfare. DOD Directive 3000.07. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=757333. 
 141 
———. Unified Command Plan. April 6, 2011. 
Department of State. “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Congressional Budget Justification.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 
2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/252179.pdf. 
———. “HR Fact Sheet.” Bureau of Human Resources. June 30, 2017. 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/25421.pdf. 
Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3–0, Unified Land 
Operation. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011. 
Director of Strategic Services. “Operational Groups Field Manual,” Office of Strategic 
Services Reproduction Branch, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1945. 
http://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/operational-groups-fm.pdf. 
———. “Special Operations Field Manual-Strategic Services,” Office of Strategic 
Services Reproduction Branch, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1944. 10.  
http://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/special-operations-fm.pdf. 
Defense Manpower Data Center. “DOD Personnel, Workforce Reports, & Publications.” 
July 31, 2017. https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. 
Doyle, David. “Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant 
Command.” Monograph, Command and General Staff College School of 
Advanced Military Studies, 2009. 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/SAMS/media/Monographs/DoyleD-
21May09.pdf. 
Drea, Edward J. “History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–2012.” Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, DC, 2013. 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Command_Plan.p
df. 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. “The President’s News Conference.” April 7, 1954. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10202. 
Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its 
Aftermath. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993. 
Erickson, Andrew S. and Conor M. Kennedy. “China’s Maritime Militia.” CNA 
Corporation. March 7, 2016. https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/Chinas-Maritime-
Militia.pdf. 
 142 
“Excerpts from the Tower Commission’s Report.” The American Presidency Project. 
Accessed October 2, 2017, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/PS157/assignment%20files%20public/TOWER
%20EXCERPTS.htm. 
Gerges, Fawaz. ISIS: A History. Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press, 2016. 
Feickert, Andrew. U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress 
(CRS Report No. RS21048) Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2013. 17–18. www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA587142. 
Filozof, Andrea. “Unconventional Warfare Is Not the Answer to Your Problem.” War on 
the Rocks. September 28, 2016, 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/unconventional-warfare-is-not-the-answer-to-
your-problem/. 
Fox, David. A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for 
Special Forces in the 21st Century. U.S. Army War College: Carisle Barracks, 18 
March 2005. 
Garamone, Jim. “Dunford: Command, Control Must ‘Keep Pace’ in 21st Century.” U.S. 
Department of Defense. January 4, 2016. 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/639844/dunford-command-
control-must-keep-pace-in-21st-century/. 
Gates, Robert M. “All-Volunteer Force.” Lecture, Duke University, Durham, NC, 
September 29, 2010. 
———. “Landon Lecture.” University of Kansas, November 26, 2007. https://www.k-
state.edu/media/newsreleases/landonlect/gatestext1107.html. 
Gerasimov, Valery. “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand 
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations.” 
Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kurier online. 26 February 2013. 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_
20160228_art008.pdf.  
“Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats.” Pew 
Research Center, Washington, DC, August 1, 2017. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-
change-as-leading-security-threats/. 




———. “A Withering Critique of Obama’s National Security Council.” The Atlantic 
Magazine. November 12,2014. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/a-withering-critique-
of-president-obamas-national-security-council/382477/. 
Goldsmith, Jack. “The Remarkably Open Syrian Covert Action.” Lawfare. July 23, 2013, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/remarkably-open-syrian-covert-action. 
Graff, Garrett M. “A Guide to Russia’s High Tech Tool Box for Subverting U.S. 
Democracy.” Wired. August 13, 2017. available at 
https://www.wired.com/story/a-guide-to-russias-high-tech-tool-box-for-
subverting-us-democracy/.  
Gray, Alex. “The World’s 10 Biggest Economies in 2017.’ World Economic Forum 
online. 9 March 2017. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-
economies-in-2017/. 
Green, Michael, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas. 
“Counter-Coercion Series: East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” Asia 
Maritime Transparency Initiative. 13 June 2017. https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-
east-china-sea-adiz/. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse Univ. Press, 
2004. 
Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 
3–05, Special Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012. 
Henriksen, Thomas, Eyes, Ears, and Daggers: Special Operations Forces and the 
Central Intelligence Agency in America’s Evolving Struggle against Terrorism. 
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016. 
Hoffman, Frank G. “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.” Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 52 
(1st Quarter 2009). 
———. “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats.” War on the 
Rocks. July 28, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-
political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/. 
Holmes, Kim R. “Memo to a New President: How Best to Organize the National Security 
Council.” Backgrounder. No. 3098. April 2016. 
http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/memo-new-president-how-best-organize-
the-national-security-council.  
Huntington, Samuel. The Solider and the State. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1957. 
 144 
Indyk, Martin. “U.S. Strategy Toward Iran,”(speech, Council on Foreign Relations, 
Washington D.C, 28 March 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/u-s-
strategy-toward-iran/. 
Jansen, Eric, “Summary of Mintzberg’s Five Configurations,” seminar handout for 
MN3121: Organizational Design for SOF, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA. 2015. 
Jay, John. “Federalist Paper No. 3: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and 
Influence.” For the Independent Journal. November 3, 1787. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 1. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. 
———. Joint Operations Planning. JP 5–0. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf.  
———. Special Operations. JP 3–05. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf. 
———. Unconventional Warfare. JP 3–05.1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015. 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05_01.pdf  
Joint Special Operations University. Special Operations Interagency Reference Manual. 
Tampa: JSOU, 2013. 
http://www.soc.mil/528th/PDFs/2013SOFIACTRefManual_Final.pdf. 
Jones, Seth G., James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S. Chivvis, Ben Connable, 
Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson and Nathan Chandler. Rolling Back the Islamic 
State. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html. 
Katzman, Kenneth. Iran’s Influence in Iraq (CRS Report No. RS22323) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
Kofman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky. “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid 
Warfare.’” Kennan Cable, no. 7 (April 2015). 
 “Large Military-Civilian Gap Among Young Americans.” Pew Research Center, 
Washington, DC, (February 2, 2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2012/02/02/large-military-civilian-gap-among-young-americans/. 
Lead Inspector General for Contingency Operations. “Interview With General Michael 
Nagata: Syrian Train and Equip Program and the U.S. Strategy To Counter ISIL.” 
Quarterly Report to Congress: October 1, 2015-December 31, 2015. Accessed 
November 6, 2017, https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/other-
reports/operation_inherent_resolve_12312015_0.pdf. 
 145 
Liang, Qiau and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts 
Publishing House, February 1999. 
Lowenthal, Mark. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2017. 
Lynch, Marc. The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East. New 
York: Public Affairs, 2016. 
Madden, Dan, Dick Hoffman, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John 
E. Peters, Linda Robinson, and Abby Doll. Toward Operational Art in Special 
Warfare. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research _reports/RR779.html. 
Mansour, Renad and Faleh Jabar. “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Papers. Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. April 28, 2017. 
Marquis, Susan L. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1997. 
Maxwell, David. “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” Small Wars 
Journal. October 23, 2014. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/do-we-really-
understand-unconventional-warfare. 
———. “Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations.” Small Wars Journal. October 
13, 2013. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-the-future-of-special-
operations?page=1. 
———. “Why the New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and Unconventional Warfare.” 
War on the Rocks, August 28, 2015. https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-
new-syrian-army-failed-washington-and-unconventional-warfare/. 
Mcleary, Paul. “The Pentagon Wasted $500 Million Training Syrian Rebels. It’s About to 
Try Again.” Foreign Policy. March 18, 2016, accessed October 20, 2016. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/18/pentagon-wasted-500-million-syrian-rebels. 
McChrystal, Stanley A., Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell. Team of 
Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. New York: 
Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 
McCuen, John J. “Hybrid Wars.” Military Review (March-April 2008). 
McFate, Jessica Lewis. “The ISIS Defense In Iraq And Syria: Countering an Adaptive 
Enemy.” Middle East Security Report. 
 146 
McGurk, Brett. White House Press Briefing (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of the Special 
Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Combat ISIS, August 4, 2017). 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273198.htm. 
McInnis, Kathleen J. “‘Right-Sizing’ the National Security Council Staff? CRS Insight 
No. IN10521. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10521.pdf. 
McRaven, William H. “USSOCOM Posture Statement.” House Armed Services 
Committee, March 6, 2013. 
Millis, Walter. “The Military Clauses of the Constitution.” In American Military 
Thought. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. 
Mintzberg, Henry. “Structure in Fives: A Synthesis of the Research on Organization 
Design.” Management Science, vol. 26, no. 3 (March 1980), 322–341.  
https://www.ics.uci.edu/~corps/phaseii/Mintzberg-StructureIn5s-MgmtSci.pdf. 
Modell, Scott and David Asher. “Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network.” Center 
for New American Security. September, 2013. 5–12. 
Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
5th ed. [rev. and reset], New York: Knopf, 1973. 
Morton, Katherine. “China’s ambition in the South China Sea: is a legitimate maritime 
order possible?” International Affairs, vol. 92, no. 4. July 2016. 
Nadimi, Farzin. “Iran’s Expanding Military Role in Iraq.” The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy. September 8, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/iransexpanding-military-role-in-iraq. 
National Intelligence Council. Global Trends: Paradoxes of Progress. Washington, DC: 
Director of National Intelligence, 2017. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full- Report.pdf. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. “The 9/11 
Commission Report.” Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004. 
Naylor, Sean D. Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations 
Command. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015. 
Naylor, Sean D. “The Pentagon Ups the Ante in Syria Fight.” Foreign Policy Report. 
March 30, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/the-pentagon-ups-the-ante-
in-syria-fight-iraq-islamic-state-delta-force/. 
 147 
Nelson, Randal and Mike Gallagher, “Supporting Army and Joint Special Operations,” 
Army Sustainment, May-June 2016: 12–13. 
http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/2016/MayJun16/PDF/166176.pdf. 
Nutter, John. The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy. 
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000). 
Obama, Barack H. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC: White House, 2015. 
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.  
———. “Statement by President Obama on the Situation in Syria.” August 18, 2011. The 
Obama White House Archives. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria. 
Obernier, Jennifer A. and Frank N. Sanders. “Enabling Unconventional Warfare to 
Address Grey Zone Conflict.” Small Wars Journal. September 28, 2016. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/enabling-unconventional-warfare-to-address-
grey-zone-conflicts. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Intelligence Community Directive 304.” 
Washington, DC: Office of the DNI, July 9, 2009. 
Osgood, Robert E. Limited War: The Challenge of American Strategy. Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago, 1957. 
Ostovar, Afshon. Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guards. New York: Oxford Press, 2016. 
O’Toole, George J. A. Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, 
and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA. New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1991. 
Paddock, Alfred H., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Lawrence, KS: University 
of Kansas Press, 2002. 
Perry, Tom and Naline Malla. “Nusra Front attacks Western-backed rebels in northern 
Syria.” Reuters. July 31, 2015, accessed October 20, 2017. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra/nusra-front-attacks-
western-backed-rebels-in-northern-syria-idUSKCN0Q50TL20150731. 
Powell, Alexander. “Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration.” 
Center for Naval Analyses. October 2016. 
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2016-U-014394-Final.pdf. 
Rawley, Christopher. Unconventional Warfare 2.0: A Better Path to Regime Change in 
the Twenty First Century, Periplus Media, 2014.  
 148 
Robinson, Linda. “The Future of Special Operations Forces.” The Council on Foreign 
Relations. Council Special Report no. 66 (April 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/special-operations/future-us-special-operations-forces/p30323. 
Sabet, Farzan. “Military intervention, Iranian-style.” War on the Rocks. June 30, 2014 
https://warontherocks.com/2014/06/military-intervention-iranian-style/. 
Schadlow, Nadia. “Peace and War: The Space Between.” War on the Rocks (August 
2014). 
Schake, Kori and William F. Wechsler. “Process Makes Perfect.” Center for American 
Progress. January 2017, accessed October 2, 2017, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/01/05/295673/pro
cess-makes-perfect/. 
Schools and Training Branch. “Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Organization and 
Functions,” Schools and Training Branch of OSS, June 1945. Transcribed to 
HTML by Patrick Clancy of the HyperWar Foundation. 
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USG/JCS/OSS/OSS-Functions/index.html. 
Schulz JR, Richard H. “Showstoppers.” The Standard Weekly. 26 January 2004. 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/showstoppers/article/4846#!. 
Schmitt, Michael N. and Andru E. Wall. “The International Law of Unconventional 
Statecraft.” Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 5 (2014): 349–376. 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Schmitt-Wall-International-
Law-of-Unconventional-Statecraft.pdf. 
Schwartz, Felicia. “Trump proposes cutting State Department budget by 37%.” The Wall 
Street Journal. February, 28, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-
proposes-cutting-state-department-budget-by-one-third-1488306999. 
“Secretary Gates: It was the operational micromanagement that drove me nuts.” 
television interview, 2:34, posted by Bret Baier of FOX News, October 16, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=guT5x_KKnwU. 
Senate Armed Services Committee. Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Ranger Raid on October 3–4 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia (1995). 
Shore, Zachary. Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions. 1st U.S. ed. New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2008. 
Silkman, John W. “Unconventional Warfare and Operational Art: Can We Achieve 
Continuity in Command and Control?” Master’s thesis, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, 2004. http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWEG/AY_2004-
/Silkman,%20J%202004.pdf. 
 149 
Sirin, Cigdem V. “Public Support for Military Interventions across Levels of Political 
Information and Stages of Intervention: The Case of the Iraq War.” Armed Forces 
& Society, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 2012). 
Slick, Stephen. “Measuring Change at the CIA.” Foreign Policy. May 4, 2016. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/measuring-change-at-the-cia/. 
Stein, Aaron. “Partner Operations in Syria: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward.” The 
Atlantic Council. (July 2017). http://www.apcml.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Partner_Operations_in_Syria_10-Jul-2017.pdf. 
Terrill, Andrew W. “Iranian Involvement in Yemen.” Orbis, vol. 58, no. 3 (2014). 
“The changing face of Congress in 5 charts,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, 
(February 2, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/02/the-
changing-face-of-congress-in-5-charts/. 
The White House. National Security Decision Directive Number 2: National Security 
Council Structure. Washington, DC: The White House, 1982. 
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD
2.pdf.  
Thielenhaus, Christopher, Pat Traeger, and Eric Roles. “Reaching Forward in the War 
against the Islamic State.” Prism, vol. 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2016). 
Thomas, Raymond A. USSOCOM Posture Statement.” 115th Cong. 1 (2017), 
http://www.socom.mil/Pages/posture-statement-hasc.aspx. 
Townsend, Ashley. “The strategic significance of China’s Woody Island power play.” 
The National Interest. 1 March 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-
strategic-significance-chinas-woody-island-power-play-15363. 
Trevithick, Joseph. “The Pentagon’s War Effort in Syria Spans Five Countries.” War is 
Boring. August 18, 2016, accessed November 6, 2017, https://medium.com/war-
is-boring/the-pentagons-war-effort-in-syria-spans-five-countries-23c76dfa8407. 
Trump, Donald J. “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and 
South Asia.” August 21, 2017. The White House. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-president-
trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia. 
Twentieth Century Fund. The Need to Know: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy. New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund Press, 1992. 
 150 
U.N. Department of Public Information. “The Responsibility to Protect,” Background 
Note, March 2012. 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/bgresponsibility. 
United States Army Special Operations Command. “White Paper: SOF Support to 
Political Warfare.” U.S. Army Special Operations Command. March 10, 2015. 
———. “USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Narrative and Setting the Course 
to 2035.” USASOC, 2017. 
———. “ARSOF Operating Concept 2022.” USASOC, September 26, 2014. 
http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%202
014.pdf. 
United States Department of the Army. Mission Command. Army Doctrine and 
Reference Publication 6–0. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 
17, 2012. 
United States Government. “United States Government (USG) Support to Resistance 
Framework” (unpublished draft 0.33, January 11, 2017). 1–60. 
United States Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations. 
Joint Publication (JP) 3–05. (16 July 2014). 
United States Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unconventional 
Warfare. Joint Publication (JP) 3–05.1. (September 15, 2015). 
United States Senate. Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy Commander, 
United States Special Operations Command before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the Posture of Special Operations Forces, March 4, 2008. 11. 
http://ogc.osd.mil/olc/docs/testOlson080304.pdf. 
United States Special Operations Command. “‘Little Green Men’: A Primer on Modern 
Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine, 2013- 2014.” Assessing 
Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies. (Fort Bragg: USASOC, 2015). 
United States Special Operations Command. “SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the 
Spear.” Tampa: USSOCOM, May 2013 
Van Herpen, Marcel H. Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism. London: 
Rowman, 2014. 
Votel, Joseph L., Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin. 
“Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone.” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 80 (1st 
Quarter 2016). 
 151 
Wall, Andru E. “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military 
Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard Law School 
National Security Journal, vol. 3, no. 1 (2011). 
Walton, Timothy A. “China’s Three Warfares.” Delex Special Report. 18 January 2012, 
4. 
———. “Treble Spyglass, Treble Spear: China’s ‘Three Warfares.’” Defense Concepts. 
vol 4, ed. 4. (2009). 
Ward, Steven R. “The continuing evolution of Iran’s military doctrine,” The Middle East 
Journal, vol. 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2005). 
Warsaw Summit Communiqué. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. July 9, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
Washington, George. “Farewell Address.” American Daily Advertiser. Washington, DC. 
September 9, 1796. 
Wastnidge, Edward. “Iran and Syria: An Enduring Axis.” Middle East Policy, vol. 24, no. 
2 (2017). 
Weed, Matthew C. A New Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the 
Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals. CRS Report No. R43760. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=799051. 
Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. The National Security 
Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 153 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
